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Abstract  
 
How has the practice of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) created 
a distinctive regional law of non-intervention, and how has general international law 
influenced the content of that regional law? Answering this question is the aim of this 
study. The core proposition is that a distinctive regional law of non-intervention is 
made by ASEAN, which is made possible by general international law, but this 
influence of general international law can also constrain the scope of regional law.  
This core proposition is advanced as follows. First, the study demonstrates how an 
international organisation (such as ASEAN) can make regional law based on the 
general rules of international law, particularly in relation to an international 
organisation’s separate legal personality. Second, it examines regional law-making, 
with particular reference to non-intervention’s content, which is facilitated by United 
Nation’s organs: non-intervention’s content is variable because it requires making 
choices, which are made by reference to the general rules of international law. Third, 
the core proposition is supported by a case study that analyses how ASEAN (organs) 
used the general rules of international law (especially in relation to separate legal 
personality) to create a distinctive regional law of non-intervention, during the long 
Kampuchean conflict (1978-1990). Fourth, the core proposition is advanced through 
another case study of ASEAN practice regarding Myanmar: it highlights diminutions 
in non-intervention’s content, in Articles 2 and 10 of the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation (1976) when evaluated against emerging rules general international law, 
such as the International Law Commission’s work on protecting persons during 
disasters. Fifth, in conclusion, this study explains the implications of its core 
proposition. Prospectively, regional law would still be distinctively made by ASEAN, 
but on a narrower basis. This is because of geopolitical changes within Southeast 
Asia, between the United States and China. Consequently, it is foreseeable that some 
ASEAN member States might not identify themselves as belonging to Southeast Asia 
anymore.  
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What’s in a name? That which we call a rose by any other name would smell as sweet. Some 
names like “rose”, acknowledge what exists. Others, like “unicorn”, create what otherwise 
would not exist. In between lies names that simultaneously describe and invent reality. 
“Southeast Asia” is one of these.1  
 
In brief, because of Orientalism the Orient was not (and is not) a free subject of thought or 
action.2 
 
The Judgment seeks to rehabilitate the history of peoples and nations by constructing its 
edifice on the axiomatic bases of international law…3 
 
 
  
                                                            
1
 Donald K Emerson, ““Southeast Asia”: What’s in a Name?” (1984) 15 Journal of Southeast Asian 
Studies 1 (No. 1) at 1.  
2
 Edward Said, Orientalism (USA: Vintage Books, 1994) at 3.  
3
 Declaration by Judge Ranjeva, Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and 
South Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore) (Judgment) [2008] ICJ Rep 12 at para 4 at 103. 
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Chapter One 
A STUDY OF NON-INTERVENTION WITH ASEAN CHARACTER    
I. Introduction  
1) A Contribution to the Field 
How has the practice of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) created 
a distinctive regional law of non-intervention, and how has general international law 
influenced the development and content of that regional law? Answering this question 
is the aim of this study.  
The contribution of this study is its focus on the acts of ASEAN as an international 
organisation that I shall call “acts with an ASEAN character”, as opposed to the acts 
of ASEAN states individually, a point to which I return below.  These acts with an 
ASEAN character make a regional (international) law of non-intervention, which is 
distinctive, because this study focuses on non-intervention’s legal content as created 
by ASEAN, a separate legal person. In the extant literature regarding non-
intervention, there is no distinction between acts with an ASEAN character, and acts 
of individual ASEAN States (i.e., who are not acting within the auspices of ASEAN).   
However, the content of a regional law of non-intervention also develops and changes 
under the influence of general international law.  In this respect, powerful external 
actors, especially the United States and China, shape the rules of general 
international law, which is in dynamic tension with the making of a distinctive regional 
law. Put differently, it is possible to ascertain a distinctive regional law of non-
intervention (which applies to the region of Southeast Asia) precisely because general 
international law provides an analytical framework for the discernment of such rules. 
Therefore, while general international law makes a distinctive regional law possible, 
it can also constrain the scope of regional law. To this extent, then, the core 
proposition of this study is that the regional law of non-intervention is influenced by 
the rules of general international law.  
The following chapters will progressively establish this core proposition. This chapter, 
however, starts with the problems of the extant literature regarding non-intervention. 
First, we start with a discussion of the various meanings regarding non-intervention. 
Second, we consider the specific ways in which the term non-intervention had been 
used with respect to ASEAN: the literature here is principally studied from an 
International Relations perspective. 
13 
 
One main problem, it is argued, with the International Relations literature (IR 
literature) is that the many studies regarding non-intervention are not studies of acts 
by ASEAN, an international organisation with separate legal personality. Rather these 
have been studies of disparate acts of individual states acting in their separate 
capacities. The extensive IR literature has been uncritically assimilated in legal 
studies of non-intervention, and the implications of tis approach are discussed.  
2) The Scope of Non-Intervention at General International Law   
To appreciate the extent in which the legal literature had assimilated the weight and 
relevance of the IR literature’s contribution with respect to non-intervention, it is useful 
to outline, as a basis for comparison with the IR literature, the scope of non-
intervention at general international law. To this extent, it would appear that the vague 
nature of non-intervention’s scope is difficult to define at general international law.1 
Therefore, this difficulty in defining non-intervention’s scope at general international 
law, because of its vagueness, contributed to the assimilation of the IR literature’s 
account of non-intervention concerning ASEAN.  
 
However, a starting point is Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, which provides that: 
“nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state 
or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present 
Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures 
under Chapter Vll.” The term “essentially within the domestic jurisdiction” has become 
associated with non-intervention in the sense that intervention by a State or 
international organisation in the “internal affairs” of another sovereign State 
encroaches upon matters which belong to its sovereign exercise of competence. This 
statement acknowledges that the prescriptive, legislative, and adjudicatory 
jurisdictions of a State are potentially engaged (subject to the limits imposed by 
general international law).2  
 
However, the term “domestic jurisdiction” in the context of non-intervention is different 
from the concept of “jurisdiction” at general international law. At general international 
law, “jurisdiction” concerns what falls within the authority of one state rather than 
another state (although sometimes authority is given to more than one state). On the 
other hand, “domestic jurisdiction” in Article 2(7), UN Charter, concern issues which 
                                                            
1
 See further discussion of vagueness in Chapter Three, Section I.  
2
 Generally see Alex Mills, “Rethinking Jurisdiction in International Law”, (2014) 84 BYIL 187.  
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fall within the authority of a state as opposed to being a matter of international 
concern. Furthermore, Article 2(7), UN Charter, strictly relates to the limits of the UN’s 
competence to intervene in the affairs of a state, and not the limits on the powers of 
states to intervene in each other. In contrast, the Friendly Relations Declaration 
(1970) contains provisions which involve both forms of non-intervention (i.e., 
intervention by the UN and between States, respectively).3 
 
Arguably, therefore, the reference to “domestic jurisdiction” in Article 2(7), UN 
Charter, is a vertical division of authority, but “jurisdiction” at general international law 
is horizontal. It is agains this brief survey of the various uses of jurisdiction that non-
intervention which prohibits interventions in the “internal affairs” of a sovereign State, 
as it is used in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), and interventions which 
are “essentially within the domestic jurisdiction” of a sovereign State are used 
interchangeably.  
 
Both expressions (i.e., “internal affairs and domestic jurisdiction”) are not legal terms 
of art, especially if we consider the background against which the term “domestic 
jurisdiction” arose in Article 15(8) of the League of Nations Covenant (1920).4 If 
parties under the Covenant failed to resolve their disputes through diplomatic 
negotiations, there was recourse to arbitration or judicial process under Articles 12-
13. In lieu of all three avenues of pacific settlement of disputes, Article 15(8) finally 
allowed the League of Nations Council to recommend a settlement if all its members 
(without the involvement of the disputing parties) voted unanimously in favour. 
Importantly, however, Article 15(8) required the Council to decline to make a 
recommendation of a settlement if the dispute involved a State’s “domestic 
jurisdiction”. Effectively, therefore, Article 15(8) preserved a State’s right of war under 
the League of Nations Covenant.  
 
One example, however, of content excluded from Article 15(8) concerns a sovereign 
State’s jurisdiction, regulation and treatment of its nationals on another State’s 
territory. In the Nationality Decrees case (1923),5 the PCIJ held that the dispute 
between France and the UK over the treatment of French nationals in Tunis-Morocco 
did not fall under matters essentially under France’s “domestic jurisdiction”. The 
                                                            
3
 See further my discussion of the Friendly Relations Declaration in Chapter Three, Section V.  
4
 League of Nations, OJ Special Supplement 3 (1920).  
5
 Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco (French Zone) (1923) PCIJ Series B No 4 (7th 
February 1923).  
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reason is because France had reduced her discretion regarding the protectorates of 
Tunis-Morocoo by entering into international engagements with the UK, which the 
latter was legally entitled to invoke. The PCIJ stated that the question of what 
constituted a matter which was within the domestic jurisdiction of a State is an 
“essentially relative question”, which depends on the “development of international 
relations”. This is an important point because the scope of a State’s domestic 
jurisdiction, which is protected by non-intervention, and its scope is subject to the 
developments at general international law. 
 
Another point related to the scope of non-intervention is the vagueness of its content 
in descriptive and evaluative terms. Put simply, the content of a State’s internal affairs 
(or domestic jurisdiction) is drafted in a descriptively or evaluatively vague manner, 
which must be interpreted in relation to the general rules of international law, which 
engage the legal problem at a given point in time. I illustrate these considerations in 
the area of Myanmar’s discretion to act during Cyclone Nargis in Chapter Five. For 
now, it is useful simply to bear in mind the scope of non-intervention, as a matter of 
general international law, before we consider, by comparison, the IR literature’s 
account of non-intervention in terms of its relation to the ASEAN Way, a diplomatic 
practice.  
 
Returning again to Article 2(7), UN Charter, the purpose of this provision concerns 
the Security Council’s authority under Chapter VII in the pacific settlement of disputes. 
The term “essentially within the domestic jurisdiction” recognises the exception being 
accorded to a State’s sovereignty although the Security Council is able to determine 
the existence of a threat to international peace and security. Article 2(7) of the UN 
Charter, therefore, is designed to strike a difficult balance between the Security 
Council’s legal authority to take enforcement measures under Chapter VII against 
prohibitions by the Security Council to recommend measures which fall within the 
“domestic jurisdiction” of that State. 
 
Of course, the content of what constitutes matters which are “essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction” of that State to trigger the prohibitions against the Security 
Council are not defined. Indeed, as the UN developed, the Security Council’s Chapter 
VII powers have curtailed the “domestic jurisdiction” of a State, as attested to, for 
example, in the Council’s determination that Libya’s actions concerning the 
destruction of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, on 21 December 1988, were a threat 
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to international peace,6 and that Libyan nationals should be extradited under UN 
Security Council Resolution 731.7 Libya’s argument was that it had already complied 
with the Montreal Convention by electing to try its own nationals in lieu of extradition. 
In short, the Security Council had limited the domestic jurisdiction of Libya to decide 
on the best cause of action in accordance with the Montreal Convention.   
 
3) Meaning of Non-Intervention and Method of this Study  
Having explained the scope of non-intervention at general international law, this part 
further explains the various uses of the term “non-intervention”. Because the term has 
not been used consistently, the IR literature also studied non-intervention in a 
particular way, mainly from the perspective of acts by ASEAN States. This 
explanation matters because it clarifies the point that the (legal) rule of non-
intervention can also be applied when assessing the action of one ASEAN state 
against each other. But these are not acts with an ASEAN character. Acts with an 
ASEAN character are relevant to the formation of regional rules of non-intervention, 
which are carried out through ASEAN organs.  
The importance of this distinction (between acts by ASEAN States and acts with an 
ASEAN character) to advance a distinctive regional law of non-intervention are 
discussed further below.  For now, it is enough to note that the IR literature’s lack of 
clarity in making this distinction complicates the legal effort in ascertaining the scope 
of non-intervention’s meaning, which it is now necessary to discuss.  
Non-intervention is not a legal term of art. At general international law,8 non-
intervention is a “rule”, “principle”,9 “norm”, or even all of them in the same sentence: 
“for governments, scholars and international organs alike, the “rule” against 
interference in internal politics seems to be an article of faith; but despite the 
                                                            
6
 S/Res/748 (31 March 1992). 
7
 S/Res/731 (21 January 1992).  
8
 There is no conclusive definition of “general international law”: in this study, I broadly define the word 
“general” in “general international law” as legal rules on the international plane, which include (but are 
not limited to) treaties, custom, and principles, which can be determined by reference to legality. In 
“Conclusions of the Work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties 
Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law” (2006) ILC Yearbook Vol II Part 2 
footnote 976 at 179 (“Fragmentation Conclusions”), the International Law Commission (ILC) concluded 
that, particularly for its work on fragmentation, general international law can be defined in relation to its 
“logical counterpart”, special law (i.e., lex specialis as a technique of interpretation and conflict 
resolution), a distinction that “lawyers are usually able to operate…by reference to the context in which 
it appears”.  
9
 In the Nicaragua case, the International Court of Justice began its substantive analysis of non-
intervention this way: Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United 
States of America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14 (“Nicaragua”), para 202 at 106. 
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frequency of its incantation in international discourse, how the norm applies to non-
forcible conduct is inadequately understood”.10 
On other occasions, it is called the principle of non-interference, as the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) in Nicaragua refer to: “The principle of non-intervention involves 
the right of every sovereign State to conduct its affairs without outside interference”.11 
Therefore, the legal literature suggests that non-intervention and non-interference 
seem to be used interchangeably, with the possibility that non-interference is a 
broader prohibition than non-intervention.12 As one commentator states: “This policy 
of ‘‘non-interference’’ was turned into a legal principle when ASEAN states adopted 
the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia in 1976. The difference in 
terminology adopted - ‘‘non-interference’’, rather than ‘‘non-intervention’’ - appears 
significant…it is arguable that the principle of “non-interference” adopted by ASEAN 
is distinguishable from the principle of “non-intervention”, even prohibiting otherwise 
lawful forms of interference that would not constitute an “intervention”. Even though 
this principle of non-interference does not apply outside ASEAN, other Asian states 
have traditionally abided by ASEAN’s principle of non-interference in dealing with any 
ASEAN Member States”.13  
Nevertheless, however non-intervention’s status (or non-interference’s status) is 
characterised,14 a key point in this study is that a regional law of non-intervention 
could still be created by ASEAN practice. In other words, because non-intervention’s 
                                                            
10
 Lori Damrosch, “Politics Across Borders: Non Intervention and Non Forcible Influence Over Domestic 
Affairs” (1989) 83 AJIL 1.  
11
 Nicaragua, para 202 at 106 (n9).  
12
 Maziar Jamnejad & Michael Wood, “The Principle of Non-intervention” (2009) 22 Leiden Journal of 
International Law 345 at 347; Sean Watts, “Low-Intensity Cyber Operations and the Principle of Non-
Intervention” in Cyber War: Law and Ethics for Virtual Conflicts (Jens David Ohlin, Kevin Govern, and 
Claire Finkelstein, eds) (Oxford: OUP, 2015) 240 at 255.  
13
 Hitoshi Nasu, “Revisiting the Principle of Non-Intervention: A Structural Principle of International Law 
or a Political Obstacle to Regional Security in Asia?” (2013) 1 Asian Journal of International Law 25 
(“Nasu”) at 36.  
14
 Furthermore, this study does not examine if non-intervention by ASEAN is lex specialis. Broadly, “lex 
specialis” means that when “two or more norms deal with the same subject matter, priority should be 
given to the the norm that is more specific”: see Fragmentation Conclusions, para 5 at 178 (n8). In ILC, 
“Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of 
International Law (Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission)” (13 April 2006) UN 
Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (“Fragmentation Report”), paras 111-112 at 60-61, the ILC also added that a rule can 
be special or general in relation to a subject matter (non-intervention, for example), or with regard to the 
actors of the subject matter whose actions are regulated by the special or general rule (Fragmentation 
Report, p 669). Therefore, it is immaterial to this study’s research question whether non-intervention is 
lex specialis, simply because the special law’s content must be concrete (enough), before difficult 
distinctions can be drawn between general and special law. Finally, see Fragmentation Conclusions, 
para 4 at 178 (n8): lex specialis does not extinguish general international law. Indeed, the established 
principle of harmonisation applies to interpret potentially conflicting norms, on a specific issue, into a 
single set of compatible obligations. On doubts concerning lex specialis, generally see Marko Milanovic, 
Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties: Law, Principles, and Policy (Oxford: OUP, 2013) 
(“Milanovic”) at 249-261 and Anja Lindroos, “Addressing Norm Conflicts in a Fragmented Legal System: 
The Doctrine of Lex Specialis” (2005) 74 Nordic Journal of International Law 27.  
18 
 
content is a moving target, which is determined against extant rules at general 
international law, the ASEAN practice regarding non-intervention arguably reflects 
regional custom or arguably affects the interpretation of ASEAN’s treaty obligations. 
With respect to ASEAN, then, this study’s core proposition is that ASEAN can create 
a distinctive regional law of non-intervention. However, it is harder for ASEAN to 
sustain this distinctive regional content of non-intervention because it is influenced by 
and subject to general international law. On these grounds and for brevity, therefore, 
I simply use the expression “non-intervention” throughout this study.  
Non-intervention is also a placeholder, i.e., a concept which is used to describe and 
evaluate different aspects of ASEAN.15 Most commonly, non-intervention is 
understood as an ingredient of the “ASEAN Way”.16 The “ASEAN Way” is an 
ingrained diplomatic practice which emphasises a particular form of elite interaction 
between politicians of ASEAN member States, in which interventions in other member 
States’ internal affairs are apparently taboo.17 In short, non-intervention is used as a 
starting point to study the frequent exceptions to this diplomatic practice.  
To date, the IR literature on non-intervention concentrates on studying how much of 
non-intervention’s content remains at general international law (if anything), and its 
implications (if any) to the “ASEAN Way” or ASEAN in general.18 Despite this 
canonical treatment of non-intervention in the IR literature, these are not legal 
assessments of non-intervention with an ASEAN character. By “character”, I mean 
the invocation of and application by ASEAN on non-intervention, acting as an 
international organisation, with a separate legal personality distinct from its member 
States.19 Hence an ASEAN “character” in this study refers to a regional law of non-
intervention, whose content is assessed against the rules of general international 
law.20  
In contrast, the IR literature usefully illustrates various aspects of non-intervention, as 
practised by different States in Southeast Asia, acting in their sovereign capacities as 
independent States.21 Though these States are also members of ASEAN, their 
                                                            
15
 See Chapter One, Sections II and III.   
16
 See Chapter One, Section III.  
17
 Generally Hiro Katsumata, ‘‘Reconstruction of Diplomatic Norms in Southeast Asia: The Case for Strict 
Adherence to the ‘ASEAN Way’ ’’ (2003) 25 Contemporary Southeast Asia 104.  
18
 See Sections II to V.  
19
 I.e., the objective legal personality of an international organisation is inferred from its powers and 
purposes: Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion) [1949] 
ICJ Rep 174 at 178-180. For discussion, see Chapter II, Section III.    
20
 See above, n8.  
21
 Chapter One, Sections II to V. 
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actions which implicate non-intervention are not conducted under ASEAN’s auspices 
or through its organs.  I refer to these situations as acts by ASEAN States, referring 
to States which are acting in their individual, sovereign capacities.  
On the other hand, what I term acts of ASEAN member States, through their 
representatives acting within ASEAN organs, are legally distinct. Such acts involve 
the exercise of ASEAN’s separate personality, through ASEAN. Such actions might 
be said to have an ASEAN character.  
Accordingly, this study offers a fresh perspective on the law of non-intervention with 
a focus on its ASEAN character. The focus is on ASEAN’s practice of non-
intervention, and not that of ASEAN States. This study examines how ASEAN, an 
international organisation, applies the basic constructs of general international law, 
i.e., separate legal personality and the sources of international law.22 It evaluates how 
ASEAN practice, through its organs, on non-intervention is legally distinct as regional 
law, and the extent in which general international law influences this distinct regional 
law.     
Today “Southeast Asia” is a geographically recognised region.23 However, it is not 
merely the fact of geographical contiguity that makes “Southeast Asia” a region.24 
Because the people who live inside this area, i.e., the “locals”, had no reason to see 
themselves as being related, in any way, during a long period of colonial rule, it was 
the “outsiders” who legally identified and defined a region on behalf of the “locals”.25  
Therefore, I argue, regional integration did not begin when the ASEAN Charter came 
into force in 2008.26 It did not even start when ASEAN was founded in 1967.27 It 
sprang into life before that, during the Second World War, when outsiders invented 
“Southeast Asia” as a name for exigent and not disinterested reasons.28 The 
expression “Southeast Asia” is an external invention, an area which is made “real” 
through rules of general international law.  
                                                            
22See James Crawford and Martti Koskenniemi, The Cambridge Companion to International Law 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2012) (“Crawford and Koskenniemi”) at 14.  
23
 Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (adopted 20 November 2007, entered into force 
15 December 2008) 2624 UNTS 223 (“ASEAN Charter”), Article 6(2).  
24
 For discussion, see Chapter Two, Section V.   
25
 Wang Gungwu, “Two Perspectives of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore and China” in Locating 
Southeast Asia: Geographies of Knowledge and Politics of Space (Paul Kratoska, Remco Raben & Henk 
Schulte Nordholt, eds) (Singapore: NUS Press, 2006) 60 at 61.  
26
 See Chapter Two, Section V.  
27
 Declaration constituting an agreement establishing the Association of South-East Asian Nations 
(signed 8 August 1967) 1331 UNTS 235 (“Bangkok Declaration”). 
28
 For discussion, see Chapter Two, Section V.   
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For two reasons, this focus on the ASEAN character of non-intervention matters. First, 
there is still no extensive legal study on non-intervention in ASEAN practice. Indeed, 
as I explain below,29 there are signs that the international legal scholarship on point 
has been distorted by assimilating the IR literature.30 A focus on the ASEAN character 
of non-intervention, based on the general rules of international law, will offer new 
perspectives on how non-intervention’s content is made, as regional law, through 
ASEAN.  
The real extent of non-intervention’s content with an ASEAN character is far more 
limited, it will be shown, than in the IR literature’s account. Significantly, viewed 
through the lens of an international organisation’s separate legal personality, a focus 
on the ASEAN character of non-intervention will reshape our understanding of 
regional law-making in Southeast Asia. The regional law of non-intervention is 
intertwined with general international law. This relationship raises problems for the 
prospects of a distinct regional law developing and enduring at international law.31 
Second, this study is a timely foil to the recent growth in “regional” international legal 
scholarship,32 which seeks to create indigenous knowledge33 on ASEAN. However, 
as the “local” scholars in Southeast Asian studies have long learnt,34 our means of 
understanding and explaining knowledge production are not fully “local”.35 Any 
difference of attitudes regarding this particular form of knowledge production must be 
transformed, as a mental exercise, when local scholars write about the present.36 
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 See Chapter One, Section V.  
30
 See Chapter One, Section V for the literature cited therein. 
31
 See Conclusions in Chapter Six.  
32
 A prominent and sustained effort is arguably conducted by the Centre for International Law (CIL) in 
Singapore, which was only established in 2009. Its scholarly output on ASEAN is prodigious and it is no 
longer practical to list its output here. At this writing, discrete monographs under the series, “Integration 
through Law: The Role of Law and the Rule of Law in ASEAN Integration” are being published by 
Cambridge University Press (CUP).  
33
 The mission statement for its Integration Through Law project says it will “put in place the building 
blocks for an authentic body of ASEAN and Asian integration theory developed in and with a sensitivity 
to the particularities and peculiarities of the Region and Continent”: available at 
<https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/Mission-Statement-CIL-ASEAN-Integration-
through-Law-Project-12-Oct-2009.pdf> at 4 (emphasis supplied)(accessed 1 May 2018).    
34
 Generally Thum Pingtjin, “Southeast Asian Studies as a Form of Power” (2012) 62 The Newsletter  
(International Institute for Asian Studies) (Winter) 12; Ariel Heryanto, “Can There Be Southeast Asians 
in Southeast Asian Studies?” (2002) 5 Moussons 3.  
35
 For an example, see the language in Malaysia’s reliance on Grotius’s account of the Johor Sultanate 
to support its historical claim to the Pedra Branca in Counter-Memorial of Malaysia, Case Concerning 
Sovereignty Over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (25 January 2005), 
para 29 at 18: “At time of the Dutch capture of the Portuguese vessel Catarina in 1604 on the shore of 
Johor, Hugo Grotius identified Johor as a Sultanate which ‘for long had been considered a sovereign 
principality’."  
36
 For instance, the CIL project seeks to develop a “prolegomena” for an Asian theory of Integration that, 
whilst informed by, is not just a crude cut-and-paste of, the experience of other regions, see 
<https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/2.2-Project-Design_Mission-Statement.pdf/> at 6-
7(accessed 1 May 2018). For a famous prolegomena of international law, see Hugo Grotius, The Rights 
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Through a Third World Approach to International Law (TWAIL), an approach which I 
shortly explain, this study shows how “regional” knowledge production on ASEAN’s 
legal efforts at regional integration is always evaluated against general international 
law.37 These are “universal” standards,38 although they remain largely European and 
Western standards of international law.39 As an example, consider this striking 
statement by Cremona et al which appears to contribute to indigenous legal 
scholarship: “If one of the purposes of ASEAN external action is to promote its identity, 
then that identity is defined and shaped by these principles as well as by the ASEAN 
acquis” (original emphasis).40   
 
The word “acquis” (acquis communautaire for “Community patrimony”) has long been 
linked to the European Union’s integration.41 Cremona et al do not explain, in their 
well-meaning effort, why the word “acquis” is meaningful to ASEAN’s experience: it 
bears recalling that their monograph belongs to a series which purports to avoid a 
“crude cut-and-paste” of another region’s experiences, with sensitivity for “Asian 
particularities” and “cultural identities”.42 
 
The “local” scholars, therefore, will find it hard to escape from the universal standards, 
in legal and non-legal knowledge production, when they write about the present and 
future of ASEAN. In this respect, observe the universal and common grounds in the 
2015 joint statement between the ASEAN Summit and the United States:  
 
We recognise that our relationship is grounded in shared principles, including the principles and 
purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and the ASEAN Charter. We are committed to a rules-
based approach in Asia, respect for international law and the peaceful resolution of disputes. Our 
partnership is committed to strengthening democracy, enhancing good governance and the rule of law, 
                                                            
of War and Peace (Vol 3, Book III) (Richard Tuck and Jean Barbeyrac eds, 2005 edn) (USA: Liberty 
Fund, 2005) at 1741. 
37
 See the General Editors’ preface in the ASEAN Integration through Law series, for example, in 
Jacques Pelkmans’s The ASEAN Economic Community: A Conceptual Approach (Cambridge: CUP, 
2016) at xiii: “…the project is sensitive to ‘non-Law’. It variously attempts to locate the appropriate 
province of the law in this experience. That is, not only the role of law, but also the areas that are and 
should remain outside the reach of legal institutionalization with due sensitivity to ASEAN and Asian 
particularism and political and cultural identities” (emphasis supplied). This point is broadly repeated in 
the CIL’s mission statement, at 2 (n33).  
38
 The CIL’s mission statement, at 2 and 9 (n33), accepts this: “ASEAN Member States therefore 
envisage that rules of law and the Rule of Law will become a major feature in the future of ASEAN.” Its 
output will “examine the mechanisms proposed and available for ensuring implementation and 
compliance – with or without a dispute – the sharp edge of the rule of law”. The scholarship will advance 
“understanding of the potential and constraints to the role of law and the rule of law and the relationship 
between ASEAN law and the domestic law of its Member States” (emphasis supplied).  
39
 See discussion in Chapter Three, Section III on the influence of Emmer de Vattel and Lassa 
Oppenheim on non-intervention’s “historical origins”.  
40
 Marise Cremona, David Kleimann, Joris Larik, Rena Lee & Pascal Vennesson, ASEAN’s External 
Agreements: Law, Practice and the Quest for Collective Action) (Cambridge: CUP, 2015) at 50.  
41
 Generally Carlo Curti Gialdino, “Some Reflections on the Acquis Communautaire” (1995) 32 Common 
Market Law Review 1089. 
42
 See above, n33.  
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promoting and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, encouraging the promotion of 
tolerance and moderation, and protecting the environment.43 
 
Against this background, therefore, this study adopts a TWAIL-influenced 
perspective.44 A decentralised movement, TWAIL embodies a range of styles.45 It is 
not a method or a theory.46 One does not choose, but falls into TWAIL.47 Self-
awareness is a unifying interest of TWAIL, which is reflected in its concerns with the 
systemic bias, structural issues, and assimilation of international law.48  
In some ways, this study is a confessional experience of trying to understand and 
explain my relationship with the discipline of international law. While researching the 
history of non-intervention in legal terms, the initial aim was functional. It was 
necessary to give an overview of its origins, before moving to the content. However, 
I quickly learnt that reading about non-intervention’s history is to participate, as an 
international lawyer, in shaping the history of non-intervention in Southeast Asia.49  
Accordingly, TWAIL permits some space to interrogate and understand the influence 
of general international law on the regional law of non-intervention with an ASEAN 
character. For these reasons, this study’s examination of the ASEAN primary 
materials in the case studies are slightly different from a legal adviser’s role in 
examining primary materials with a view to rendering legal advice. Some of these 
ASEAN primary materials, especially the early materials regarding the Kampuchean 
conflict (1978-1990), were not drafted by lawyers. 
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 Joint Statement on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations-United States Strategic Partnership 
(25 November 2015) between the United States Government and ASEAN Summit (i.e., Heads of 
State/Government of ASEAN member States) (emphasis supplied), available at 
<https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/21/joint-statement-asean-us-strategic-
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 Antony Anghie, “TWAIL: Past and Future” (2008) 10 International Community Law Review 479 at 480: 
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 Generally see Anghie, ibid at 480; Sébastien Jodoin and Katherine Lofts, “What's Critical about Critical 
International Law? Reflections on the Emancipatory Potential of International Legal Scholarship” in 
Critical International Law: Postrealism, Postcolonialism, and Transnationalism (Prabhakar Singh and 
Benoît Mayer, eds) (Oxford: OUP, 2014) at 326. 
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 Steven Ratner and Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Appraising the Methods of International Law: A Prospectus 
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 Michael Fakhri, “Introduction - Questioning TWAIL’s Agenda” (2012) 14 Oregon Review of 
International Law 1 at 12. 
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 Generally Karin Mickelson, “Taking Stock of TWAIL Histories” (2008) 10 International Community Law 
Review 355; M. Sornarajah, “Power and Justice: Third World Resistance in International Law” (2006) 10 
Singapore Yearbook of International Law 19; Antony Anghie and B.S. Chimni, “Third World Approaches 
to International Law and Individual Responsibility in Internal Conflicts” (2003) 2 Chinese Journal of 
International Law 77.  
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 On this point, generally see Philip Allott, “Language, Method and the Nature of International Law” 
(1971) 45 BYIL 79 at 119: “the reader is not merely an audience: he is an active participant in the process 
of finding the law.” 
23 
 
In reading the text of an ASEAN primary material, therefore, there is perhaps even 
more of what Daniel Bethlehem has described as the “invisible” conduct of deciding 
the law’s content, which a foreign legal adviser will normally face in legal practice.50 
It will be evident from the case studies below that “invisible” conduct does shape the 
final text of an ASEAN primary material. By “invisible”, then, I am referring to the 
“invisible conduct” of political decisions which were not made public but likely 
culminated in the text of (for example) an ASEAN treaty or ASEAN communiqué.  
In other words, it is not helpful to focus exclusively on the plain meaning of the written 
text of an ASEAN primary material. This is because my study is not a written 
submission for trial and it is not prepared as a legal opinion for advisory purposes.51 
To adapt Marko Milanovic’s remarks for this context,52 this study is an academic 
examination which can be more candid in suggesting that the influence of general 
international law on the regional content of non-intervention with an ASEAN character 
is inevitable.     
II. The IR Literature’s Emphasis on Non-Intervention as an Aspect of the 
“ASEAN Way” 
  
This section shows how the study of non-intervention in the IR literature does not 
address acts with an ASEAN character. This matters because there is little basis in 
the IR literature on which to determine, as a matter of law, the content of any 
distinctive regional law of non-intervention as created by ASEAN.  
 
ASEAN was established on 8 August 1967.53 The founding member States are 
Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. The turbulent nature of 
bilateral relations between these founding member States has been widely 
discussed.54 ASEAN is not the first indigenous effort but it is still the most successful 
effort at creating an international organisation in Southeast Asia.55 Its membership 
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 Generally see Daniel Bethlehem, “The Secret Life of International Law” (2012) 1 Cambridge JICL 
(Issue 1) 23.  
51
 For a different context, see Milanovic at 264 (n14).  
52
 Ibid: “It is not the purpose of this study to try to reconcile the conflicting strands of jurisprudence, 
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 See Bangkok Declaration (n27).    
54
 Generally see Chan Heng Chee, “Southeast Asia 1976: The Handling of Contradictions” (1977) 4 
Southeast Asian Affairs 3 at 3; Michael Leifer, “Sources of Regional Conflict” and “Southeast Asia” in 
Michael Leifer: Selected Works on Southeast Asia (Chin Kin Wah & Leo Suryadinata eds) (Singapore: 
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 For discussion of earlier attempts, see Chapter Two, Section VI.   
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grew after Brunei was admitted on 7 January 1984.56 Despite a decade of diplomatic 
antagonisms against ASEAN States, Vietnam became a member on 28 July 1995.57 
Laos and Myanmar became ASEAN Member States on 23 July 1997. Cambodia was 
the last to be admitted on 30 April 1999.58 The ASEAN Charter, the organisation’s 
constituent instrument in treaty form, entered into force on 15 December 2008.59  
 
Against this background, the IR literature studies non-intervention as a “political norm” 
which evolves within this larger group of member States.60 As a political norm, non-
intervention is explicitly linked to the “ASEAN Way”.61 This body of knowledge 
production on non-intervention, which is related to ASEAN,62 must be treated with 
care because it barely contains legal rules, from which to draw legal conclusions.  
Crucially, the IR literature has not addressed non-intervention with an ASEAN 
character. As I explain in the case studies, non-intervention has developed regionally, 
i.e., an “ASEAN practice”, which can be framed, understood, and evaluated as the 
acts of a separate legal person, at general international law.  
However, legal assessments of non-intervention with an ASEAN character have 
uncritically embraced the IR literature.63 While it is difficult to measure its precise 
effect on the international legal scholarship that addresses ASEAN, I argue that the 
limited legal literature on point has effectively surrendered to the IR literature’s 
knowledge production on non-intervention.64  In this respect, James Crawford had 
warned against making undue approximations outside our disciplinary lane of 
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 1984 Declaration of the Admission of Brunei Darussalam into ASEAN (7 January 1984), available at 
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 See further Chapter Four.  
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 Generally Rodolfo C Severino, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community: Insights from the 
Former ASEAN Secretary-General (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2006) at 53-70.  
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ASEAN and its organs was the Bangkok Declaration (n27): see Chapter Two. On the ASEAN Charter, 
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 Generally see Michael Antolik, ASEAN and the Diplomacy of Accommodation (London: ME Sharpe, 
1990); Mely Caballero-Anthony, Regional Security in Southeast Asia: Beyond the ASEAN Way 
(Singapore: ISEAS, 2005); Shaun Narine, “The English School and ASEAN” (2006) 19(2) Pacific Review 
199.  
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 See Chapter One, Section V.  
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international law.65 With due caution, therefore, my survey, in Sections III and IV, 
highlights a common theme of the IR literature, i.e., non-intervention’s connection to 
the “ASEAN Way”, and explains the limits of this approach for a legal study of non-
intervention’s content.  
III. Constructivism: An Intellectual Response to Realism 
1) Michael Leifer, a Reluctant Realist 
It is necessary to begin with Michael Leifer because he dominated the early 
knowledge production related to ASEAN.66 The constructivist telling of ASEAN 
emerged later, as a reaction to this early body of scholarship by Leifer. Though Leifer 
was ambivalent about being described as a “Realist”,67 his scholarship was primarily 
concerned with the question of managing regional order in Southeast Asia.68  
A student of the “English School” of international relations,69 Leifer studied ASEAN in 
the context of its role in contributing to this regional order.70 His analytical framework 
was the balance of power.71 Because of ASEAN’s conduct during the long 
Kampuchean conflict,72 Leifer acknowledged ASEAN’s success as a “diplomatic 
community”.73 He remained sceptical about ASEAN’s ability to conduct external 
relations with the major powers such as the United States, China, and Japan.74  
To Leifer, a stable balance of power must exist between these major powers, before 
ASEAN could effectively engage them.75 Non-intervention received scant attention. 
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 James Crawford, “International Law as Discipline and Profession” (2012) 106 Proceedings of the ASIL 
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Routledge, 2006) (“Essays in Memory of Michael Leifer”) at 2. 
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 Wang Gungwu, “Foreword” in Selected Works on Southeast Asia at xvi (n 54).  
71
 Leifer wrote: “…the term balance of power as a generalization to explain that pattern is less than 
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 See Chapter Four.  
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Review 25. 
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 Ibid at 35-38.  
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26 
 
In 1999, Leifer described the Treaty of Amity & Cooperation (1976) as an “attempt to 
codify appropriate norms” and acknowledged non-intervention’s role in this 
context:”…in 1976 precepts such as mutual respect for national sovereignty, non-
interference in other states’ internal affairs, an injunction against the use of force and 
engagement in the peaceful settlement of disputes were hardly peculiar to Southeast 
Asia”.76 
 
2) Amitav Acharya  
After the Cold War, constructivism proved just right for the times and began to 
challenge the Realist narrative of a regional struggle by ASEAN for order and 
security.77 To the constructivists, culture did not just produce norms. Norms make 
culture.78  
The main argument of constructivism is that regional cooperation between States is 
a social process, which can yield a transforming effect on the intramural relations of 
Southeast Asian States.79 Constructivism maintains that norms can have a life of their 
own.80 Norms are internalised by the relevant actors and decision makers,81 which 
consequently influence State behaviour and promotes peaceful intramural conduct.82  
In 2001, Amitav Acharya gave theoretical articulation and content to the expression 
“ASEAN Way”.83 He offered a distinctive perspective in understanding the “nature and 
quality of socialisation” in the intramural relations regarding Southeast Asia.84 
Acharya drew on Karl Deutsch’s security community theory that disagreed with the 
orthodox perspective that war was the final arbiter between States.85 Deutsch argued 
that a security community was a form of international cooperation that could lead to 
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 See n73 at 29.  
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 Essays in Memory of Michael Leifer at 8 (n67).  
78
 Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of 
Regional Order (3rd ed) (London & New York: Routledge, 2014) (“Constructing a Security Community”) 
at 69.  
79
 Ibid, 44-69.  
80
 Constructing a Security Community at xi (n78).  
81
 The IR literature does not define the actors: they are primarily the political leaders of the ASEAN 
member States, a focus which was identified as the knowledge gap in Lee Jone’s monograph on non-
intervention (see below, n148).    
82
 Constructing a Security Community at xi (n80).  
83
 For an early attempt, see Estrella Solidum, “The Role of Certain Sectors in Shaping and Articulating 
the ASEAN Way”, in ASEAN: Identity, Development and Culture (RP Anand and P Qisuimbing, eds) 
(Quezon City: University of Philippines Law Centre & East-West Centre Culture Learning Institute, 1981).  
84
 Constructing a Security Community at 8 (n78).  
85
 Karl W. Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations (2nd ed) (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall, 
1968) (“The Analysis of International Relations”). Deutsch’s work marked a break from the orthodox 
perspective that war was the final arbiter between States.  
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integration, if the political actors hold stable expectations of peace at present and for 
the future.  
 
Thus Acharya argued that norms have had an independent role in advancing 
regionalism through ASEAN.86 Over time, Acharya argued, habits of consultation, 
informal dialogue, and the reciprocal giving of “face” by political actors mitigate 
intramural problems.87 In short, an “ASEAN Way” of diplomatic interaction exists 
between the political actors.88 Therefore, ASEAN is an “imagined community” that is 
built from the socialisation of norms.89  
 
Acharya described these norms as “legal-rational” and “socio-cultural” ones.90 It is 
difficult to understand what he meant.91 Acharya claimed that, in this respect, non-
intervention was “arguably the single most important principle” underpinning ASEAN 
regionalism.92 Pertinently, Acharya recognised non-intervention’s provenance as 
being partly related to international law, based on a Westphalian state system and 
was embodied in the constituent instruments of regional organisations.93 To this 
extent, Acharya cited the sources of non-intervention, which were “firmly enshrined”94 
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 Constructing a Security Community at 21-23 (n78).  
87
 Ibid at 43-70, especially at 69.  
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 Ibid at 44, 63 and 66.   
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 Generally Amitav Acharya, The Making of Southeast Asia: International Relations of a Region 
(Singapore: ISEAS, 2012).   
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 Constructing a Security Community at 43-44 (n78).  
91
 Acharya’s understanding of international law suggests that the IR literature’s knowledge production 
on non-intervention contains few recognisable standards for us to draw legal conclusions. In defining 
norms, he adopted the distinctions between legal and social norms by another scholar: Peter 
Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Post War Japan (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1998) at 38. Acharya “slightly redesignate(s)” them into legal-rational and 
social-cultural norms: the most common (if not exclusively so) sources of legal-rational norms in 
international relations are the universal principles of Westphalian state system”; social- cultural norms 
reflect the “historical and cultural milieu” of the actors and explain why they might be effective as “informal 
instruments”: see Constructing a Security Community at 22 (n78).  
Acharya’s (political) views are not necessarily invalid, but it is still unclear what “rational” means: I do not 
understand him to imply that social-cultural norms are “irrational”. Nor is it correct that, at international 
law, non-binding instruments are less effective than his “legal-rational” ones: see my discussion of 
interaction between treaties and non-binding instruments, see further Chapter Two, Section III.   
92
 For consistency, I retain the term “non-intervention” to analyse Acharya’s discussion, which began this 
way: “Arguably the single most important principle underpinning ASEAN regionalism is the doctrine of 
non-interference…As a well-established principle of the Westphalian state system, it was firmly 
enshrined in the charter of the UN…”: Constructing a Security Community at 56 (n78) (emphasis 
supplied).  
93
 I.e., the Organisation of African Union, Organisation of American States and the Arab League, 
Constructing a Security Community at 56 (n 78).   
94
 Constructing a Security Community at 56 (n 78). 
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in the UN Charter, Bandung Conference,95 Bangkok Declaration 1967,96 ZOPFAN 
(1971),97 and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC, 1976).98  
Acharya, however, does not explain the relevance of international law to his claim 
that non-intervention underpins ASEAN regionalism.99 Instead he says:”…the 
doctrine of non-interference can only be understood in the context of the “domestic 
security concerns of the ASEAN States””.100  
Acharya contends that, in “operational terms”, there are “four main aspects” in the 
“obligations imposed by ASEAN’s doctrine of non-interference”.101 These four aspects 
include: refrain from criticising another member State’s political systems;102 criticising 
the actions of States for breaching the non-interference doctrine;103 no support in any 
form to rebels who seek to destabilise the effective authority within a member state;104 
assistance to member states who are fighting rebels who seek to destabilise the 
effective authority.105  
The word “operational” is not explained. It is likely a reference to the practical 
applications of non-intervention as a diplomatic practice of ASEAN. In short, non-
intervention operates in the “ASEAN Way”. The following strands of Acharya’s 
reasoning support this point. First, and significantly, refraining from criticisms is an 
operational aspect of non-intervention.106 Second, and more broadly, non-intervention 
“can only be understood” within the context of “domestic security concerns”.  
Put another way, this implicates a sovereign State’s internal affairs: ASEAN member 
States should refrain from criticising or expressing disapproval of perceived faults in 
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 Final Communiqué of the Asian-African Conference of the Non-Aligned Countries (Conference of 
Bandung), text available in George McTurnan Kahin, The Asian-African Conference, Bandung, 
Indonesia, April 1955 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1956) at 76-85.  
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 See above at n27.   
97I.e., ASEAN Declaration of a Zone of Peace, Free and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), text available at 
<http://www.icnl.org/research/library/files/Transnational/zone.pdf>.  
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 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (concluded 24 February 1976) 1025 UNTS 297 
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 Constructing a Security Community at 56 (n78).  
100
 Ibid at 56-57: apart from non-intervention as a “doctrine”, a “principle”, Acharya also describes it as a 
“central tenet of intra-regional relations”.   
101
 Constructing a Security Community at 57 (n78).   
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 Constructing a Security Community at 57 (n78).   
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 Constructing a Security Community at 57 (n78).   
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 Constructing a Security Community at 57 (n78).   
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 Constructing a Security Community at 57 (n78).   
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 Acharya cited the example of ASEAN’s “response to the ‘People’s Power” revolution in the Philippines 
in 1986. He recounted the military support of “fellow ASEAN members”, including Indonesia, and argued 
that “ASEAN did not cease its implicit support” for President Ferdinand Marcos: see Constructing a 
Security Community at 57-58 (n78). However, these are acts by ASEAN States because they are 
bilateral issues and unrelated to ASEAN actions as a legal person. These are not the acts of ASEAN 
member States qua ASEAN.  
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the ways that another member State manages their “domestic security concerns”.107 
This link between refraining from making criticisms to non-intervention, which in turn 
operates within the diplomatic practice conducted in an “ASEAN Way”, is a political 
evaluation.  
Making comments is rarely an illegal act at international law, much less an illegal one 
which is prohibited by non-intervention.108 Nonetheless, Acharya is the first scholar to 
make systematic claims about the content of non-intervention related to ASEAN.  
There are, however, few legal grounds in his work to conclude what role international 
law plays in the “socialisation”109 of “legal-rational” norms110 among its political actors. 
He is concerned with a political study of political actors, their institutions (i.e., ASEAN), 
and the processes in which they interact.  
In his study of ASEAN, Acharya is not concerned with showing how the norms 
influence an outcome.111 It is not clear how (whether) the political actors were 
socialised by non-intervention. This is sometimes a “doctrine” or a “norm”, usually a 
“principle”,112 but probably all the same from a socialisation perspective.  Furthermore, 
Acharya did not distinguish the separate acts of ASEAN in respect of non-
intervention, from that of ASEAN States, acting in their separate, sovereign 
capacities.   
For these reasons, it is difficult to assess Acharya’s political evaluation against legal 
rules. Yet, as I explain below,113 it is exactly this sort of political evaluation which has 
been assimilated by international legal scholarship, and upon which undue 
consideration has been attached to drawing legal conclusions on non-intervention’s 
content.  
3) Jürgen Haacke  
Jürgen Haacke built on Acharya’s scholarship by explicating the origins and evolution 
of the “ASEAN Way”.114 Haacke argued that the “ASEAN Way” is a diplomatic and 
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 Another example by Acharya is “ASEAN’s non-response to the Thai military’s crackdown on pro-
democracy demonstrators in May 1992”: see Constructing a Security Community at 58 (n78). In legal 
terms, if it is a “non-response” by ASEAN, then we should question if this is even an ASEAN act at all.  
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 See Chapter One, Section V, Part 3 below.  
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 Constructing a Security Community at 8 (n78).  
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 n91.   
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 This knowledge gap in the IR literature was addressed by Christopher Roberts’s monograph, 
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 Constructing a Security Community at 56-57 (n78).  
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 See Chapter One, Section V.  
114
 Jürgen Haacke, ASEAN's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Development and Prospects 
(London & New York: Routledge, 2005) (“ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture”) at 11: Haacke 
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security culture in which the actors – ASEAN leaders and officials – share a 
“normative terrain”.115 According to Haacke, these norms116 arise because “ASEAN 
leaders”117 work from the basis of a struggle for recognition as sovereign States, 
followed by security concerns.118  
Against this background, Haacke advances the notion of a diplomatic and security 
culture (not community),119 which is defined as the ASEAN leaders sharing a 
“common stock of ideas and values”120 to enhance their security.121 For our purposes, 
Haacke identified six “core” norms in the “ASEAN Way”:122 sovereign equality; non-
recourse to use of force and peaceful settlement of conflict; non-interference and non-
intervention; non-involvement of ASEAN to address unresolved bilateral conflict 
between members; quiet diplomacy; mutual respect and tolerance. 
Haacke is explicit that his contribution to constructivist knowledge, related to ASEAN, 
rests on his political analyses of how the political actors – principally specific ASEAN 
leaders – behaved.123 The six “core” norms were identified, as an analytical 
framework, to advance his proposition that norms shape political conduct. But these 
norms do not dictate the political outcomes.124  
To summarise: the scholarship by Acharya and Haacke has shaped the knowledge 
production related to ASEAN. Of particular significance is their articulation of the 
                                                            
confessed that his theoretical assumptions as being “situated in the constructivist camp of International 
Relations theory, as broadly defined”. 
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 Ibid at 1.  
116
 Although Haacke stated what the core norms contain, he did not explicitly define what “norms” mean 
to him (for a list of these core norms, see n121): it appears that he was using norms in a behavioural 
and procedural manner, likely in terms of non-confrontation (“i.e., behavioural) and recourse to informal 
meetings to resolve differences (“procedural”): ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture at 5-6 and 234 
(endnote 7) (n114). Thus these are unlikely to be “norms” in a legal sense, which can be assessed 
against legality: see n60.  
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 Ibid at 16-32 and 216.   
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 ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture at 2 (n114).  
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“territorial integrity”, “political autonomy”, and the leaders’ “political survival”: ibid at 11. 
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 Ibid at 1 and 214.  
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 Under “Theoretical Assumptions” of his monograph, for example, Haacke said: “the book also takes 
seriously the idea that ontological insecurity experienced by particular leaders can readily translate into 
perceptions of threat in relation to, say, interstate or regime security”: ibid at 11.  
124
 Non-intervention was a consideration in the context of an “ASEAN Way”. Haacke concluded that the 
“ASEAN Way” (with implications for non-intervention) was strained in the case studies of the 
Kampuchean conflict and flexible engagement imbroglio: ibid at 81-112 and 165-191. On the legal 
irrelevance of flexible engagement, see Section IV.  
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“ASEAN Way” as a diplomatic practice, which shapes intramural behaviour and the 
“norms” that comprise it.125  
Most importantly, Haacke’s identification of non-intervention as a one core norm of 
the “ASEAN Way” is remarkable:126 it does not explain why the core norms were 
“core” to ASEAN. Nor was there an elaboration how these core norms were identified 
or where they came from.  
These were bold claims: the key result is an authoritative embedding of non-
intervention’s proper “home” in the “ASEAN Way”.127 Consequently, the constructivist 
scholarship of this period has become a necessary point of reference - and departure 
- in the IR literature on ASEAN, even for scholars who do not share a constructivist 
persuasion.128 
IV. Recent IR Literature Cannot Escape Constructivism 
 
1) Christopher Roberts 
The previous section explained how the early IR literature merged its disciplinary 
study of non-intervention with his explanation of the “ASEAN Way”, the latter not 
consisting of acts with an ASEAN character. This literature provides, therefore, no 
basis upon which to determine the regional content of non-intervention as a matter of 
law. This section continues with the argument by showing how the more recent IR 
literature moves away from the canonical focus linking non-intervention’s link with the 
“ASEAN Way”, by studying its disciplinary contradictions.  
This section illustrates that the IR literature, both recent and established, does not 
provide a firm basis to study non-intervention in legal terms or its distinctive regional 
content as arising from acts with an ASEAN character.  
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 For clarity, I am not saying that Acharya and Haacke invented the term “ASEAN Way”. Their 
scholarship gave the “ASEAN Way” an elaboration that proved useful to practitioners: the former ASEAN 
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One notable contribution against the constructivist telling with respect to ASEAN is 
the work of Christopher Roberts.129 He sought to test the constructivist proposition 
that norms socialised the political actors.130 To this end, Roberts’s findings are 
informed by his conduct of “in-depth interviews at the elite and grassroots levels”.131 
His contribution lies in linking theory (by Acharya and Haacke, for instance) with 
empirical evidence.132   
Roberts claims that norms exist in the “ASEAN Way” but they are “highly transient”.133 
This assimilates Haacke’s account of norms in the “ASEAN Way”.134 Like Acharya, 
Roberts recognised that the Bangkok Declaration (1967),135 a non-binding instrument 
which established ASEAN,136 referred to UN Charter’s “principles”, including the 
“principle of non-interference”.137 For Roberts, international law, through the UN 
Charter, supports the “normative rules” which govern regional interaction as 
follows:138 “rhetorically, the normative rules governing regional interaction have 
traditionally been…(iii) the non-interference in the domestic affairs of others. Such an 
interpretation is supported by the (Bangkok) Declaration’s reference to the principles 
of the United Nations Charter which…includes the principle of non-interference.” 
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 Christopher B Roberts, ASEAN Regionalism: Cooperation, Values and Institutionalisation (London: 
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 Ibid at 182.  
134
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 Bangkok Declaration, n27.  
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It is evident that Roberts was not referring to “normative rules” in the legal sense of a 
treaty rule being assessed for legality, such as Articles 2(4) or 2(7) of the UN Charter. 
Also, as explained already, the explicit link made by Acharya and Haacke between 
non-intervention and the “ASEAN Way” is vital. It permits a random tossing of norms 
inside the constructivist box of “ASEAN Way” to yield the argument that, as did 
Roberts, “ASEAN’s principle of non-interference prohibited the Association from 
commenting on internal affairs”.139 It would appear that Roberts implied that norms 
generated by the “ASEAN Way” bind member States in their intramural relations.  
 
To support his claims, Roberts cited the example of the “haze”140 that billowed yearly 
from uncontrolled forest fires in Indonesia, which severely polluted the air quality of 
Malaysia and Singapore.141 When Singapore publicly pressed Indonesia to reveal 
satellite images of the fires that caused the haze, Roberts said that: “Singapore’s 
actions represented a clear contravention of ASEAN’s modalities where the principle 
of non-interference prohibits implied and/or overt acts of public criticisms.”142  
 
Hence Roberts’s appraisal of non-intervention is concerned with its “clear 
contravention”, in terms of changes to non-intervention’s content.143 Norms, including 
non-intervention, are unstable and do not constitute socialisation, a point which he 
claimed is buttressed by findings based on the elite interviews.144  
Yet, in the haze issue which Roberts instanced, Singapore was acting bilaterally with 
Indonesia.145 This was not an act carried out by ASEAN as an international legal 
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“Singapore's Offer of Haze Assistance Package to Indonesia “(7 June 2016). On 18 September 2015, in 
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fulfil their obligations under the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze which all 10 ASEAN 
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person.146 Crucially, Roberts’s evaluation of Singapore’s actions is not based on 
formal sources, relying instead on two pieces of secondary literature.147  
2) Lee Jones  
In a provocative work,148 Jones offered a distinctive perspective on non-
intervention:”…I do not consider only collective interventions by ASEAN as a 
grouping. ASEAN member-states are so rarely capable of acting en 
bloc149…Focusing solely on what ASEAN agrees on collectively would unduly 
overlook vast amounts of state behaviour. Moreover, exploring member-states’ 
conduct is the only way to actually test the proposition that they are bound by a 
regional norm of non-interference…If we observe some ASEAN states intervening 
but others not, and no collective agreement on intervention is reached, it is clearly 
illogical to claim that the lack of a corporate ASEAN policy proves the power of non-
interference. It would merely prove member-states’ inability to reach consensus – 
which can be explained by reference to the social conflicts underpinning each state’s 
position and the difficulties of coordinating divergent policies.”150 
Lee Jones has likely written the first English monograph in the IR literature, which 
exclusively studied non-intervention by explicitly merging the acts of ASEAN States 
with legally distinct ASEAN acts. His key proposition is that non-intervention is 
selectively used as a “technology of power”:151 dominant interests are identified,152 
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152
 See his critical reading of the UN Transitional Authority of Cambodia and ASEAN in relation Cambodia 
during the Kampuchean conflict: ASEAN, Sovereignty and Intervention at 128-140 (n148).    
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the power distribution of the working class and bourgeoisie are studied,153 and 
capitalism is critiqued.154 Non-intervention, Jones argues, is used by the dominant 
political actors, mainly the government, to “buy time and space” (whatever this 
means).155  
Despite Jones’s provocative thesis, his work is also a reaction to the constructivist 
claim that non-intervention is an element of the “ASEAN Way”. His scholarly ambition 
is to: “…cut through elite rhetoric to the reality of state practice, to disrupt the major 
area of scholarly consensus on ASEAN, to question the most common explanations 
given for the form Southeast Asian regionalism takes, and to provide a sounder basis 
for policy-making.”156  
 
Jones did not study “state practice” in the same way that international lawyers identify 
State practice, from which legal conclusions are drawn.157 It is doubtful whether Jones 
wanted to (he did not have to) consider the salience of international law to non-
intervention at all. To him, the “sovereign territorial state thus enables some political 
projects, yet constrains others”.158 In his reactions to the problems of constructivism 
and in giving his particular account of non-intervention related to ASEAN, Jones said: 
“Scholars thus inadvertently side with the ASEAN’s authoritarian regimes, which 
sought to present left-wing movements as enemies of the state and foreign 
subversives, rather than people who simply wished to organise their society, economy 
and politics in a way that threatened existing power relations.”159 
It is against this background that Jones approaches his whole study through Marxist 
state theory160 and critical political economy perspectives,161 another intensely 
political study which still creates gaps which international law can usefully fill.162  
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 Jones: “’society’ is not principally comprised of smooth ‘socialisation’ and ‘interactions’…but by gross 
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structural constraints”, ASEAN, Sovereignty and Intervention at 221-222 (n148).  
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 ASEAN, Sovereignty and Intervention at 20 (n148).   
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 ASEAN, Sovereignty and Intervention at 8 (n148).   
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 Generally Michael Wood and Omri Sender, “State Practice”, MPEPIL (2017).   
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 ASEAN, Sovereignty and Intervention at 20 (n148). 
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 Ibid at 20. 
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 Generally Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes (London: NLB, 1973) and Bob 
Jessop, State Power: A Strategic-Relational Approach (Cambridge: Polity, 2008).  
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 For an overview of Jones’s approach, see Shahar Hameiri & Lee Jones, “Murdoch International: The 
‘Murdoch School’ in International Relations (Working Paper No. 178)” (December 2014) available at 
<https://www.murdoch.edu.au/Research-capabilities/Asia-Research-Centre/_document/WP178.pdf>. 
The “Murdoch School” focuses on social and political conflict in the context of capitalist development to 
explain institutional and political outcomes: its analytical framework is rooted in the Marxist state theory 
of Poulantzas and Jessop (ibid).  
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 I illustrate the limits of Jone’s arguments in Chapter One, Section V.  
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V. Limitations of the IR Literature’s Knowledge Production on Non-Intervention: 
The Example of Flexible Engagement and Enhanced Interaction 
 
1) Purpose 
 
This section illustrates the problems with the IR literature’s approach to non-
intervention with an example. The example will show how a (legal) basis is lacking, 
on which a distinctive regional law of non-intervention could be determined. It is useful 
to recapitulate the IR literature’s core elements of non-intervention as follows: it is a 
norm, principle, doctrine, which is connected to a distinctive practice of quiet 
diplomacy, i.e., the “ASEAN Way”;163 it recognises its basis in international law as a 
“legal-rational norm”;164 it studies contraventions of non-intervention and considers 
the implications for the “ASEAN Way’s” style of quiet diplomacy; it does not 
distinguish acts of ASEAN, an international organisation with legal personality, from 
acts of ASEAN States.     
 
The IR literature had observed occasions in which Thailand made a deliberate effort 
in 1997 to reform non-intervention’s content through the so-called “flexible 
engagement”.165 It is an “effort” because nothing significant arose at law. The idea 
was that ASEAN States166 should be able to comment on the political developments 
of one another. Thailand, at least, wanted it to be less restrictive because of its 
“earnest struggle” for the international acceptance of its “democratic credentials” 
under the neo-liberal government of Chuan Leekpai, which assumed power in 
November 1997.167 Because of the financial crisis, Thailand had to convince the 
United States government and International Monetary Fund to support its economic 
recovery.168  
These developments occurred against a broader background of a financial crisis in 
1997 in Southeast Asia. A financial crisis caused Thailand, Malaysia, and particularly 
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 See nn92, 122 and 137.  
164
 I.e., UN Charter, ASEAN Charter, and the Bangkok Declaration: nn27, 90, and 134 respectively.   
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 Robin Ramcharan, “ASEAN and Non-interference: A Principle Maintained” (2000) 22 Contemporary 
Southeast Asia 60; Jürgen Haacke, “The Concept of Flexible Engagement and the Practice of Enhanced 
Interaction: Intramural Challenges to the 'ASEAN Way'” (1999) 12 Pacific Review 581.  
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 I.e, acts by ASEAN States which are acting in their individual, sovereign capacities.   
167
 ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture at 165-190 (n114); Constructing a Security Community at 
152 (n78); ASEAN Regionalism at 105 (n129).  
168
 ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture at 172-173 (n114); ASEAN, Sovereignty and Intervention 
at 108 (n148).  
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Indonesia, to experience capital flight problems.169 Singapore and Indonesia, 
consequently, suffered from sluggish economic growth. Notably, Suharto of Indonesia 
was forced to resign his presidency after 31 years in power.170 Cambodia’s admission 
to ASEAN was delayed171 because of a power struggle between Prime Minister Hun 
Sen and Prince Ranadriddh.172 
 
Against this wider background, the IR literature gave “flexible engagement” 
considerable attention.173 Its knowledge production does tell us about political 
personalities and the wider political background. But the conclusions on non-
intervention can be misleading, and are less useful for international lawyers. This is 
because the IR literature had strongly relied on secondary materials to form political 
conclusions regarding non-intervention’s content.  
 
My purpose, therefore, is to use this example of “flexible engagement” to show the 
sharp variance between political and legal conclusions on non-intervention’s content. 
This greatly matters. As I shortly explain, the IR literature did not make – it does not 
want or need to – distinctions between acts by ASEAN States, from ASEAN member 
States, acting through ASEAN and its organs. Our legal conclusions, however, 
regarding non-intervention with an ASEAN character must be evaluated against legal 
rules at general international law.    
2) The IR Literature Uses Secondary Sources to Draw Political Conclusions 
on Non-Intervention  
The IR literature made the following points. First, it noted the introspective mood 
among leaders of ASEAN States after the financial crisis.174 Acharya referred to the 
“major blow to ASEAN’s credibility”.175 Jones delved into the “widespread social 
unrest and demands for political reform”.176  
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 See Chapter One, Section V, Part 2.   
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 For a sample of immediate academic reactions after the crisis broke in July 1997, see Leif Roderick 
Rosenberger, “Southeast Asia's Currency Crisis: A Diagnosis and Prescription” (1997) 19 Contemporary 
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 Constructing a Security Community at 149-150 (n78).  
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Second, in terms of Thailand’s diplomatic effort, “flexible engagement” is usually 
attributed to Surin Pitsuwan,177 then Thailand’s foreign minister.178 Actually, Pitsuwan 
did not use this term in his formal statements. On 24 July 1998, in his opening 
statement as Thailand’s representative at the 31st ASEAN Ministerial Meeting 
(AMM),179 the word “flexible” (not “flexible engagement) was only used once: “We 
need stronger engagement among ASEAN and we also need equally to adapt 
ourselves to changing times. We must be flexible in our approach to the tasks at hand 
while steadfastly adhering to the long-standing principles for which ASEAN has stood 
and which have truly served us well. That, I believe, is the essence of the “ASEAN 
Way.””180 
Pitsuwan suggested that:181 “The principle of non-interference is not the issue and 
has never been the issue. The name or terminology is also not of any real significance 
either. Let us instead focus on the real issues — what is at stake for ASEAN and what 
we together can do about it. For the real issue is how we can work together to 
strengthen ASEAN’s cohesiveness, relevance and effectiveness in dealing with the 
new challenges of a new millennium…the issues of democracy and human rights are 
those that we have to increasingly deal with in our engagement with the outside world. 
How are we going to put ourselves on the offensive rather than always be on the 
receiving end?”182  Third, therefore, democracy and human rights were possible 
candidates for “engagement” in “real issues”. In pursuit of this goal, Pitsuwan’s formal 
statement lacked sufficient elaboration of what Thailand would do as an ASEAN 
member State.183 Importantly, the term “flexible engagement” did not appear in the 
AMM’s joint communique of 25 July 1998 at all.  
Based on Pitsuwan’s statement, as Thailand’s representative at the AMM, on 24 July 
1998, it is difficult to draw legal conclusions relevant to the ASEAN character of non-
intervention. Only the formal statements which were raised by representatives of 
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 Generally see Constructing a Security Community at 149 (n 78); ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security 
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 See “Opening Statement by His Excellency Dr. Surin Pitsuwan Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand 
at the 31st ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) Manila, Philippines, 24 July 1998”, available at 
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 Generally see Thomas Grant, “Doctrines (Monroe, Hallstein, Brezhnev, Stimson)” MPEPIL (2014) 
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ASEAN member States, expressed during this AMM, might count as State practice 
of ASEAN organs.184 This is because, as explained above, acts of ASEAN member 
States, through their representatives acting within ASEAN organs, are legally 
distinct.185 
Fourth, instead of studying these formal statements, the IR literature focused on “two 
major speeches”186 that Pitsuwan had made at a Track II forum187 and Thammasat 
University.188 It is legally relevant to ask if Pitsuwan advanced a formal position (if at 
all) as Thailand’s foreign minister,189 or as Thailand’s representative (an ASEAN 
member State), at the AMM.190 The answer is apparent in Thailand’s response. Its 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs circulated a position paper to the ASEAN member States, 
before the 31st AMM. The paper bore a felicitous title - “Thailand’s Non-Paper on the 
Flexible Engagement Approach”.191  
 
Fifth, another argument in the IR literature was that the Philippines “openly sided” with 
Thailand’s proposal.192 For example, Acharya cited the remarks by the Philippines’s 
Foreign Secretary, Domingo Siazon, who reportedly said: “…when the situation is 
opportune, more pro-active ASEAN policy among its members may be felicitous and 
it may not be sufficient just to have a policy of non-intervention”.193  
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Siazon’s remark was based on a news report in the Singapore Straits Times, dated 5 
July 1998.194 On 24 July 1998, at the 31st AMM, Siazon delivered an opening 
statement in his capacity as the Philippines’s foreign secretary.195 Non-intervention 
was not raised at all.196   
 
Finally, the IR literature suggested that “enhanced interaction” was adopted, as a 
compromise, in lieu of “flexible engagement”.197 The term “enhanced interaction” is 
attributed in the literature to Indonesia’s foreign minister, Ali Alatas.198 For example, 
Acharya said: “Instead of flexible engagement, the evidently less intervention-
oriented notion of ‘enhanced interaction at the suggestion of Ali Alatas was adopted 
as a policy framework to deal with transnational issues within the region.”199 
Furthermore, Roberts cited an interview that he conducted with an advisor to the Thai 
government,200 who apparently “supported the utility of enhanced interaction” 
because:201  
Both sides must be able to exchange views…and be able to talk frankly.202 
In political terms, it is likely that Alatas’s “face-saving diplomacy”203 of an “enhanced 
interaction” was “adopted as a policy framework”204 by ASEAN States. No one knows 
whether it is really different from “flexible engagement”. In 2004, already retired, 
Alatas publicly stated that, through a newspaper article, “enhanced interaction” 
allowed “comment on domestic issues that portray all member nations in a negative 
light”.205  
                                                            
194
 “Engagement Policy 'being Considered'”, The Straits Times, 5 July 1998, at 26.  
195
 “Statement of H.E. Domingo L. Siazon, Jr, Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines and 
Chairman of the 31st ASEAN Standing Committee At the Opening of the 31st ASEAN Ministerial Meeting 
Manila”, 24 July 1998, available at <http://asean.org/?static_post=winning-the-challenges-of-the-21st-
century-statement-of-he-domingo-l-siazon-jr-secretary-of-foreign-affairs-of-the-philippines-and-
chairman-of-the-31st-asean-standing-committee-at-the-opening-of-the-3>.   
196
 Ibid. Also see “Closing Statement of H.E. Domingo L Saizon, Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the 
Philippines at the 31st ASEAN Ministerial Meeting”, Manila, 25 July 1998, available at 
<http://asean.org/?static_post=closing-statement-of-he-domingo-l-siazon-jr-secretary-of-foreign-affairs-
of-the-philippines-at-the-31st-asean-ministerial-meeting-amm-manila-25-july-1998>.  
197
 ASEAN Regionalism, endnote 25 at 107 and 216 (n129): he supports this claim with a secondary 
source by Shigekatsu Kondo, East Asian Strategic Review (Tokyo: National Institute for Defence 
Studies, 2000) at 36.   
198
 Constructing a Security Community, endnote 166, at 151 and 162 (n 78): he based it on Alatas’s 
diplomatic effort in “No Go on Flexible Engagement” in The Straits Times, 25 July 1998, at 23. 
199
 Constructing a Security Community at 151 (n78) 
200
 ASEAN Regionalism, endnote 25 at 216 (n129): Roberts interviewed Kanala Khantaprab who advised 
Thailand’s Government on 26 December 2001.  
201
 Ibid.  
202
 Ibid.  
203
 Ibid at 106.  
204
 Constructing a Security Community at 151 (n78).   
205
 Agence France-Presse, “ASEAN must reinvent itself, loosen non-interference policy – Diplomat”, 7 
January 2004.  
41 
 
Observe, then, the strong reliance in the IR Literature on secondary sources, namely 
newspaper pieces and interviews. Of course, intensely political factors were at play: 
politics is to be found somewhere in the background of all legal conclusions.206 In 
terms of legal assessment, however, what States say or do not say on the 
international plane can be legally binding. What matters is that, on 24 July 1998, in 
his capacity as the Indonesian foreign minister, Alatas said nothing about “enhanced 
interaction” or “flexible engagement” in his opening statement at the 31st AMM.207 
Most importantly, the joint communique of the 31st AMM made no express or overt 
reference to “enhanced interaction” at all.208 
 
Michael Wood reminds us that the selection and assessment of (secondary) 
materials, which include elite interviews and newspaper pieces, as evidence of State 
practice, require judgment and experience.209 Here “experience” entails some form of 
lawyerly scepticism regarding the probative value of uncorroborated statements, 
which are made by high-ranking political figures.210  
 
This account of the ways and means in which the IR literature uses secondary 
sources matters: its work is not helpful in forming legal assessments of non-
intervention’s content. There is scant distinction between the acts of ASEAN States, 
from that of ASEAN as a legal person. When the acts of ASEAN States are not 
analysed as being distinct from those of the AMM, the legal conclusions which we 
draw from the IR literature can be misleading.211 For instance, Haacke said: 
“Significantly, though, ASEAN foreign ministers departed from the Manila meeting, 
allowing members – not least against the backdrop of the principle of sovereignty – 
to engage in what was termed ‘enhanced interaction’. This concept conveyed a 
compromise reached by ASEAN.”212 
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Finally, it is flatly imprecise to say that the AMM “agreed” as follows: “Consequently, 
the 1998 AMM agreed only to sanction ‘enhanced interaction’ on matters of regional 
concern, balanced by the official retention of the non-interference principle.”213  
VI. Distortive Influence on International Legal Scholarship: ASEAN Practice or 
Practice by ASEAN States?  
 
1) Purpose 
The previous sections have demonstrated how the IR literature did not distinguish 
between ASEAN states acting in their individual capacities, and acts with an ASEAN 
character (i.e., ASEAN acting as a legal person qua international organisation).  I 
have also illustrated this point with an example, through the developments regarding 
flexible engagement.  
Despite these problems in relying on the IR literature for a legal study of non-
intervention, this section shows how the legal scholarship had assimilated the weight 
and relevance of the IR literature. This point matters because, unless the problems 
inherent in the IR literature are acknowledged, it may unduly influence any analysis 
of how ASEAN makes a distinctive regional law of non-intervention.  
As I shortly explain, it is problematic to assimilate these contributions in our drawing 
of legal conclusions on non-intervention with an ASEAN character. This section 
argues that the IR literature distorts legal assessments of non-intervention’s content. 
For clarity, I discuss the matters of assimilation and distortion separately, under two 
discrete headings, but both are related.   
2) Assimilating Non-Intervention’s Content in an “ASEAN Context” 
Tan Hsien-Li said this about non-intervention:214 “Although these principles215 were 
similar to conventional Westphalian principles regulating international relations, their 
exercise needed to be understood within the ASEAN context. Indeed, they have 
become synonymous with how ASEAN diplomacy is carried out and these have been 
termed the “ASEAN Way”.216  
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It is difficult to determine what the words “ASEAN context” and “ASEAN Way” mean 
in legal terms, especially if they indicate behaviours which can be assessed against 
rules at general international law. The words “ASEAN Way” is not used in the ASEAN 
Charter217 - a constituent instrument.218 There is only one international legal 
system.219 As international lawyers, we can only understand “the ASEAN context” 
against general international law.220 This is why the ASEAN Charter states that 
“ASEAN and its Member States shall”221 uphold the UN Charter and international 
law.222  
Indeed, it is arguable that elements of this diplomatic practice, i.e., “ASEAN Way”, are 
reflected in the ASEAN Charter, especially the provisions on consensual decision 
making.223 If so, the material questions of law, especially non-intervention’s content 
in relation to the “ASEAN Way”, become an interpretative matter. This is based on 
the law of treaties, the general rule of the Vienna Convention being applicable.224 To 
this end, “consensus” is determined based on its textual meaning, its context, 
subsequent conduct, subsequent agreement, and so on.  
Accordingly, there are rules of general international law, to evaluate non-
intervention’s content in relation to consensual decision-making. It is not the “ASEAN 
context” or “ASEAN Way”, ostensibly behavioural norms, which prevails at 
international law. While there may be an “ASEAN Way” to manage—or resolve—
differences at sea, on land, in the air, or space, this (ASEAN) way must still be subject 
to the rules and principles of international law.225  
Since “ASEAN and its member States” agreed to uphold international law and the UN 
Charter,226 a choice must be made. Either ASEAN is an international legal person, 
which carries international rights and obligations on the international plane, or it is 
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not. If it is, ASEAN is always subject to powerful claims of universality, manifested as 
general international law.227 The international legal system does not contain a 
permanent hierarchy of a right to intervene or against intervention in international 
relations – this is a moving target, as I argue in Chapter Three.228  
Useful lawyering relies on legal rules that the whole discipline recognises, 
understands, and even accepts.229 While these are formal points, they remain salient. 
However, the international legal scholarship still conflates non-intervention at 
international law, with non-intervention as part of the “ASEAN Way”. Marise Cremona 
et al says: “…the principle of non-interference and the defence of the ‘sanctity of 
sovereignty’ are at the heart of policy-makers’ understanding of their foreign policy, 
the characteristics of the region and of ASEAN specifically…”230 
 
Similarly, in the context of monitoring ASEAN treaties and instruments, Simon 
Chesterman argued that certain “mechanisms”,231 agreed in 1995,232 to address the 
damage caused by haze from Indonesia were:233 “…typical in that they did not depart 
from ASEAN’s norms of ‘informality, non-interference and consensus’.”234 
When we evaluate Chesterman’s point on the 1995 mechanisms, against general 
international law, the conclusion is this: in relation to the haze, non-intervention is 
legally irrelevant. Although the 1995 mechanism is not binding at international law, 
general rules at international law still exist to appraise it for legality for two reasons.  
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First, despite the 1995 mechanism’s non-binding status, it was still an act of an 
ASEAN organ at general international law.235 ASEAN acted as a venue to facilitate 
these comments, although it was conducted as an “informal” ASEAN Ministerial 
Meeting on the Environment.236 Second, transboundary pollution is not an “internal 
affair” of any State both as a matter of first principles because the discussion (i.e., 
comments) and functional cooperation within this ASEAN organ occurred by 
consent.237  
3) Distorting Legal Conclusion: Making Comments & Non-Intervention 
Non-intervention does not prohibit the making of comments at international law.238 
Even in diplomatic law, it is very hard for a receiving State to prohibit comments, on 
grounds of non-intervention, which are made by representatives of the sending 
State.239 As Eileen Denza explains, “with the greater emphasis in modern 
international relations on the encouragement and protection of human rights in other 
States, conflicts between the diplomatic duty of non-interference and objective of 
promoting observance of human rights are frequent”.240   
In contrast, the IR literature has stressed the “ASEAN Way” as a diplomatic practice 
which avoids confrontation through criticisms of each other.241 Significantly, it is in this 
sense that non-intervention is treated as relevant within the ASEAN context. Having 
participated in drafting the ASEAN Charter, a constituent instrument, Walter Woon is 
explicit about the connection between non-intervention and the “ASEAN Way”:242 
“The principle of non-interference in an ASEAN context means that the member 
States do not resort to publicly lecturing one another (or other countries) about their 
domestic situation…It does not mean that matters of common concern are not raised 
sub rosa at the informal Foreign Ministers’ and leaders’ meetings…Advice from 
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 Under Article 10 of the ASEAN Charter (n23), this is a sectoral body, an ASEAN organ at international 
law. As Chesterman noted (ibid at 66), the arrangements were cooperative but “unusual” because it 
contained monitoring features, in relation to transboundary pollution of the atmosphere, sea and 
hazardous waste.  
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“…nothing in the (TAC) is to be interpreted as preventing a State Party from engaging on or commenting 
upon issues of international interest, at “Australia National Interest Analysis” [2005] ATNIA 14 at para 
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family, even when the message is unwelcome, is more palatable than hectoring from 
outsiders. The existence of the Charter now justifies this legally.”243  
Once again, it is claimed that non-intervention’s content occurs in an “ASEAN 
context”, which exceptionally permits comments to be made (but it is subject to 
consensus). The reasoning is instructive: it is not general international law, which 
shapes the “ASEAN context”. Plainly, the “ASEAN context” becomes legally justified 
by a treaty.244  
Similarly, Ingo Venzke and Thio Li-ann also assimilated, with more finesse, the IR 
literature’s connection between non-intervention and the “ASEAN Way”.245 After 
taking note of Article 2, TAC in its entirety, which contained the treaty basis of non-
intervention, Venzke and Thio said:  “Despite the adherence to the cardinal ASEAN 
principle of non-interference in internal affairs as a manifestation of the international 
law principle of sovereign equality, which formerly justified turning a blind eye to e.g. 
human rights abuse in a member State, this was never strictly adhered to and has 
gradually been relaxed. One might add that Member States have differed on which of 
these behavioural principles they emphasize: socialist and military regimes have 
typically underscored non-interference in national affairs, while other Member States 
have foregrounded institutional cooperation and friendly relations. Some argue that 
the “ASEAN Way” will continue but be supplemented by a new rule of law…with the 
motivation to achieve efficient and predictable action.”246   
This passage suggests that there is no collective agreement on non-intervention’s 
content. Presumably, this is because individual ASEAN member States emphasise 
different positions on non-intervention. Arguably, a sharper focus in relation to this 
matter would involve examining formal statements of the ASEAN organs on a 
particular case.247 If no statements on non-intervention were made, it is arguable that 
non-intervention simply did not apply.248  
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 Walter Woon, The ASEAN Charter: A Commentary (Singapore: NUS Press, 2016) at 60-61 
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 But see Woon’s preface, ibid at ix: “I should say at the outset that this is not a law book. It is impossible 
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(emphasis supplied).  
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 Thio Li-ann & Ingo Venzke, The Internal Effects of ASEAN External Relations (Cambridge: CUP, 
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 Ibid at 10.  
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 In The Internal Effects of ASEAN External Relations at 10, footnote 7 (n245), Thio and Venzke cited 
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unhandsome treatment of the monks in 2007. For further discussion, see Chapter Five.   
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Whether non-intervention has been “relaxed” is not the point.249 Rather, the “internal 
affairs” aspect in Article 2, TAC to which non-intervention applies is now subject to 
the obligations of ASEAN membership, under the ASEAN Charter.250 In other words, 
the subsequent practice of Article 2, TAC, has to be interpreted in accordance with 
the ASEAN Charter, under the law of treaties at general international law.251  
To conclude: I have shown how the international legal literature had assimilated the 
IR literature’s signal contribution to non-intervention’s content as being related to the 
“ASEAN Way”. There are qualitative implications for the legal reasoning that follows. 
The conclusion that non-intervention’s content has waned is correct. It is also true 
that, as a diplomatic practice, the “ASEAN Way” is real, but this reality can be framed 
and assessed against general international law.  
This, then, is the key problem of the IR literature: the many studies regarding non-
intervention are not “ASEAN acts” at all. As this study shows, the content of non-
intervention with an ASEAN character, which is distinctive as regional law, are much 
narrower when compared to the IR literature.   
VII. Structure of Chapters 
 
This introductory chapter has two broad goals. First, it identifies and explains the core 
proposition of this study regarding non-intervention with an ASEAN character. There 
is no extant legal study of regional rules of non-intervention as made by ASEAN (as 
a separate legal person). The core proposition, then, is that there is a distinctive 
regional law of non-intervention, which is made by ASEAN, and this is in turn 
influenced by general international law.  
Second, therefore, a substantial part of this chapter focussed on identifying the 
problems with current studies of non-intervention with respect to ASEAN: it is 
principally examined from an International Relations perspective. The IR literature 
                                                            
that the demonstrations in Myanmar are being suppressed by violent force and that there has been a 
number of fatalities”. The word “non-intervention” did not appear in this statement. The statement is 
available at  
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concerning non-intervention does not distinguish between acts of individual ASEAN 
States, and acts with an ASEAN character.  
One outcome is that even legal scholarship regarding non-intervention had begun to 
assimilate uncritically the IR literature’s studies as to non-intervention. Despite having 
shown that no firm legal basis exists to classify the acts studied in this literature as 
being acts with an ASEAN character, the legal literature’s assimilation still occurred. 
The core proposition of this study, i.e., the distinctive regional law of non-intervention 
is made by ASEAN and is influenced by general international law, can only be 
advanced after acknowledging the problems with the extant literature on non-
intervention with respect to ASEAN.   
The rest of this study proceeds as follows. Chapter Two discusses how international 
organisations make international law through their organs, as separate legal persons, 
which are distinct from its member States. Relatedly, it explains how an international 
organisation can make regional law, and what “regional” means in relation to general 
international law.  
Chapter Three gives a broad account of the “origins” and content of non-intervention 
at general international law. It argues that determining non-intervention’s content 
requires making choices, but these choices are made by reference to the general 
rules of international law.252  
Chapter Three illustrates this argument by showing how the canons of Emmer de 
Vattel and Lassa Oppenheim253 continue to shape the general rules regarding non-
intervention at international law. This chapter also shows how non-intervention’s 
content is protean, a moving target which is facilitated through the venue of an 
international organisation – the UN’s organs.   
Chapters One to Three, therefore, show how an international organisation such as 
ASEAN can make regional law, based on the general rules of international law. The 
rest of this study uses two case studies to support my core proposition that general 
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 On the language of legal scholarship in the American Journal of International Law after the terrorist 
attacks of 11 September 2001, Gerry Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns 
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international law influences (and restricts) this regional law of non-intervention with 
an ASEAN character.  
Accordingly, Chapter Four examines how ASEAN (organs) used the general rules of 
international law (especially in relation to separate legal personality) to create a 
distinctive regional law of non-intervention, during the long Kampuchean conflict 
(1978-1990).  
Chapter Five investigates ASEAN practice with respect to Myanmar. It points to the 
diminution in non-intervention’s content, as contained in Articles 2 and 10 of the 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, 1976 (TAC),254 when evaluated against emerging 
rules general international law. One example includes the International Law 
Commission’s ongoing work on protecting persons during disasters.255  
Both case studies in Chapters Four and Five are chosen for two reasons. First, a 
sustained body of primary materials over a period of time, produced by ASEAN and 
the United Nations, are available. This availability matters because it allows a 
comprehensive survey of the range and effect of general international law on the 
regional law-making of non-intervention with an ASEAN character. Second, despite 
a focus on just two case studies, both subject matters bear examination because they 
represented pivotal phases in the development of ASEAN as an international 
organisation.   
ASEAN’s conduct during the long Kampuchean conflict is a political coming of age 
and has been extensively studied in the International Relations literature. This is likely 
the first legal treatment of ASEAN’s conduct during the Kampuchean conflict, which 
created a distinctly regional content of non-intervention.   
The second case study addressed ASEAN’s conduct with respect to Myanmar, an 
ASEAN member State. By now, ASEAN has expanded its membership to admit 
Myanmar, Lao, Cambodia, and Vietnam (its former political adversary). The various 
actions of the ASEAN organs against the Myanmar government, which 
unquestionably implicated Myanmar’s internal governance, are remarkable: its 
actions suggest the regional content of non-intervention had changed through 
diminution.  
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This is because, from 1979-1990, ASEAN had taken the regional position that non-
intervention protected change of governments in Kampuchea (however deplorable 
the Khmer Rouge government was). Now, in the 2000s, ASEAN took positions 
against Myanmar and pressed for specific changes to its political governance, which 
include the participation of Aung San Suu Kyi. These changes, the diminution to its 
regional content of non-intervention, reflected changing goals of ASEAN as an 
international organisation. To achieve these goals, ASEAN had to conduct effective 
external relations with other international legal persons: it was hard not to be 
influenced by general international law.  
Chapter Six concludes.     
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Chapter Two 
HOW INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS MAKE GENERAL INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND REGIONAL LAW 
 
I. Purpose 
 
In Chapter One, we have discussed the problems regarding the IR literature on non-
intervention with respect to ASEAN. As explained already, it is not easy to determine 
the legal content of non-intervention with respect to ASEAN in the IR literature, which 
is mainly concerned with studying non-intervention as a diplomatic practice. 
Nonetheless, the legal literature which addressed ASEAN had assimilated the IR 
literature’s conclusions regarding non-intervention.  
Having identified this problem, it is now possible to develop the core proposition that 
ASEAN can create a distinctive regional law of non-intervention, which has an ASEAN 
character in this sense. Its regional content is made possible by general international 
law, but this influence of general international law can also constrain the regional law 
of non-intervention. Therefore, in this chapter, the core proposition is developed by 
explaining three distinct but related lines of enquiry.  
First, this chapter explains how and when international organisations can make 
international law as international legal persons at general international law, which are 
separate from the member States that created them. To this extent, therefore, this 
chapter gives an account of treaties and custom as authoritative sources of binding 
commitments, under Article 38, Statute of the International Court of Justice.1 Treaties 
and custom are explored because they are established indications of State consent, 
a powerful reflection of the Lotus presumption.2  Next, this chapter explores how 
                                                            
1
 Statute of the International Court of Justice (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 
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international organisations, as a venue,3 challenge the primacy of consent in treaties 
and custom, by creating rules at general international law in the form of non-binding 
instruments.4   
Second, having explained how international organisations can make international 
law, the second line of enquiry concentrates on their capacity to make a particular 
type of international law-making: regional international law. This enquiry matters to 
the core proposition because it facilitates the arguments in this study that ASEAN, an 
international organisation, can make regional international law. This type of regional 
law-making,5 which is enabled by general international law, validates the reality of a 
Southeast Asia as a coherent region in terms of geography and shared values.  
However, as illustrated in Chapter Five, general international law can also constrain 
the scope of regional law-making. It is in this sense that regional international law, as 
made by ASEAN, is analysed and used in normative terms. It is normative because 
there are rules that are particular to a regional area, which are legally binding and 
from which legal consequences can arise, on the basis of general international law. 
However, this study focuses only on one particular regional law that is important to 
ASEAN: non-intervention.  
Chapters Three-Five will elaborate on and examine the third line of enquiry, i.e., how 
general international law creates descriptively and evaluatively vague content, as to 
non-intervention, which allows the regional law of non-intervention to be made by 
ASEAN.  
This chapter, therefore, supports the core proposition with an analytical framework to 
evaluate these three related lines of enquiry by explaining ASEAN’s separate acts, in 
terms of how the general rules of international law enable international organisations 
(such as ASEAN) to make distinctive regional international law, whose legal bases 
are grounded in the sources of international law such as treaties and customary 
international law. Accordingly, two elements of an international organisation’s law-
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 For a comprehensive account of how different international actors, legal sources, and international 
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making are examined as forming an analytical framework in this chapter. The first is 
that international organisations serve as a venue in which States formulate and 
discuss law-making in a multilateral setting.6 The other is the outcome of this 
multilateral interaction between States: treaties are concluded and customary 
international law, i.e., custom,7 might emerge. Additionally, numerous non-binding 
instruments such as codes, declarations, and guidelines are also agreed by States.  
Legal consequences can (they often do) arise from this form of multilateral interaction 
between States, at a venue, in an institutionalised sense. This is because general 
international law accords international organisations a separate legal personality, 
from which its actions can be evaluated for legality, in a distinctive way which is 
separate from the member States who created that international organisation.  
The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to explain the core proposition of how 
regional law is influenced by general rules of international law: it forms the legal basis 
on which non-intervention’s content, a type of regional law with an ASEAN character, 
is evaluated and evolves in two case studies below. Not only is regional law 
influenced by general international law, regional law-making can be created by 
international organisations, as actions which are separate from the member States 
who created them, because its legal basis is rooted in general international law.  
The outcome is that, I argue, this type of regional law-making advances and validates 
a geographical area in a normative (therefore constructive) sense, as a “region” of 
“Southeast Asia”. In other words, general international law crystallises the reality of 
Southeast Asia as a region, through its general rules which permit ASEAN to make 
regional international law and custom, as a separate legal person. This analytical 
framework used to explain and understand the distinctive regional law-making 
capacity of ASEAN is further developed in Chapter Three, by concentrating on the 
law-making of one subject of law which matters to ASEAN: non-intervention.  
The descriptive and evaluative vagueness of non-intervention, alongside the regional 
law-making capacity of ASEAN in term of its basis treaties and regional customary 
international law, are created by rules of general international law. This point matters 
because the case studies, in Chapters Four and Five, will show how the same body 
of practice can be understood as ASEAN having created a regional law of non-
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intervention as regional customary international law and subsequent practice in treaty 
interpretation. The outcome of this conclusion is to advance the core proposition that 
both the customary and treaty basis of ASEAN’s law-making of non-intervention are 
distinctively regional, with an ASEAN character, on the basis that general rules of 
international law enable it but can also constrain the scope of this distinctive regional 
law-making.  
II. Article 38 as a Statement of the Law8  
1) Treaties  
 
This section explains how two particular rules of general international law, i.e., the 
rules regarding the making of treaties and the formation of custom, form a wide legal 
basis which allow law-making to be generated by States or international 
organisations, as international legal actors. The general rules of international law 
regarding treaties and custom can be used as an analytical framework to identify, 
understand, and evaluate the international legal actors (including ASEAN) who are 
making international law to reflecting their broad agreement as to specific areas of 
cooperation. This section, therefore, advances the core proposition that a distinctive 
regional law of non-intervention has been made by ASEAN, which in itself is possible 
because of the rules of general international law.     
Article 38 is strictly an injunction, not a rule, on the ICJ to consider the four sources 
in its judicial conduct of cases.9 At general international law, however, Article 38 is a 
statement of the sources of international law,10 a “rule of recognition” for binding 
obligations.11 Article 38 bears the burden of international relations well. It is a 
convenient starting point to evaluate legal rights and obligations,12 an intrinsic part of 
international law-making.13  
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 See n1. On the role of instruments, generally see Boyle and Chinkin (n3) especially at 210-260; Joost 
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There is literature on point that explores how international organisations create a new 
legal “source”, which is not reflected in Article 38.14 Instead, I want to stress the 
relevance of treaties and customs, as paradigmatic sources of Article 38,15 within 
international organisations.16 It is the subject of treaties, to which I first turn.  
Although there is no formal hierarchy between the four sources in Article 38, treaties 
are still the most important source of obligations in practice.17 Their importance is 
based on the control that States still exercise, through their tacit or express consent, 
over international law-making.18 Legal obligations principally advance the self-
interests of States, although it is a separate matter whether those self-interests are 
aligned with the interests of the population within that State. As a legal source of 
binding obligations, then, treaties allow States to choose they are willing and able to 
agree, through consent in treaties.19  
As a consensualist regime, the law of treaties embodies corollaries such as non-
retroactivity and good faith.20 Here the legal rules are binding on all States because 
of its unquestionably universal character, partly because of the “unspoken 
assumption”21 that the 1969 Vienna Convention probably reflects customary 
international law (with the possible exception concerning reservations to treaties).22 
However, international law works because it relies on “something more” than 
consent,23 which cannot wholly be based on the whims of particular States.24  
I shall shortly elaborate on the vital role of international organisations, as a venue, to 
make such universal law in treaty form. For now, I want to emphasise two points in 
relation to treaties as a legal source of Article 38. First, there is a wide range of 
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interests that reflect changing social needs and are important for mankind, which 
justify the evolution of treaties beyond what was originally consented to.25   
Second, there are indications of a downward trend in terms of State support for 
multilateral treaties.26 Through international organisations, including ASEAN, its 
member States increasingly agree non-binding instruments, such as codes or 
guidelines. These instruments are not treaties because the member States did not 
agree to be bound by the commitments at international law. However, this increased 
recourse to such instruments, through international organisations as venues, 
interacts with treaty law. For example, such instruments can be evaluated as 
subsequent practice or as the fulfilling of specific purposes under an international 
organisation’s constituent instrument.27  
2) Custom  
 
This part supports the core proposition by elaborating on how the rules at general 
international law regarding the formation of custom contribute to an analytical 
framework, from which we can determine the regional law-making of an international 
organisation. As a source of law, custom is a spontaneous but universally binding 
form of international cooperation.28 Its two constituent elements, the general practice 
of States which is accepted as law (i.e., opinio juris)29 were recently affirmed by the 
ILC as the “basic approach”30 to determining custom’s content.31 In fact, the insistence 
of several States in retaining the term “opinio juris” (alongside the language of general 
State practice being accepted as law)32 attests to the primacy of consent to custom’s 
formation. 
However, Crawford reminds us that custom, at general international law, is not always 
universally binding.33 The rules on persistent and subsequent objection, as well as 
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particular custom, which apply to certain group of States, serve to underscore 
consent’s primacy to the opposability of custom, to all States, at general international 
law.34 However, it bears emphasis that these developments were influenced – 
sometimes attenuated - through international organisations.  
Three examples illustrate this point. First, the role of the International Law 
Commission’s (ILC) is a strong example of carrying out the General Assembly’s 
mandate,35 which has metamorphosed into combining progressive development and 
codification of international law. Pertinently, in its work on the identification of custom, 
the ILC’s Draft Conclusion Four states that the acts of international organisations can 
count as evidence for the “formation” or “expression” of customary rules.36 This 
approach was criticised by the Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization 
(AALCO) on grounds that the ILC’s output37 and ICJ case law are not State practice.38 
The Special Rapporteur replied as follows: “Regional views (i.e., of the AALCO) may 
be important, but on a topic like the identification of customary international law they 
must surely be seen as a contribution to a universal view of the matter.”39 
The second example of an international organisation’s role in shaping custom is the 
assertion, by the ICJ (a “principal” organ of the UN, with judicial competences)40 in 
Nicaragua,41 regarding non-intervention’s customary status on the basis of the 
General Assembly’s Friendly Relations Declaration (1970). I return to this matter in 
Chapter Three.42  
The third example is the law of the sea. As James Harrison had explained, different 
types of institutions were involved in shaping its laws, which broadly implicated core 
issues of jurisdiction and sovereignty.43 From the Hague Codification Conference 
(1930) to the ILC’s Four Geneva Conventions (1958), it was UNCLOS III which finally 
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created a universal legal order.44 Despite its ad hoc nature, UNCLOS III was 
facilitated through the UN, as an important venue, on which its organs such the 
General Assembly continue to advance the laws of the seas, including Resolution 
46/263 in 1994 on implementing Part XI of the resulting UN Convention on the Law 
of the Sea.45  
Though not a party to this resulting treaty, even the United States accepted that this 
treaty’s principal provisions represented custom.46 It is a powerful testament to the 
role of international organisations in shaping the qualitative nature of State consent, 
from an absolutist form to an evolutive granting of consent in a multilateral venue.  
III. How International Organisations Make General International Law  
1)  A Venue to Advance Treaties & Custom with Soft Law 
 
This section continues with the previous argument that general rules of international 
law, in particular the rules regarding the creation of treaties and custom, form a broad 
basis on which to identify and evaluate the law-making acts of international legal 
actors, such as international organisations. In this section, we will examine how these 
general rules in treaties and custom create international organisations, and endow 
them in turn with law-making capacity (including soft law), on grounds of their being 
separate legal persons. The purpose of this section, then, is to demonstrate how 
general rules of international law provide an analytical framework to identify and 
evaluate international organisations as being capable of creating regional law, which 
advances the core proposition that it is (i.e., regional law) influenced by general 
international law.  
As Koskenniemi and Crawford had observed, there is “no denying” that some 
international law is created and formulated through the institutional venues of 
international organisations.47 Having already surveyed the significance of treaties and 
custom in creating general rules of international law, this section explores the roles 
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that international organisations play in advancing treaties and customs. It examines 
an outcome of this role: the instruments that are made by an international 
organisation, as a separate legal person, which share a relationship with treaties and 
custom.  
Examples of these instruments include the setting of technical (and non-binding) rules 
with a universal application,48 such as the IAEA49 or MARPOL.50 These instruments 
are manifestations of “soft law”,51 a term which it is hard to define.52 “Soft law” 
instruments create expectations of behaviour but they are still non–binding.53 
Therefore, it is common to explain “soft law” as falling along a “continuum” or 
“spectrum” of international law-making between treaties or custom.54 In this study, the 
following “soft law” instruments which are made through the venues of international 
organisations are considered:55 communiques and statements of ASEAN organs;56 
UN General Assembly and Security Council resolutions;57 ICJ judgments; works of 
publicists; ILC draft articles and commentaries. 
As to the relationship between these instruments with Article 38’s treaties and custom, 
international lawyers variously explain that these instruments might: fill interstitial 
gaps;58 create a psychological moment;59 be interactive;60 represent a valuable 
element of practice;61 constitute important evidence of international law;62 act as an 
intermediary between treaties and custom.63  
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Consequently, one vital question that arises from this relationship between 
instruments with treaties and custom, formed within international organisations, is the 
matter of acquiescence and its relationship with consent.64 As I shortly explain, 
acquiescence in this sense is a form of tacit consent to the emergence of rules 
through (for instance) notification or discussion at any fora, but importantly there is no 
explicit protest against its emergence in response.65 Therefore, through the conduct 
of its representatives within an international organisation's organs, or otherwise in 
accordance with that international organisation's constituent instrument,66 a member 
State's practice can reflect acquiescence to a potential law-making instrument, in lieu 
of express consent.67 
In this respect, it is important to emphasise an important (and orthodox) point about 
the sources of international law here. There is an informal hierarchy between legal 
sources, in which treaties enjoy priority over custom.68 This informal hierachy reflects 
the practical acknowledgement of international legal practice: treaties often indicate 
particular resources being allocated to negotiating a certain outcome, over a specific 
time, which culminates in the treaty text.69 Put simply, a treaty (compared with custom) 
reflects the most probative evidence of State consent to the obligations and rights 
which binding at law.  
For clarity and from a technical standpoint, though, ICJ judgments and ILC draft 
articles and commentaries are obviously not “sources” of law, but their strong 
influence in advancing general rules of international law is evident. Be that as it may, 
it is practical, both in legal practice and policymaking, to refer to ICJ judgments (which 
are subsidiary means under Article 38) and ILC draft articles and commentaries 
because of the duration and influence being attached to (as well as the stature of 
particular lawyers who are involved in) producing the judgment or ILC work product 
on point.  
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Throughout this study, therefore, my recourse to ICJ judgments and ILC draft articles 
and its commentaries must be read with these clarifications in mind. Returning, then, 
to the matter of acquiescence and tacit consent, in Certain Expenses, the ICJ 
reasoned that the General Assembly’s power to budget for international peace and 
security is within Article 17, UN Charter:70 the longstanding practice of the UN organs 
reflect member States’ acquiescence and create a rebuttable presumption (despite 
the Soviet Union’s negative vote on occasions). 
In its Walls opinion, the Court relied on the practice of UN organs, the General 
Assembly and Security Council, to suggest that UN member States had acquiesced 
to an evolved interpretation of Article 12, UN Charter.71 Although Article 12(1) 
expressly states that the General Assembly should not make a recommendation 
when the Security Council is exercising its functions over a dispute, it seems that the 
subsequent practice of both organs and acquiescence of UN members to this practice 
has effectively rendered the words in Article 12(1) a dead letter.72 In its recent work 
on the subsequent practice and conduct of interpreting treaties, the ILC also endorsed 
this form of acquiescence as legally valid.73  
Acquiescence, I argue, has become a general rule at international law to appraise the 
legal effects of an international organisation’s actions.74 In terms of the soft law 
instruments that the organs of international organisations make, it is implausible as a 
pure legal point that these instruments can exist on the international plane and not be 
subject to the general rules of international law.75 As Boyle and Chinkin have 
observed, these instruments which are created by international organisations 
advance and formalise the international law-making process.76 I illustrate this point 
with two case studies below, regarding ASEAN organs which are prolific in generating 
a wide range of (non-binding) instruments.77  
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These implications, regarding soft law instruments and acquiescence,78 arise from an 
international organisation’s separate legal personality - a legal construct which the 
ICJ developed in its case law.79 There is some irony here. This is because our 
understanding of soft law instruments and acquiescence is shaped by the case law 
of the ICJ since Reparation, a case which I shortly explain, whose decisions strictly 
only bind the litigating parties. In fact, its case law, broadly defined as soft law 
instruments above, has considerably advanced general international law,80 
particularly in the field of international organisations.  
This ready recourse to the ICJ’s case law is not just a “subsidiary means”, under 
Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute, to determine “rules of law”. Two separate points 
bear emphasis. First, as a formal and technical matter of its binding nature, ICJ case 
law is binding on the litigating parties to the dispute. It is not binding on parties not 
involved in the dispute that gave rise to the case law, and only constitutes a subsidiary 
means of legal analysis in this sense.  
Second, however, ICJ case law is influential despite its formal legal basis as a 
subsidiary means of legal analysis. Philip Allott reminds us that a distinctive trait of 
our brain is its proclivity to detect patterns.81 Therefore, in terms of framing legal 
problems, the lawyer’s brain selects (and excludes) materials, arranges the relevant 
parts onto legal rules, and draws a legal conclusion.82 If this conclusion is widely 
accepted by those who operate in the discipline, it is recognised as good international 
lawyering.83 As Crawford explains: “I know good lawyering when I see it, including 
good international lawyering, and I could give an account of why it is good that others 
(including my opponents) could understand and even accept.”84 
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Thus our reliance on ICJ’s case law is, as Alvarez observes, a “self-fulfilling 
phenomenon”.85 Because the Court’s judicial output is publicly available, we expect 
international lawyering to engage with the reasoning in ICJ’s case law, despite its 
technical basis as non-binding instruments or “soft law”.   
Pertinently, through its case law on international organisations, the Court did not just 
supply vital clarifications to UN functions its early years. The ICJ’s reliance on its own 
case law on international organisations created rules at general international law, 
which lead other legal actors (tribunals, States, and international civil servants, for 
instance) to perceive international organisations as a separate legal persons, from 
the member States which created them.86  
Accordingly, the ICJ is not just a “principal judicial organ”87 but one of the UN’s 
“principal organs”.88 In the specific sense of the core proposition that regional law is 
shaped by general international law, the UN has performed a signal role as a venue 
in creating influential general rules at international law which shape the corollaries of 
legal personality, namely the law relating to the acquiescence of member States to 
the acts of organs,89 and the international responsibility of that international 
organisation.90  
2) What is an International Organisation? 
 
The part furthers the core proposition by explaining the influence of general rules at 
international law, which shaped the development of an international organisation’s 
separate legal personality. In 1865, the International Commission of the Cape Spartel 
was established.91  An outcome of a treaty between the Sultan of Morocco and 
Christian States, the Commission was created to facilitate freedom of navigation 
along the Moroccan coast.92 At first, it began with low institutionalisation.93 As the 
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Commission’s duties to run the lighthouse at Cape Spartel grew, the legal status of 
this lighthouse also became a matter of serious concern.94  
There were doubts if organs of international organisations could make law, including 
the essential capacity to enter into contracts to buy goods.95 Questions arose as to 
whether States intended to delegate power onto international organisations.96 The 
legal powers of the Commission’s organs had to be determined through 
interpretation,97 on grounds of its already enjoying and exercising functions which 
were necessary to its effective running.98  
Put another way, the characteristics which define an international organisation are 
neither exhaustive nor onerous.  This is why, in 2011, the ILC defined an international 
organisation as follows: “…an organization established by a treaty or other instrument 
governed by international law and possessing its own international legal personality. 
International organizations may include as members, in addition to States, other 
entities.”99 
 
The ILC emphasised that this definition was not intended for “all purposes”. It was 
one definition of an international organisation’s “common characteristics” that was 
aligned to ARIO’s purposes.100 The ILC also rejected an older definition of 
international organisations, in the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions, by dropping 
the “intergovernmental” from its definition in ARIO. As Jose Alvarez notes, this loose 
definition absorbs the proliferation of “collectivities”, usually with a technical focus 
which includes hybrid governmental and private actors.101 
In short, then, general international law does not set “stringent” rules to ascertain 
separate legal personality, which in turn implicates deeper issues as to how (and to 
what extent) an international organisation’s organs act separately from its member 
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States express consent in law-making. These issues directly flow from the ICJ’s case 
law, which we next consider to illustrate the core proposition that regional law is 
shaped by general international law.   
3) The ICJ Case Law on an International Organisation’s Objective Legal 
Personality at General International Law.  
 
The Reparation case decisively shaped the law of international organisations102 
regarding the contemporary issues of international law-making by (and through) 
international organisations, which I address below. Unsurprisingly, law-making of this 
nature has produced an emerging subject: an international organisation’s 
responsibility.103  
In Reparation, the Court was asked to determine whether the UN had legal capacity 
to bring claims against “injuries” for it or for third parties.104 It held in the affirmative 
that the UN must have legal personality to carry out the functions which the member 
States intended.105 The ICJ recognised the UN has “special tasks” to perform.106 It 
has duties and rights in relation to the maintenance of international peace and 
security.  
Controversially, it reasoned that the functions that member States intended of the UN, 
as a “supreme type” of international organisation, can be specified in implied from the 
constituent instruments or through practice within the UN.107 The Court took a 
functional approach, holding that an international organisation's powers could arise 
from a necessary implication.108 In short, an international organisation must be 
deemed to have those powers it needs in order to function effectively.109  
The Court’s reasoning affirmed the role of State consent in international legal 
obligations. In qualitative terms, though, it affirmed consent and “something more”.110 
The functions, duties, and rights enjoyed by an international organisation such as the 
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UN can be traced back to what was consented to by member States in the UN 
Charter. But the Charter, a treaty, may adapt to the “requirements of international 
life”.111 Its functions are given effectiveness because it cannot always be based 
entirely on the whims – or pure consent - of its member States.112  
This argument of “necessary implication”113 is not new. In the ILO Advisory case 
(1926),114 the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) decided that, after 
considering the purposes of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the 
constituent treaty gave the ILO the “competence” to legislate for specific wage 
earners.115 In the European Commission Blue Danube case (1927),116 the PCIJ again 
endorsed this approach to the implied powers of an international organisation. When 
member States create an entity at law, the latter is allowed to exercise its functions 
without restrictions, subject to the constituent instrument.117 
The vital issue of consent, by member States as to how an international organisations’ 
organs were able to act, were implicitly addressed by the Court in a series of cases.118 
As a UN organ, its approach created a standard vocabulary and method of legal 
argument at general international law, which applied to all international 
organisations.119 In Certain Expenses, the ICJ held that the practice of member States 
and the organs are interrelated. Thus they form the general practice of that 
international organisation.120 The practice of organs, the Court reasoned, can serve 
as proxies for State consent.121  
In Namibia, the ICJ said that organ practice is probative for interpretation of 
subsequent practice under Article 31,122 although it is at odds with the plain textual 
meaning of the Charter.123 In the Wall case,124 the Court again attached weight to the 
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general practice of the UN: the textual language in Article 12, UN Charter seems to 
prohibit the General Assembly from addressing an issue, once the Security Council 
acts on it.125 However, the Court held that UN member States had acquiesced to the 
General Assembly’s practice of dealing with an issue together with the Security 
Council.126  
This survey of the Court’s case law underscores an important point. It was an 
international organisation, i.e., the UN, through the ICJ as one of its principal organs, 
which served as a venue for creating rules at general international law which are 
potentially applicable to all international organisations.127 Despite the valid 
qualifications that only States (not international organisations) have plenary 
competences at international law, these days we take for granted the legal construct 
of separate legal personality. These cases affirm the rule in Reparation as to an 
international organisation’s separate legal personality. Indeed, we readily assume an 
international organisation’s legal personality because it is the corollaries (such as the 
international responsibility of an international organisation), now broadly part of the 
law of international organisations, which are more controversial.   
Thus this part advanced the core proposition, i.e., regional law is determined by 
general international law, by showing how the general international law of separate 
legal personality was created by an international organisation (i.e., the UN, through 
the ICJ) itself. Once created, this rule of separate legal personality strengthens the 
force of general international law concerning international organisations, with 
consequences for the making of regional law by international organisations. The next 
part elaborates on this point.  
4) Separate Actions and International Responsibility as Corollaries of 
Separate Legal Personality 
 
The “common ends” (i.e., the shared goals) of an international organisation, as 
broadly agreed by member States, must be made effective through interpretation.128 
However, this raises (rebuttable) presumptions about the member States’ 
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acquiescence to the conduct of the organs within that international organisation.129 
One explanation of acquiescence’s validity at law, as a corollary of an international 
organisation’s legal personality, is the notion that the organ’s actions are separate 
from those of the member States.130 Therefore, this part furthers the core proposition 
by illustrating how international organisations can create regional law, which are 
enabled by developments of the rules at general international law. I examine this point 
in terms of the double function of State representatives who act within international 
organisations. 
Within an international organisation, the representative131 of a member State acts and 
speaks, in a formal capacity, for her State: the more high-ranking the representative, 
then it is reasonable to attach more weight to the potential legal consequences and 
opposability, which arise against her State at international law.132 Dual conduct occurs 
simultaneously. For example, the representatives who sit in an ASEAN organ perform 
a dual role.133 On the one hand, they are jointly acting as an ASEAN organ within the 
overall functions of ASEAN.134 On the other hand, they are also individually acting as 
representatives of their respective States, with the express aim of advancing national 
interests.  
However, the conduct of these representatives, for ASEAN States or as ASEAN 
member States, can still be evaluated as acquiescence to an ASEAN organ’s 
actions.135 As I argued earlier, ASEAN organs did not endorse changes to non-
intervention through “flexible engagement”.136 This proposition, i.e., that “flexible 
engagement” is not an ASEAN act because it was never articulated by an ASEAN 
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organ, is supported by the weight of ICJ case law on international organisations since 
Reparation.       
Another corollary of an international organisation’s separate legal personality is the 
ILC’s progressive development of rules on the international responsibility of 
international organisations,137 conducted through its organs. The ILC’s work, then, 
has reinforced the separateness of an international organ’s actions from its member 
States.138 This is plausible only because of its heavy reliance on the ICJ’s body of 
case law on international organisations. Accordingly, Article 6(1), ARIO states: “The 
conduct of an organ or agent of an international organization in the performance of 
functions of that organ or agent shall be considered an act of that organization under 
international law, whatever position the organ or agent holds in respect of the 
organization.” 
 
The organic link between an organ and the international organisation is reinforced in 
Article 8, ARIO as follows: “The conduct of an organ or agent of an international 
organization shall be considered an act of that organization under international law if 
the organ or agent acts in an official capacity and within the overall functions of that 
organization, even if the conduct exceeds the authority of that organ or agent or 
contravenes instructions.”139 
 
Thus, despite the apparent artificiality of separating the conduct of representatives 
who often act as agents of organs,140 the actions of international organisations 
(including law-making acts) can create legal consequences, which are distinct from 
its member States.141 Importantly, this part has furthered the core proposition’s 
position as to the influence of general international law (on regional law) by 
demonstrating the general rules which have emerged, as a consequence of an 
international organisation’s separate legal personality.  
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Pertinently, in relation to ASEAN’s regional law-making, this study will focus on the 
formal statements by ASEAN organs as “official” acts regarding non-intervention’s 
content with an ASEAN character.142 As already explained in Chapter One, this 
approach is a foil to the canonical treatment of non-intervention in the International 
Relations literature, which links its salience to the “ASEAN Way”, without 
differentiations between acts of ASEAN States from ASEAN member States.143  
IV. How International Organisations Make Regional Law   
1) Regional Custom: A Building Block of Regional Law 
 
This section develops the core proposition that general international law permits the 
identification and evaluation of international organisations as separate legal persons, 
which are capable of making regional law. The purpose of this section, then, is to 
advance the core proposition by showing how general rules of international law permit 
and influence international organisations to make regional custom, which is distinctive 
to a specific area.  
In the last section, I explored how international organisations, at general international 
law, act as venues to create general rules such as separate legal personality, the 
separate acts of international organisations’ organs, and their international 
responsibility. I also explained how this rule-setting in a multilateral context of an 
international organisation creates outcomes, in the form of non-binding instruments, 
i.e., soft law, at general international law.  
Having explained how influential general rules of international law arose with respect 
to international organisations, this section builds on the two elements of venue and 
outcome by focussing on its manifestations in regional law making. International 
organisations, including ASEAN, can (and do) make regional law, on grounds of 
geography or a community of values which is shared by a group of States.  I will show 
how general international law, through law-making efforts by the ICJ and ILC, enabled 
regional law to exist at all. However, regional law is evanescent. It is subject to 
persistent claims of universality, on grounds of global cooperation.144  
Turning first to the ICJ, it started to develop regional law, in the particular form of 
regional custom in the Asylum (1950) case: “(Colombia) has relied on an alleged 
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regional or local custom peculiar to Latin-American States…The Party which relies 
on a custom of this kind must prove that this custom is established in such a manner 
that it has become binding on the other Party. The Colombian Government must 
prove that the rule invoked by it is in accordance with a constant and uniform usage 
practised by the States in question, and that this usage is the expression of a right 
appertaining to the State granting asylum and a duty incumbent on the territorial 
State.”145 Therefore, Colombia’s argument that a regional custom existed failed 
because the ICJ ruled that the practice was neither constant nor uniform.146 In the 
Rights of American Nationals in Morocco (1952),147 the Court again used the term 
“local custom” by approving its dictum in Asylum that the “establishment of local 
custom” must be based on constant and uniform usage.   
 
By 1960, in the Rights of Passage case,148 the ICJ widened the notion of “local 
custom” to custom which is particular between States.149 In other words, it is not just 
geographical contiguity which defines regional custom. The particularity of local 
custom can include attitudes between States, not enjoined by geographical contiguity, 
which are accepted as law: “With regard to Portugal's claim of a right of passage as 
formulated by it on the basis of local custom, it is objected on behalf of India that no 
local custom could be established between only two States. It is difficult to see why 
the number of States between which a Iocal custom may be established on the basis 
of long practice must necessarily be larger than two. The Court sees no reason why 
long continued practice between two States accepted by them as regulating their 
relations should not form the basis of mutual rights and obligations between the two 
States.”150  
 
In 1986, the Court restated that custom can be regional in terms of geographical 
contiguity. In the Nicaragua case, it concluded: “…the Court finds that in customary 
international law, whether of a general kind or that particular to the inter-American 
legal system, there is no rule permitting the exercise of collective self-defence in the 
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absence of a request by the State which regards itself as the victim of an armed 
attack.”151  
 
In the Frontier Dispute case (1986),152 the Court again validated custom’s regional 
character with respect to uti possiditis: “The fact that the new African States have 
respected the administrative boundaries and frontiers established by the colonial 
powers must be seen not as a mere practice contributing to the gradual emergence 
of a principle of customary international law, limited in its impact to the African 
continent as it had previously been to Spanish America, but as the application in 
Africa of a rule of general scope.”153 
 
More recently, in the Navigational and Related Rights case (2009),154 the ICJ merely 
assumed without elucidation that regional custom can exist at general international 
law: “The Court does not consider that it is required to take a position in this case on 
whether and to what extent there exists, in customary international law, a régime 
applicable to navigation on “international rivers”, either of universal scope or of a 
regional nature covering the geographical area in which the San Juan is situated.”155 
 
This survey of case law, since the Asylum case, suggests that, although the Court 
has affirmed that regional law as custom can exist at international law, it declined to 
explain the meaning of regional or local custom. Both types of custom point to a 
broader phenomenon of “particular custom”, which only binds certain States.156 
Relatedly, Maurice Mendelson tells us that the “local” in particular customs meant a 
“particular area of the earth’s surface”.157 As I shortly argue, an “area of the earth’s 
surface” is not always self-evident as a fact. In relation to “Southeast Asia” as a region, 
it was – it is – an assertion which was universalised through general international law.  
 
The recent Navigational and Related Rights case follows this established trend of 
assertions that regional law, based on geography, can exist. Hence, on the matter on 
subsistence fishing between the riparian communities of Costa Rica and Nicaragua, 
                                                            
151
 See n41 at para 199.  
152
 Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali) (Judgment) [1986] ICJ Rep 554 (“Frontier Dispute”). 
153
 Ibid at para 21.  
154
 Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) [2009] ICJ Rep 213 
(“Navigational and Related Rights”).  
155
 Ibid at para 34. Generally see Luigi Crema, “The ‘‘Right Mix’’ and ‘‘Ambiguities’’ in Particular Customs: 
A Few Remarks on the Navigational and Related Rights Case” in International Courts and the 
Development: Essays in Honour of Tullio Treves (Nerina Boschiero et al eds) (The Hague: TMC Asser 
Press, 2013) at 65-75.  
156
 See further the ILC’s discussion on particular customs, n32 at para 80.  
157
 Maurice Mendelson, The Formation of Customary International Law: Collected Courses of the Hague 
Academy of International Law (Volume 272) (Leiden/Boston: Brill Nijhoff, 1998) at 215.  
73 
 
the Court decided that, somewhat obliquely, regional custom which is particular to 
both States obtained: “Subsistence fishing has without doubt occurred over a very 
long period…the Parties agree that the practice of subsistence fishing is long 
established. They disagree however whether the practice has become binding on 
Nicaragua…For the Court, the failure of Nicaragua to deny the existence of a right 
arising from the practice which had continued undisturbed and unquestioned over a 
very long period, is particularly significant. The Court accordingly concludes that 
Costa Rica has a customary right.”158 
 
2) The ILC Universalises the ICJ’s Case Law 
 
This part develops the core proposition by showing how even regional custom (a 
specific type of regional law) as created by international organisations, between 
particular States, would still be influenced by general international law, in terms of its 
legal grounding on which to create regional custom. To this extent, the ILC’s Draft 
Conclusion 16 says this about regional custom: “A rule of particular customary 
international law, whether regional, local or other, is a rule of customary international 
law that applies only among a limited number of States.”159 
 
In other words, particular custom is the exception to the general rule on custom: the 
latter is universal and binding, if the dual elements of state practice and opinio juris 
are satisfied. The ILC had relied on the ICJ’s case law160 to affirm a legal view that 
particular custom covers a “certain geographical area” (regional custom) or those 
constituting a “community of interests” (local custom), the latter not being limited to 
geography.161 This clarifies and builds on the thinness of legal reasoning in the Court’s 
case law, and is a powerful reminder of how international organisations (through its 
organs) advance general international law.  
 
In terms of legal sources under Article 38, the ICJ’s case law is obviously not binding. 
As indicated already, the Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization (AALCO)162 
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criticised this elevation, of the ICJ’s jurisprudence to a “high pedestal”163 of “primary 
materials”,164 as “worrisome”.165 The ILC Special Rapporteur responded:  
 
I do think this may be based on a misunderstanding. It is important to distinguish two separate matters: 
- First, the materials that need to be looked at in order to ascertain the methodology for identifying rules 
of customary international law. 
- Second, the materials (evidence) needed to be examined in order to determine whether a rule of 
customary international law exists.166 
 
In the Special Rapporteur’s telling, the ILC’s work falls under the first matter of being 
“materials” being used to ascertain “methodology” in identifying custom. The 
AALCO’s rejoinder rightly noted: “the consequences of such a distinction between 
methodology and particular rules of law should not merely be asserted, but need to 
be proved.”167  
 
A “methodology” is a system of methods which are used in a certain field.168 In this 
purported field of identifying rules of custom, i.e., secondary rules, the “methodology” 
presumably means the method, an application of a conceptual apparatus (i.e., the 
ILC’s draft conclusions) to the practical problems of identifying custom in international 
legal practice.169 For these reasons, the Special Rapporteur is correct to apply, as a 
so-called “methodology”, i.e., those posited rules by States, which count as 
conclusive evidence for determining custom.  
 
The Special Rapporteur barely made a persuasive case, even if one accepts (for the 
sake of an argument) his position that States’ consent to regional custom is prioritised 
as a “rule”.170 In aid of his position, the Special Rapporteur confined himself to two 
examples of practice in relation to European States, namely the views of Belgium 
(customary rule to prosecute or extradite persons who had committed crimes of 
humanity) and that of Switzerland (non-refoulment as a regional customary law in 
Europe).171 
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To conclude: the ILC’s existence is the permanent outcome of the multilateral actions 
of another principal UN organ, the General Assembly.172 That its work serves more 
as a “methodology” (guidance) and not as evidence of determining custom is not the 
point.173 When the Special Rapporteur and the ILC speak, through the UN as a venue 
and in the draft conclusions, its authority can potentially creates legal effects. This 
authority was used to deflect the AALCO’s regional concerns with subtle claims that 
universalism exists, at all levels: “The work of the ILC is nothing if it is not collective. 
The Special Rapporteur is a servant of the Commission, whose proposals are often 
more in the nature of “kite-flying” than anything else. They are launched, and then 
blown hither and thither by members of the Commission (and by States), and they 
emerge the better for the collective consideration.”174  
 
V. How Regional Law is made for Southeast Asia  
1) Introduction  
 
This section develops the study’s core proposition as to how the distinctive regional 
law (of non-intervention) is influenced by general international law, which is presented 
in two broad ways. First, in this section, we will explore the roles of powerful external 
actors who “create” a region of Southeast Asia through the use of treaties over a 
period of time. The presence and active roles of external powers in influencing the 
regional law-making of ASEAN will be a constant feature, as demonstrated in the 
following and concluding chapters.  
At the outset of this chapter, I stressed two elements of venue and outcome which 
involve international organisations. I have also discussed how international 
organisations can make general and regional international law. This final section 
concentrates these discussions with particular reference to “Southeast Asia”. This 
approach is important because Southeast Asia is, I argue, an area which exists 
largely because general international law permits its characterisation as a region.  
Second, therefore, because general international law allows us to characterise this 
area as a region in legal terms, so a form of regional law based on geography and 
values can be created for States in Southeast Asia. After decolonisation, rules at 
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general international law applied to all States including the Third World States, an 
automatic result of international relations as determined by the former colonial rulers. 
Thus ASEAN became a venue to advance the regional law-making of non-
intervention, which in turn shapes a region of Southeast Asia.  
2) “Southeast Asia” is a Necessary Invention   
 
This part furthers the core proposition by explaining how the region of “Southeast 
Asia” had to be created through the conduct of powerful external actors that 
influenced the general rules of international law, which in turn gradually shaped the 
“regionality” of Southeast Asia. In this respect, then, words are not just copies of 
things but contain a basic power to define reality.175 This is true for “Southeast Asia”: 
this area is partly made “real”, a region, because of the rules at general international 
law. In terms of geographical contiguity, “Southeast Asia” is “real” enough: we can 
point to a defined area of “Southeast Asia” on a map. The ASEAN Charter validates 
this reality, as a criterion of admission by sovereign States, to ASEAN. It says that 
membership is based on: “Location in the recognised geographical region of Southeast Asia.”176 
However, the fact of geographical contiguity does not inevitably yield the conclusion 
that “Southeast Asia” is real. Indeed, Donald Emmerson tells us that there are at least 
twelve variations to the English spelling of “Southeast Asia”:177 “Southeast Asia";178 
"South East Asia"; "South-East Asia";179 "South-east Asia"; "southeast Asia"; "south-
east Asia"; "Southeastern Asia"; "South Eastern Asia"; "South-Eastern Asia";  "South-
eastern Asia", "southeastern Asia"; (xii) "south-eastern Asia’.  
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Therefore, as late as 1965, the London Times thought that “South-east Asia” was a 
cartographic “upstart”.180 Even in 2008, the ICJ in the Pedra Branca case181 seemed 
unable to make up its mind.182 The Court referred to this area as “southeast Asia”,183 
“south-east Asia”184 and “South East Asian”.185  
 
The creation of an Association of Southeast186 Asian Nations, i.e., ASEAN, indicated 
some agreement between member States as to the existence of a region capable of 
sharing common values.187 This point is manifest in the membership of Myanmar, 
Cambodia, Lao, and Vietnam, whose admission confirmed their agreement that they 
“belonged” to Southeast Asia.188 In other words, common values are defined in 
geographical terms, relative to an area in which ten sovereign States are located.  
 
As a legal person, ASEAN can conduct external relations with other States and 
international organisations.189 Article 41(3) of the ASEAN Charter states: “ASEAN 
shall be the primary driving force in regional arrangements that it initiates and 
maintain its centrality in regional cooperation and community building.”190 
 
What is “external” and “regional” to ASEAN must be assessed against a contingent 
reality. It is – it can be - a “primary driving force” subject to the Great Powers’191 tacit 
agreement who act as powerful external powers. This point is apparent in the ongoing 
defining of Southeast Asia’s common values with the Great Powers, advanced 
through ASEAN as a venue. Prominent examples include: the ASEAN + 3 (Japan, 
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China and South Korea) Process;192 East Asia Summit (ASEAN + 3, India, Australia 
and New Zealand);193 and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF);194  
 
However, the Great Powers, especially the United States and UK, were long involved 
in this area even before ASEAN was created (see Diagram A). It is their previous 
involvement that set general rules of international law, on which ASEAN derives its 
regionality as an international organisation for States in an area of Southeast Asia. 
The following part elaborates on this point with examples.  
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3) Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty (1954 Manila Pact):195 An Early 
Attempt to Define Southeast Asia 
 
This part supports the core proposition by instancing one example of how the conduct 
of powerful external actors, at general international law, would influence the 
acceptance by the “locals” of Southeast Asia as a reality after decolonisation. To this 
extent, and led by the United States, the 1954 Manila Pact was a collective defence 
treaty dedicated to the “containment” of communist China.196 Its Article V established 
a “Council” to “provide for consultation with regard to military and any other planning 
as the situation obtaining in the treaty area may from time to time”. Effectively, then, 
the Manila Pact was an international organisation, as broadly defined earlier, with 
some measure of institutionalisation in the Council. 
Within a specified “treaty area”, its parties197 agreed to a system of collective defence 
against “aggression by means of an armed attack”.198 Article VIII defines the “treaty 
area” as follows: “the general area of Southeast Asia, including also the entire 
territories of the Asian parties,199 and the general area of the Southwest Pacific not 
including the Pacific area north of 21 degrees 30 minutes north latitude.200 The parties 
may, by unanimous agreement, amend this article to include within the treaty area 
the territory of any state acceding to this Treaty in accordance with Article VII or 
otherwise to change the treaty area.”201 
 
In treaty form, Article VIII is an extraordinary provision that advanced early ideas of 
“Southeast Asia”. Apart from the (unhyphenated)202 words, i.e., “Southeast Asia”, the 
parties in the “treaty area” were a “rump group”.203 A few did not belong to what is 
now the “geographically recognised region” of Southeast Asia, as stated in the 
ASEAN Charter.204 Second, racialisation is apparent. By “Asian parties”,205 this term 
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 Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty (adopted 8 September 1954, entered into force 19 
February 1955) (1955) 209 UNTS 24 (“Manila Pact”).   
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 With the involvement of the United States in Vietnam from 1964, the Manila Pact (ibid) became 
unworkable: generally see Ralph Braibanti, “The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty” (1957) 30 
Pacific Affairs 321.   
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evidently meant the Philippines, Pakistan and Thailand. Presumably, they were 
“Asian” because they did not resemble the rest. They were “The Other”, the subject 
of constructive description.206   
For political reasons, Cambodia, Lao, and South Vietnam were absorbed into a 
“general area” of non-communist States.207 Pakistan’s inclusion (1955) and eventual 
withdrawal (1972) would help to settle the limits of this “general area”. The Philippines, 
Thailand, Cambodia, Lao, and Vietnam would eventually belong to a “geographically 
recognised region” of Southeast Asia. Not Australia and New Zealand, in contrast, 
despite their geographical propinquity to the region.  
Because Article VIII included a few “Asian parties” in treaty form, the other “locals” 
found their natural inclusion into a “general area of Southeast Asia”. For example, 
given the irredentist claims between the Philippines and Malaysia over Sabah,208 
“Southeast Asia” must include Malaysia,209 although it was not a party to the Manila 
Pact. In turn, “Southeast Asia” must include Singapore because it was a federal State 
of Malaysia, until its secession as a sovereign State in 1965. Finally, since Australia 
and New Zealand, as part of the treaty area, were cartographically interposed 
between Indonesia, it was logical to include Indonesia in “Southeast Asia”. 
As I shortly explain, Article VIII, though externally foisted onto this area by the United 
States,210 would nonetheless later shape the “locals’” indigenous effort to form 
ASEAN, a venue which serves to determine further who belonged as ASEAN member 
States. The Manila Pact’s use of “Southeast Asia” as an expression to describe the 
region gave substance to the need for maintaining regional peace and security, which 
was later adapted in the TAC’s purpose of regional cooperation to advance peace, 
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stability and harmony.211 Therefore the Manila Pact, an international organisation,212 
created early ideas of a “region” of “Southeast Asia”, by delimitating States and 
excluding colonial entities who are located in the area.   
4) The ICJ Influences Regional History for “Southeast Asia”: Anglo-Dutch 
Treaty & the Pedra Branca Case.  
  
This part furthers the core proposition by demonstrating how the regionality of 
Southeast Asia as an area is given substance through general international law, 
which is especially facilitated by the UN as an international organisation. To 
appreciate the UN’s role, through the ICJ in the Pedra Branca case, in making 
regional law by rehabilitating the colonial213 history of “Southeast Asia”, it is first useful 
to sketch some aspects of the Anglo-Dutch Treaty (1824).214 In cartographic terms, 
the putative region “Southeast Asia” is somewhere to the south of China215 and east 
of India. To the British and Dutch in 1824, the region did not exist in a coherent way. 
This is why the Anglo-Dutch Treaty used the words “East Indies” and “Eastern Seas” 
interchangeably to refer to this area in general.216   
 
The treaty title clearly pronounces it as an agreement only between two States, the 
United Kingdom and Netherlands,217 who had “respective possessions” and 
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“commerce” they wanted to protect.218 The treaty sought to create a “mutually 
beneficial” political settlement for both parties,219 which resulted in their agreement to 
carve up respective spheres of influence:220 “(both parties)…admit the subjects of 
each other to trade in their respective possessions in the Eastern Archipelago,221 and 
on the continent of India, and in Ceylon…” 
 
Consequently, the lucrative spices located in the Moluccas Islands (now part of 
Indonesia) exclusively belonged to the Dutch.222 If the Netherlands were to abandon 
their monopoly to this particular “possessions”, other States, such as the UK, were to 
be given commercial access to the spice, on an equal footing.223 Only Europeans 
could potentially benefit from this treaty. A “native Asiatic power”224 (whatever that 
means) had no access to international law: it was not on the same “footing”.225 
Southeast Asia, as a region for the “locals”, did not exist. 
 
Against this background to the Pedra Branca case, one of the key issues that the ICJ 
had to decide was whether Singapore or Malaysia had sovereignty over Pedra 
Branca.226 An island along the Straits of Singapore, the Pedra Branca is a collection 
of granite rocks over 8560 square meters.227 The Horsburgh Lighthouse, still active, 
sits on the Pedra Branca. To prove sovereign title, Malaysia and Singapore relied on 
the Anglo Dutch Treaty of 1824 to advance their respective submissions on the issue 
of sovereign title over Pedra Branca.  
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The Anglo-Dutch treaty’s provenance lies in colonial law,228 as some form of legal 
“source”.229 The ICJ, Malaysia, and Singapore were (deliberately) unclear about the 
Anglo-Dutch treaty’s status as a legal source.230 The question of whether Malaysia or 
Singapore acquired sovereign title (or “transferred” sovereign title from the British) 
over the Pedra Branca during this colonial period, starting from the Anglo-Dutch 
Treaty (1824), was not addressed.231 Instead the approach adopted by Singapore 
and Malaysia seemed to accept that this treaty had (some) legal basis in framing the 
issue of sovereign title over Pedra Branca, without explaining why since both States 
were not parties to the Anglo-Dutch Treaty, to advance their specific goals.   
 
Particularly, Singapore and Malaysia relied on the Anglo-Dutch Treaty’s (i.e., a treaty) 
form as conclusive authority of political realities in this area, at that point in time, to 
further its arguments in a dispute of the 21st century. Put another way, it was irrelevant 
to the task of adjudication that both States were not involved as “locals” to the Anglo-
Dutch Treaty. The Court was used as a venue, through the voluntary submission by 
Singapore and Malaysia to its jurisdiction, to validate “history” of this area, in which 
this treaty offered (some) legal basis for appraisal. Therefore, no irony was intended 
in Singapore’s “factual” approach,232 which argued: “…the Treaty did not divide up 
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the waters of the Singapore Strait between the British and the Dutch or between 
Sultan Abdul Rahman (under Dutch protection) and Sultan Hussein (under British 
protection) … the Treaty left the entire Singapore Strait undivided and open to access 
by both the British and the Dutch. This historical truth is confirmed by the negotiating 
history which shows that although the Dutch initially proposed a demarcation line 
within the Singapore Strait, the idea was abandoned for fear that any such 
demarcation line would invite the jealousy of other powers…Hence, the demarcation 
line shown in Malaysia’s supposedly illustrative map is entirely speculative and has 
no historical, geographical or legal basis.”233 
  
Significantly, the Court endorsed this “factual” approach on the basis that “the 
substantive provisions of Articles 8 to 12 which provide for a set of mutual territorial 
adjustments, that the 1824 Anglo-Dutch Treaty was concluded to settle once and for 
all the disputes that had developed between the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands…”.234 Consequently, the ICJ used this exchange of colonial 
possessions, a “political settlement”,235 as evidence, in treaty form, to support its legal 
conclusion that two spheres of influence existed. Accordingly, this conclusion allowed 
the Court to reject Singapore’s argument that there was a “legal vacuum” in terms of 
sovereignty over Pedra Branca at that point in time:236 “…the Treaty was the legal 
reflection of a political settlement reached between the two colonial Powers, vying for 
hegemony for many years in this part of the world, to divide the territorial domain of 
the old Sultanate of Johor into two sultanates to be placed under their respective 
spheres of influence. Thus in this scheme there was no possibility for any legal 
vacuum left for freedom of action to take lawful possession of an island in between 
these two spheres of influence. This political settlement signified at the same time 
that the territorial division between the two Sultanates of Johor and of Riau-Lingga 
was made definitive by the conclusion of this Anglo-Dutch Treaty.”237 
 
Though the ICJ referred to “spheres of influence” in this case, it did not explain what 
it means. A “sphere of influence” could simply mean an annexed territory.238 More 
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usually, though, it means the exerting of influence by a colonial power (such as the 
UK) on an entity for which it is totally dependent but also nominally sovereign.239  
  
What bears emphasis, however, is the Court’s reasoning that this “sphere of 
influence” (whatever it means) is a “legal reflection”, manifested in the Anglo-Dutch 
Treaty. Plainly, it did not “interpret” the Anglo-Dutch treaty, as we would under the law 
of treaties today. Remarkably and certainly, it used this treaty in some constructive 
sense to appraise the colonial powers’ conduct there over 100 years, from 1852-
1952:240 “The Court is of the opinion that the relevant facts… reflect a convergent 
evolution of the positions of the Parties regarding title to Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu 
Puteh.”241 
 
As a principal organ of the UN, therefore, the Court became a venue to rehabilitate 
the colonial history of “Southeast Asia”242 as the legal history of “Southeast Asia”. This 
involved the ICJ’s selective taking of a position on a moment in colonial history, in 
relation to who had sovereign control over this area: Regarding the question as to 
whether “[t]he Sultanate [of Johor] covered all the islands within this large area [of its 
territory], including all those in the Singapore Straits, such as Pulau Batu Puteh243 . . 
.”, the Court starts by observing that it is not disputed that the Sultanate of Johor, 
since it came into existence in 1512, established itself as a sovereign State with a 
certain territorial domain under its sovereignty in this part of southeast Asia. Thus 
already at the beginning of the seventeenth century, Hugo Grotius, commenting on 
the military conflict between the Sultanate of Johor and Portugal, stated that: “There 
is in India a kingdom called Johore, which has long been considered a sovereign 
principality [supremi principatus], so that its ruler clearly possessed the authority 
necessary to conduct a public war [against the Portuguese].” (Hugo Grotius, De Jure 
Praedae, Vol. I Translation, 1950 (Gwladys L. Williams), Classics of International 
Law, p. 314.)244 
 
In taking its position on this area, the Court retrospectively determined issues of 
geography: there is, it held, a Johor Sultanate which “established itself as a sovereign 
State with a certain territorial domain under its sovereignty in this part of southeast 
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Asia”.245 However, as Judge Rajeeva observed, the Johor Sultan was a “passive and 
impotent spectator” in the face of colonial expansion.246 This colonial organisation and 
apportionment of the area (i.e., of Southeast Asia) can be traced back to the Anglo-
Dutch Treaty of 1824,247 some form of legal source, on which the ICJ used to 
manufacture a moment in the history of Southeast Asia.  
 
These positions of the Court on the area’s (i.e., the putative Southeast Asia) colonial 
past is necessary to facilitate a final determination as to who had sovereign title to the 
Pedra Branca (i.e., Singapore). As case law, however, the Court’s determination on 
the history of Southeast Asia, and the Anglo Dutch Treaty’s legal relevance, is more 
than “subsidiary means” under Article 38. The ICJ has pronounced on the history, the 
relations, attitudes of the “locals” with respect to the colonial powers, and the legal 
fact of Southeast Asia’s existence at a given point in time. While this judgment is not 
strictly binding (except in relation to Singapore and Malaysia) with respect to ASEAN, 
the Court’s stature, as well the resources being used to facilitate the Court’s judicial 
reasoning in Pedra Branca, is an influential soft law instrument which exists at general 
international law, subject to the acquiescence and tacit consent by ASEAN and other 
international legal persons of the ICJ’s reasoning.  
 
In this respect, it bears stressing the point is not that the ICJ had “wrongly” decided 
the “history” of Southeast Asia, based on its reading of the Anglo-Dutch treaty. The 
history of this region had to be interpreted in some constructive sense, in order to 
resolve a legal dispute between Singapore and Malaysia. Instead, and most 
importantly in terms of the core proposition’s significance, the Pedra Branca 
judgment’s influence on regional law-making for ASEAN lies in the legal determination 
of history for the practical purpose of reaching legal outcomes for putative legal 
disputes, when new cases arise in due course.    
VI. How Regional Law is made by the “Locals”: ASEAN and its Progenitors  
 
This final section builds on the core proposition that regional law is influenced by 
general international law as follows. It shows how, after decolonisation, the newly 
independent States accepted general international law’s rules as to the creation of 
Southeast Asia’s regionality. Using these general rules, which allow the identification 
                                                            
245
 Ibid.   
246
 See Declaration of Judge Ranjeva (n181, para 5 at 107). Generally see Barbara Watson Andaya and 
Leonard Y Andaya, A History of Early Modern Southeast Asia, 1400-1830 (Cambridge: CUP, 2015), 
especially at 341-343. 
247
 Declaration of Judge Ranjeva, ibid.  
87 
 
of international legal persons such as ASEAN, the new ASEAN member States 
gradually accepted that they belong to a region. This is a region that had been created 
for them during colonisation and by external actors, through the general rules of 
treaty-making, such as the capacity of States and international organisations (as legal 
persons) to enter into treaties. Against this context, the distinctive regional law-making 
capacity of ASEAN organs qua ASEAN started on its establishment in 1967.  
 
It bears stressing that although the distinctive regional law-making by ASEAN started 
in 1967, this idea of Southeast Asia’s regionality did not definitively begin only upon 
ASEAN’s establishment in 1967. This point matters because it comports with the core 
proposition that regional law is influenced by general rules of international law. Put 
another way, ASEAN was a venue which facilitated the acceptance by the “locals” 
that Southeast Asia existed as a region, but the idea of “Southeast Asia” had already 
been created at general international law by powerful external actors.   
 
In this respect, then, I have already explained how the Manila Pact (1954) was one 
early – and external – effort to organise the region, on grounds of its being “Southeast 
Asia”.248 In fact, since 1943, “South-East Asia” (with the hyphen) was invented by the 
Allied Powers as a theatre of war, the “South-East Asia Command”.249 This war effort 
was another early effort to cohere a region in geographical terms, even though the 
intentions were thoroughly expedient.  
 
After decolonisation, the “locals” quickly embraced the term “Southeast Asia”, already 
established in the Manila Pact, possibly because it was efficient to define common 
goals for the new sovereign States who found themselves geographically related to 
the area.  Hence, in 1961, the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA)250 tersely but 
expressly used the words “Southeast Asia” to advance social and economic 
progress,251 a “free association” of countries in the same area.252  
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Similar to the ASA, when ASEAN was established in 1967, it also acted as a venue 
to embrace the term “Southeast Asia”. Member States can agree on “regional 
cooperation because they share “mutual interests” and “common problems”: this 
claim is based on the (non-binding) Bangkok Declaration of 1967.253 On the Bangkok 
Declaration, the legal literature tends to characterise it as follows: a “founding 
instrument”: more of a political declaration than a constitutional treaty; 254 a “simple 
declaration”255: “primarily a “political document”256 or “political instrument”; 257 the 
Declaration is not a treaty but rather a political document that aims to promote 
regional peace and stability and strengthen regional cooperation and mutual 
assistance on matters of common interest.258 
Despite the intention of ASEAN member States to found ASEAN in a non-binding, 
“political document”, the form of the Bangkok Declaration is arguably irrelevant as I 
shortly explain. The Bangkok Declaration exists on the international plane. It can still 
be assessed for legal consequences, against the rules at general international law.  
Whether ASEAN is “strictly speaking a loose association of States without 
supranational powers” is not the point.259 Something more than consent is required in 
understanding the practice of ASEAN and its constituent instrument of 1967. It is 
arguable that the practice of ASEAN organs transformed the original intent of ASEAN 
member States simply to create a “loose association of States” (whatever that means 
at law).260  
Just because ASEAN member States intended, in 1967, to create an entity with low 
institutionalisation did not (necessarily) mean that ASEAN actions were outside the 
reach of international legality.261 The functional approach applies.262 For instance, 
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consider the basic “machinery” to support ASEAN’s aims which was agreed in the 
Bangkok Declaration.263 At international law, the following are “rules of the 
organisation”264 which give legal status to ASEAN “organs”.265 Operative Paragraph 
Three of the Bangkok Declaration states:   
(a) Annual Meeting of Foreign Ministers, which shall be by rotation and referred to as ASEAN Ministerial 
Meeting. Special Meetings of Foreign Ministers may be convened as required.  
(b) A Standing committee, under the chairmanship of the Foreign Minister of the host country or his 
representative and having as its members the accredited Ambassadors of the other member countries, 
to carry on the work of the Association in between Meetings of Foreign Ministers.  
(c) Ad-Hoc Committees and Permanent Committees of specialists and officials on specific subjects.  
(d) A National Secretariat in each member country to carry out the work of the Association on behalf of 
that country and to service the Annual or Special Meetings of Foreign Ministers, the Standing Committee 
and such other committees as may hereafter be established.266    
 
Since ASEAN’s establishment in 1967, the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM)267 
which comprises the ASEAN foreign ministers is its most durable organ.268 Until the 
entry into force of the Charter in 2009, it was the principal coordinating organ of all 
matters within ASEAN.269 Importantly, the ASEAN Standing Committee270 acted as a 
“gatekeeper” for the AMM by meeting five to six times a year. The ASEAN Standing 
Committee selects issues for cooperation and agrees on its appropriate 
implementation, before it reaches the ministerial level for formal approval at the AMM. 
The ASEAN Standing Committee comprised ambassadors who were accredited in a 
particular ASEAN member State.271  It was chaired by the Foreign Minister whose 
State assumed the ASEAN Chair, which was assigned by alphabetical rotation.272  
In other words, an evolving practice of ministerial and bureaucratic consultation was 
cultivated.273 There is some artificiality in studying the separate acts of ASEAN since 
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the same people who make decisions within the ASEAN organs are also 
representatives of their States. I return to this point below.274 It is also true that the 
diplomatic practice was to avoid legal rules and regulations: there was no ASEAN 
Secretariat until 1977.275 Since 1974, however, ASEAN established formal relations 
with the European Economic Community (EEC).276 At general international law, 
therefore, it was the AMM that agreed joint statements with the EEC, another legal 
actor,277 on the international plane.278  
The Bangkok Declaration formed the basis for the AMM to create a joint ASEAN-EC 
Commission study group to facilitate diplomatic cooperation with the EEC in 1974,279 
even if the goals were modest.280 In 1983, the Bangkok Declaration was registered 
under Article 102, UN Charter.281 As a formal, technical matter, the Bangkok 
Declaration is not a treaty and thus non-binding.282 However, as explained already 
with respect to acquiescence and tacit consent concerning soft law instruments, non-
registration of an instrument does not mean that it is not a treaty. Simply, the fact of 
registering the Bangkok Declaration is strong evidence about the intentions of ASEAN 
member States. For these reasons, at general international law, it is misleading to 
treat the Bangkok Declaration as just a political declaration.283   
Hence, despite the non-binding Bangkok Declaration (1967), ASEAN functioned as a 
venue to institutionalise the AMM’s actions, which can be assessed for legality at 
general international law. Therefore, the AMM is a permanent entity created in 
accordance with the Bangkok Declaration and its conduct, as an ASEAN organ, is an 
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“established practice”.284 Accordingly, the Bangkok Declaration forms the “rules of the 
organisation”.285  
Two examples of the AMM’s conduct bear mention. First, through the AMM’s 
involvement, there was a profusion of projects related to food, shipping, aviation, air 
traffic services and tourism.286 These included intramural projects between ASEAN 
member States, to be conducted within ASEAN auspices.287 Indeed, there were too 
many projects.288 In a 1971 joint communique, a bewildered AMM emphasised: “…the 
value of regional collaboration and reaffirmed their determination to intensify the 
efforts of their respective Governments in this direction. They agreed therefore on the 
urgent need for the Permanent Committees to work out their respective lists of priority 
projects which could be implemented as soon as possible.”289 
 
Second, the AMM played a significant role in facilitating the TAC’s (i.e., a treaty) 
conclusion, in 1976, of a regional code of conduct for intramural relations for States 
in Southeast Asia. This is regional law-making because it is specific to a geographical 
area, in which a particular way of conducting friendly relations is a common value.290 
To appreciate how far the term “Southeast Asia” had been assimilated by the “locals” 
from the non-binding Bangkok Declaration (1967) to the TAC (1976), note the wider 
context by considering the recourse to “Southeast Asia” as a treaty term in the Manila 
Pact of 1954: “Desiring to establish a firm basis for common action to maintain peace 
and security in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific…”291 
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Now compare the Manila Pact’s use of “Southeast Asia” by powerful external actors, 
with the TAC’s recourse to “Southeast Asia” in 1976 by ASEAN member States. The 
TAC’s common goals for peace and security in the last preambular paragraph are as 
follows: “Believing in the need for cooperation with all peace-keeping nations, both 
within and outside Southeast Asia, in the in the furtherance of world peace, stability 
and harmony.”292 
 
The TAC is a code of conduct for intramural relations, agreed in treaty form, which 
applied to its parties.293 Therefore, the words “within and outside Southeast Asia” 
reflect a regional law based on who belongs to “Southeast Asia”. In 1976, “Southeast 
Asia” only included the ASEAN member States of the Philippines, Indonesia, 
Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore. Put differently, the region of Southeast Asia only 
contains ASEAN member States.  
Therefore, in 1976, Brunei,294 Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, and Vietnam did not belong 
to the region of Southeast Asia because they were not ASEAN member States.295 
Over time, however, the TAC was amended thrice.296 Each time, the amending 
protocols contain this preamble: “Desiring to further enhance cooperation with all 
peace-loving nations, both within and outside Southeast Asia and, in particular, 
neighbouring States of the Southeast Asia region.”297 
Therefore, the matter of which State belongs to “Southeast Asia” evolves through 
regional law in the TAC protocols. Through ASEAN, as a venue, a region of 
“Southeast Asia” is defined in the TAC.298 From the Manila Pact (1954) to the two 
Bangkok Declarations (ASA, 1961 and ASEAN 1967), then the TAC (1976), and 
finally the ASEAN Charter (2008), agreements on the geographical limits of 
“Southeast Asia” were made, as regional law, through international organisations.  
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Finally, and importantly, this defining of “Southeast Asia” is also based on common 
values and not just geography. Two examples illustrate this point. First, on 5 July 
1989, Papua Guinea acceded to the TAC, long before the newer ASEAN members 
did (i.e., Cambodia, Myanmar, Lao, and Vietnam). Despite its sharing of an 
international border with Indonesia in the geographical region of Southeast Asia, 
Papua New Guinea does not fall within “States in Southeast Asia”, at international 
law, under the 1998 Protocol’s amendment of Article 18, TAC.299   
 
The second example is manifest in the ASEAN Charter, a constituent instrument. This 
treaty uses the words “Southeast Asia” not on its own but in the specific language of 
an Association of Southeast Asia (ASEAN).300 And in this context, under Article 2(2) 
of the ASEAN Charter, “ASEAN and its member States”301 agree to one of its cardinal 
values, by acting in accordance with: “non-interference in the internal affairs of 
ASEAN Member States.”302  
 
The words “ASEAN and its member States” are significant: ASEAN is a separate legal 
person, a venue, which can make the law of non-intervention with an ASEAN 
character. Therefore, the rules of general international law, as discussed early in this 
chapter, strongly shape and permit the regional law of ASEAN. Exactly how ASEAN, 
through its organs, act in accordance with non-intervention is a matter of legal 
evaluation against general international law. This will be examined in two case studies 
below. However, it is first necessary to investigate non-intervention’s content at 
general international law, which the next chapter examines. 
VII. Conclusion  
 
This chapter advances the study’s core proposition that a distinctive ASEAN regional 
law (of non-intervention) is influenced by general international law in two ways. First, 
general international law sets the rules regarding law-making by international 
organisations, namely their separate legal personality and capacity to make treaties 
or regional law (such as regional custom) separately from its member States.  
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Second, international organisations also provide a venue to allow soft law to be 
created, and to coexist alongside the making of treaties and custom. Both points 
support the core proposition because general international law provides a broad 
analytical framework to understand and evaluate above how ASEAN organs, through 
the AMM, made distinctive regional law such as the TAC.  
Furthermore, this chapter has noted the role of powerful external actors, over a period 
of time, in influencing the acceptance of a geographical area which eventually 
became a (coherent) region of Southeast Asia. This development of a region was 
strongly influenced by general international law, aided by the actions of various 
external actors over time, and the result was acquiesced to by the ASEAN member 
States after decolonisation.  
Accordingly, an important piece of this study’s core proposition has been laid out: 
ASEAN is an international organisation, which can make distinctive regional law, 
because rules of general international law crystallised the region as a reality. Next, 
the general rules, aided by the active roles of powerful external actors, influenced 
ASEAN’s scope of regional law-making. Therefore, the analytical framework to 
evaluate ASEAN’s regional law-making has been established. This approach matters 
because it allows us to focus on one type of regional law that is specific to this study: 
non-intervention. The next chapter builds on the core proposition by exploring what 
is the content of non-intervention, and how it is determined, as a matter of general 
international law.  
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 Bangkok Declaration 1961 (ASA) Bangkok Declaration 1967 (ASEAN) TAC (1976) 
Preambular References to 
“Southeast Asia” 
Desiring to establish a firm foundation 
for common action to further 
economic and social progress in 
Southeast Asia.   
Mindful of the existence of mutual 
interests and common problems among 
countries of South East Asia and 
convinced of the need to strengthen 
further the existing bonds of regional 
solidarity and cooperation;  
Desiring to enhance peace, 
friendship and mutual 
cooperation on matters 
affecting Southeast Asia… 
 
Desiring to establish a firm foundation for 
common action to promote regional 
cooperation in South East Asia in the 
spirit of equality and partnership and 
thereby contribute towards peace, 
progress and prosperity in the region. 
Believing in the need for 
cooperation with all peace-
loving nations, both within and 
outside Southeast Asia… 
 
Considering that the countries of South 
East Asia share a primary responsibility 
for strengthening the economic and 
social stability of the region and ensuring 
their peaceful and progressive national 
development, and that they are 
determined to ensure their stability and 
security from external interference in any 
form or manifestation in order to preserve 
their national identities in accordance 
with the ideals and aspirations of their 
peoples. 
TABLE 1: How the Words “Southeast Asia” were used in ASEAN and non-ASEAN Instruments 
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Operative Paragraphs: 
references to “Southeast 
Asia 
The establishment of an association 
for economic and cultural co-
operation among the countries of 
Southeast Asia to be known as ASA - 
Association of Southeast Asia. 
 
The establishment of an Association for 
Regional Cooperation among the 
countries of South East Asia to be known 
as the Association of South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN). 
 
The High Contracting Parties 
shall collaborate for the 
acceleration of the economic 
growth in the region in order to 
strengthen the foundation for a 
prosperous and peaceful 
community of nations in 
Southeast Asia. 
The High Contracting Parties in 
their efforts to achieve regional 
prosperity and security, shall 
endeavour to cooperate in all 
fields …which will constitute the 
foundation for a strong and 
viable community of nations in 
Southeast Asia. 
 
This treaty… shall be open for 
accession by other States in 
Southeast Asia. 
To accelerate the economic growth, 
social progress and cultural development 
in the region through joint endeavours in 
the spirit of equality and partnership in 
order to strengthen the foundation for a         
prosperous and peaceful community of 
South East Asian   nations. 
 
To promote South East Asian studies. 
 
That the Association is open for 
participation to all States in the South 
East Asian Region subscribing to the 
aforementioned aims, principles and 
purposes. 
 
That the Association represents the 
collective will of the nations of South East 
Asia to bind themselves together in 
friendship and cooperation and, through 
joint efforts and sacrifices, secure for their 
peoples and for posterity the blessings of 
peace, freedom and prosperity. 
 
 To cooperate in the promotion of 
Southeast Asia Studies. 
 
This association is in no way 
connected with any outside power or 
power bloc and is directed against no 
other country, but is essentially free 
association of countries of Southeast 
Asia having as its objectives the 
promotion, through joint endeavour, of 
the well-being and the economic, 
social and cultural progress of this 
region. 
 
 
 
TABLE 1: How the Words “Southeast Asia” were used in ASEAN and non-ASEAN Instruments 
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TABLE 2: How the Words “Southeast Asia” are used in ASEAN Treaties 
 
 ASEAN Charter 
(2008) 
TAC (1976)  TAC Protocol (1987) TAC Protocol (1998) TAC Protocol (2010) 
Preambular 
reference to 
“Southeast 
Asia” 
WE, THE PEOPLES 
of the Member States 
of the Association of 
Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN). 
Desiring to enhance 
peace, friendship and 
mutual cooperation 
on matters affecting 
Southeast Asia… 
 
 
Believing in the need 
for cooperation with 
all peace-loving 
nations, both within 
and outside 
Southeast Asia… 
DESIRING to further 
enhance cooperation 
with all peace-loving 
nations, both within 
and outside Southeast 
Asia and, in particular, 
neighbouring States of 
the Southeast Asia 
region; 
 
CONSIDERING 
Paragraph 5 of the 
preamble of the Treaty 
of Amity and 
Cooperation in 
Southeast Asia… 
which refers to the 
need for cooperation 
with all peace-loving 
nations, both within 
and outside Southeast 
Asia, in the 
furtherance of world 
peace, stability and 
harmony. 
 
DESIRING to ensure 
that there is appropriate 
enhancement of 
cooperation with all 
peace-loving nations, 
both within and outside 
Southeast Asia and, in 
particular, neighboring 
States of the Southeast 
Asia region; 
 
CONSIDERING 
Paragraph 5 of the 
preamble of the Treaty 
of Amity in Southeast 
Asia, which refers to the 
need for cooperation 
with all peace-loving 
nations, both within and 
outside Southeast Asia, 
in the furtherance of 
world peace, stability 
and harmony. 
 
 
DESIRING to ensure that 
there is appropriate 
enhancement of cooperation 
with all peace-loving nations 
both within and outside 
Southeast Asia, in particular, 
neighbouring States of the 
Southeast Asian region, as 
well as with regional 
organisations whose 
members are only sovereign 
States. 
 
CONSIDERING Paragraph 5 
of the preamble of the Treaty 
of Amity in Southeast Asia, 
which refers to the need for 
cooperation with all peace-
loving nations, both within 
and outside Southeast Asia, 
in the furtherance of world 
peace, stability and 
harmony. 
TAC Protocol (2010) 
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TABLE 2: How the Words “Southeast Asia” are used in ASEAN Treaties 
 
 
Reference to 
“Southeast 
Asia” in main 
treaty 
provisions  
To preserve 
Southeast Asia as a 
Nuclear Weapon-
Free Zone and free of 
all other weapons of 
mass destruction; 
 
Admission shall be 
based…location in 
the recognised 
geographical region 
of Southeast Asia; 
 
Disputes which do not 
concern the 
interpretation or 
application of any 
ASEAN instrument 
shall be resolved 
peacefully in 
accordance with the 
Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation in 
Southeast Asia and 
its rules of procedure. 
The High Contracting 
Parties shall 
collaborate for the 
acceleration of the 
economic growth in 
the region in order to 
strengthen the 
foundation for a 
prosperous and 
peaceful community 
of nations in 
Southeast Asia. 
 
The High Contracting 
Parties in their efforts 
to achieve regional 
prosperity and 
security, shall 
endeavour to 
cooperate in all fields 
…which will 
constitute the 
foundation for a 
strong and viable 
community of nations 
in Southeast Asia. 
 
This treaty… shall be 
open for accession by 
other States in 
Southeast Asia. 
Article 18…shall be 
open for accession by 
other States in 
Southeast Asia.  
 
States outside 
Southeast Asia may 
also accede to this 
Treaty by the consent 
of all the States in 
Southeast Asia. 
 
(The TAC High Council 
Provision)…shall 
apply to any of the 
States outside 
Southeast Asia which 
have acceded to the 
Treaty only in cases 
where that state is 
directly involved in the 
dispute to be settled 
through the regional 
processes. 
Article 18, Paragraph 3, 
of the Treaty of Amity 
shall be amended to 
read as follows: "States 
outside Southeast Asia 
may also accede to this 
Treaty with the consent 
of all the States in 
Southeast Asia. 
Article 18, Paragraph 3, of 
the Treaty of Amity shall be 
amended to read as follows:  
"This Treaty shall be open for 
accession by States outside 
Southeast Asia and regional 
organisations whose 
members are only sovereign 
States subject to the consent 
of all the States in Southeast 
Asia. 
 
(The TAC High Council 
Provision)…shall apply to 
any of the High Contracting 
Parties outside Southeast 
Asia only in cases where that 
High Contracting Party is 
directly involved in the 
dispute to be settled through 
the regional processes. 
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Chapter Three 
 
THE VAGUE CONTENT OF NON-INTERVENTION AT GENERAL 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: “ORIGINS”, SUBSTANCE, AND FORM 
 
I. Purpose    
 
This Chapter explains and shows the extent of non-intervention’s vague content at 
general international law.1 This vagueness is a moving target, a result of shifting legal 
rules at general international law at any given point in time which require choices to 
made, in terms of how it influences regional law making. These choices, it is argued, 
are increasingly made by organs of international organisations as a law-making 
venue.  
 
Therefore, this Chapter advances the study’s core proposition that a distinctive 
regional law of non-intervention is influenced by general international law in two ways. 
First, it shows how non-intervention at general international law prohibits a potentially 
wide range of conduct which intervenes against the internal affairs of a State, but the 
application of non-intervention is always influenced by general international law. Put 
another way, the low stringency of non-intervention as a legal obligation is reflected 
in the vagueness of its content, which is determined against the broad background of 
rules at general international law. 
 
Second, this Chapter demonstrates the strength of this broad background of general 
international law, in terms of how non-intervention’s vague legal content changes over 
a period of time. This vagueness reflects dynamic tension in the distinctive regional 
law-making by ASEAN because, on the one hand, its regional content is possible 
because of non-intervention’s vagueness at general international law. On the other 
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relation to other areas of international law, for instance: non-intervention and jurisdiction; non-
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for Virtual Conflicts (Jens David Ohlin, Kevin Govern, and Claire Finkelstein, eds) (Oxford: OUP, 2015) 
at 240. 
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hand, it is precisely because of non-intervention’s vagueness that general 
international law influences (and gradually constrains) the regional content of non-
intervention with an ASEAN character, thereby reflecting the dynamic tension in the 
relationship between regional and general international law.  
 
ASEAN is a “price-taker” of these shifting rules at general international law, even 
when ASEAN organs are making the regional law of non-intervention.2 Non-
intervention exists because of a firmly held value in the West that individual States 
are accorded freedom to make political, economic, and social decisions, by governing 
its internal affairs.3 Accordingly, friendly relations between States are based on 
“respect for the equal rights and self-determination of people”.4 Furthermore, the UN 
is “based on the principle of sovereign equality of all its Members”.5  
 
However, a State’s right to govern its internal affairs through non-intervention’s 
protection, is subject to rules in the UN Charter that, within the Security Council, only 
five States6 can and do underwrite international peace and security for all other States 
under UN auspices,7 a unique international organisation. This is not to say that the 
Western-centric value of being entitled to govern a State’s “internal affairs” is 
undesirable for non-Western States in Southeast Asia. But this value is not self-
evidently universal, no more than “Southeast Asia” was universally viewed in 
geographical terms before the Second World War.  
 
Instead this Western-centric value reflects persistent claims of universality, 
manifested as general international law, which are applicable to all States. As I 
explain in this Chapter and in the case studies that follow, non-intervention exists 
alongside competing universal values, such as domestic governance and 
international trade.8 Contradictions arise from these competing values, which also 
contains legal rules at general international law, because non-intervention is a vague 
                                                            
2
 See case studies in Chapters Four and Five.  
3
 For an account of this idea by the likes of Bodin, Locke, Hume, Bentham, and Kant: see Martti 
Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia (The Structure of International Legal Argument) (reissue with new 
epilogue) (Cambridge: CUP, 2005) at 89-94; also see Anne-Marie Slaughter, “International Law in a 
World of Liberal States” (1995) 6 EJIL 503.  
4
 Article 1(2), Charter of the United Nations (signed 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 
1 UNTS XVI. 
5
 Articles 1(2) and 2(1), UN Charter (ibid); also see Operative Paras (e) and (f) of UNGA, “Declaration of 
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in 
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations” (24 October 1970) UNGA Res 2625 (XXV).  
6
 Article 23(1), UN Charter (n4). 
7
 Chapter VII, UN Charter (n4). 
8
 See Chapters Four and Five.   
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rule of international law. To this extent, vagueness of the law is related to the 
introductory chapter’s discussion as to the scope of a State’s internal affairs, of which 
some types of intervention are protected by the rule of non-intervention at a given 
point.9 As I demonstrate below, because non-intervention protects a potentially wide 
range of actions (both forcible and non-forcible), it is not legally possible to be precise 
about the exact conduct which is prohibited by non-intervention.  
 
The vagueness of non-intervention’s content is manifested in descriptive and 
evaluative terms. For example, the expression “domestic jurisdiction” (to which non-
intervention potentially applies) is descriptive of a State’s internal competences 
against external interventions. Indeed, as explained below, the Friendly Relations 
Declaration (1970) describes in more detail the types of interventions in economic, 
political, and social contexts which are prohibited. Similarly, in the context of the 
TAC’s Article 2 and 10, the expressions “internal affairs” and activities which 
“constitute a threat to the political and economic stability, sovereignty, or territorial 
integrity” of a TAC are vague. This is because although the types of activities which 
are prohibited are already described, the application of this rule turns on an evaluation 
of what constitutes a “threat”. 
 
This short account of non-intervention’s vagueness matters because it is general 
international law that primarily determines which of the myriad forms of conduct on 
the international plane, including acts with a regional character, are protected by non-
intervention at a given point. Timothy Endicott offered three advantages of vagueness 
in law (i.e, in the area of national laws): the private ordering of desirable conduct, the 
allocation of power to decision-makers, and fidelity (i.e., the compliance with the 
underlying reasons for the law).10 To adapt Endicott’s propositions for our purposes, 
general international law assumes this task through its rules by creating competing, 
desirable values of international relations (example: domestic governance and human 
rights protection).  
 
Since there are different (and sometimes competing) desirable values of international 
relations (i.e., Endicott’s private ordering argument), it is general international law 
which sets the general rules (i.e., Endicott’s allocation of decision-makers argument) 
                                                            
9
 See Chapter One, Section 1, Part 2.  
10
 Generally see Timothy Endicott, “The Value of Vagueness” in Philosophical Foundations of Language 
in Law (Andrei Marmor and Scott Soames, eds), (Oxford: OUP, 2011); also see Timothy AO Endicott, 
Vagueness in Law, (Oxford: OUP, 2000).  
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to determine the content and application of non-intervention at a given point. The 
justification in favour of vagueness in this sense lies in the universal claims of general 
international law (Endicott’s fidelity argument): at any given point, there are certain 
rules which reflect the underlying purposes of the whole of public international law 
(for instance, protection of international peace and security against the spread of the 
Ebola virus), against which non-intervention (both general and regional rules) is 
accorded minimal or no legal relevance, through its vagueness in descriptive and 
evaluative terms. In this respect, the previous chapter examined the ways that 
international organisations can make general international law and regional law. In 
this chapter, I show how international organisations particularly contribute to non-
intervention’s vague content, at various venues, through its law-making at general 
international law.  
 
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, it examines, as a broad background to this 
chapter, how the ideas of non-intervention by Vattel and Oppenheim became the 
“origins” of non-intervention for all States. Second, the diplomatic and treaty practice 
of the Organisation of American States (OAS) in making the regional law of non-
intervention is studied. Third, this chapter turns to the UN General Assembly’s 
practice and explores how non-intervention’s universal content emerged here.  
Finally, the ICJ’s case law is discussed to analyse its contribution which has resulted 
in a current but restrictive content of non-intervention.  
II. Background to Non-Intervention’s Historical “Origins”: Emmer De Vattel’s 
Influence on the ILC  
1) Introduction:  
 
The next two sections explore the influence of Emmer de Vattel and Oppenheim on 
the contemporary content of non-intervention. My goal is to show and explain how 
non-intervention’s content borrows from these European writers’ ideas as the 
“origins”, from which non-intervention’s contemporary content is determined. In other 
words, the hagiographic status of these European men at general international law 
facilitates the borrowing of their ideas to become universal claims for all States, which 
is facilitated by the desctiptive and evaluative vagueness of non-intervention at 
general international law, and advanced through organs of international 
organisations.  
Accordingly, the next two sections regarding Vattel and Oppenheim advance the core 
proposition by showing how the works of these two men have been absorbed by 
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general international law over time, which in turn proves influential in shaping the 
content of non-intervention today. We first consider Vattel. His ideas on non-
intervention still influence non-intervention’s legal content.11 Winfield, for example, 
explained Vattel’s relevance in our understanding of non-intervention’s content as 
follows:  
 
Vattel requires careful examination. Not that he formulates any detailed theory of intervention in his Droit 
Des Gens-for the word is used but twice, and, certainly not with the technical meaning now annexed to 
it-but because there is every reason to believe that some passages scattered throughout the book are 
the nidus of the modern doctrine relative to intervention.12 
 
In this respect, and with some tentativeness, Winfield claimed that Section 54 of Book 
II in Vattel’s work contained the “germ of the modern rule of non-intervention”, in which 
Vattel wrote no state has the smallest right to interfere in the government of another.13 
To appreciate Vattel’s influence on non-intervention’s content, at general international 
law, it is useful to sketch some of his main ideas.14 Generally, Vattel based his theory 
of the State on the law of nature: the common will of the law of nations is the united 
views of the citizens.15 He did not elucidate rules or principles of international law in 
his work. He did not draw legal conclusions from the attitudes of State conduct, a law-
making technique which we regard as State practice today.16 He connected 
sovereignty to independence17 and insisted that the absolute independence of States 
was most significant.18  Accordingly, the English translations of Vattel’s work which 
are related to intervention are as follows: no foreign power has a right to interfere in 
the affairs which are of a “national concern” or to “intermeddle”, save for recourse to 
good offices; 19 no nation has a right to interfere in the government of another State 
                                                            
11
 For recent citations: see Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace (Humanitarian Intervention and 
International Law) (Oxford: OUP 2003) at 19; Vaughan Lowe, “The Principle of Non-Intervention: Use of 
Force” in The United Nations and the Principles of International Law (Vaughan Lowe and Colin Warbrick 
eds) (London: Routledge, 1994) 66 at 81.  
12
 Percy H. Winfield, “The History of Intervention in International Law” (1922-23) 3 BYIL 130 at 132 
(original emphasis).  
13
 Ibid at 133: his extensive analyses of three types of intervention (at 139) – internal, punitive and 
external – are not approximations to a world which is based on sovereign equality, alongside with the 
role of five permanent members at the Security Council with unequal powers to maintain international 
peace and security.  
14
 I.e., Droit des gens; ou, Principes de la loi naturelle appliqués à la conduite et aux affaires des nations 
et des souverains, which in English roughly means “The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law 
Applied to the Conduct and to the Affairs of Nations and of Sovereigns”. In this Chapter, I use this version: 
Thomas Adamo ed, de Vattel’s The Law of Nations (USA: Woodbine Cottage Publication, 2011) (“Law 
of Nations”).  
15
 Charles G Fenwick, “The Authority of Vattel” (1913) 7 American Political Science Review 395 at 400.  
16
 Generally Michael Wood, “State Practice”, MPEPIL (2014).  
17
 Generally Stephane Beaulac, “Emer de Vattel and the Externalization of Sovereignty” (2003) 5 Journal 
of the History of International Law 237.  
18
 Ibid at 261.  
19
 Law of Nations, Book I, Chapter III, section 37 (n14): Vattel elaborates non-intervention in this chapter, 
which discusses the constitution of a State and the rights and duties of a State. 
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on the grounds that nations have liberty and independence. Each State has a right to 
be governed as they think proper;20 foreign nations are not to interfere in the internal 
government of an independent state.21 
 
Vattel admitted that exceptions applied. After all, in Vattel’s time, there was the forcing 
of his sovereign, Augustus III, as a ruler onto Poland, by the army of Russia and 
Saxony.22  Another example was also the “plunder” of Silesia by Prussia.23 Therefore, 
to Vattel, the exceptions include, in cases of tyranny, every foreign power has the 
right to help the oppressed who seek assistance. For support, Vattel cited the help of 
the Dutch United Provinces against James II of England.24 In cases of a prince who 
makes an unjust war, “everyone” has the right to help the oppressed. For just wars, 
neutral nations may interfere as mediators.25 
 
2) How the ILC advances Vattel’s Ideas on Non-Intervention  
 
Vattel was a theorist.26 A less generous view is that Vattel’s “fondness for abstract 
reasoning leads him to discuss imaginary situations”.27 Be that as it may, the ILC has 
acted as a venue to rehabilitate Vattel’s ideas on non-intervention. In a preliminary 
study on the legal issues concerning its progressive work on disaster management,28 
a topic which is discussed in Chapter Five, the Special Rapporteur, Eduardo 
Valencia-Ospina, was able to trace the “evolution” of the international legal protection 
of persons during disasters to Vattel who made the following observations, which was 
cited with approval by the Special Rapporteur:29 “…when the occasion arises, every 
Nation should give its aid to further the advancement of other Nations and save them 
                                                            
20
 Law of Nations, Book II, Chapter IV, section 54 (n14): Vattel elaborates non-intervention in this chapter 
in the context of a nation’s right to security and the effects of sovereignty and independence of a nation. 
21 Law of Nations, Book III, Chapter XVIII, section 296 (n14): Vattel referred to Book II, Chapter IV, 
Section 54 and discussed Chapter XVIII in the context of the conduct to be observed by foreign nations 
when a State in embroiled in a civil war. 
22
 See n12 at 130-134; Ann Van Wynen Thomas & AJ Thomas Jr, Non-Intervention: The Law and its 
Import in the Americas (USA: Southern Methodist University Press, 1956) at 5 (“Thomas’s Non-
Intervention”). 
23
 See n12 at 133.  
24 Law of Nations, Book II, Chapter IV, section 56 (n14). 
25 Law of Nations, Book II, Chapter III, Section 49 (n14). 
26 See n11 at 75: for one recent citation of his work, see the various citations of Vattel’s “Law of Nations 
in the Department of Defense Law of War Manual” (12 June 2015) (Office of General Counsel), available 
at  <http://www.jag.navy.mil/distrib/instructions/Law-of-War-Manual-June-2015.pdf>.   
27 Charles G Fenwick, “The Authority of Vattel” (1913) 7 American Political Science Review 395 at 398.  
28
 Eighteen draft articles on “The Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters” were adopted by the 
ILC and submitted to the General Assembly: see “Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters” UN 
GAOR 71st Session Supp No 10 UN Doc A/71/10 at 12 (4 August 2016); UNGA Res 71/141 (19 
December 2016). 
29
 ILC, “Preliminary Report on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters” (5 May 2008) UN Doc 
A/CN.4/598 at 6.  
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from disaster and ruin, so far as it can do so without running too great a risk … if a 
Nation is suffering from famine, all those who have provisions to spare should assist 
in its need, without, however, exposing themselves to scarcity…to give assistance in 
such dire straits is so instinctive an act of humanity that hardly any civilized Nation is 
to be found which would refuse absolutely to do so.”30   
 
Obviously, Vattel did not consider the giving of assistance during transboundary 
disasters in the 21st century. The Special Rapporteur advanced the following claims, 
based on Vattel’s presumed authority: “In determining the role and responsibility of 
the affected State, mention must be made of the principles of State sovereignty and 
non-intervention.31 The principle of State sovereignty is rooted in the fundamental 
notion of sovereign equality, a concept that Emerich de Vattel illustrated by noting 
that nations are “free, independent, and equal,” and that “a dwarf is as much a man 
as a giant is; a small republic is no less a sovereign State than the most powerful 
kingdom”. This understanding implies the more specific notions of independence and 
territorial sovereignty, whereby, within its own territory, a State can exercise its 
functions to the exclusion of all others. Thus understood, sovereignty is regarded as 
a fundamental principle in the international order…32 
 
In other words, the Special Rapporteur co-opted Vattel’s views by affirming 
sovereignty’s fundamental status for States: an equal right to govern a State’s 
“internal affairs”, whether these are large or small States. Non-intervention is relevant 
because it protects against interventions into a State’s “internal affairs”, which belong 
to its sovereignty. However, a State’s “internal affairs” are also subject to duties at 
general international law, a reasoning which the Special Rapporteur justified through 
recourse to another (non-binding) instrument by the ILC: “It is also worth noting that 
the International Law Commission, in its work on the non-navigational uses of 
international watercourses,33 has stated in a general way the relationship between 
sovereignty and the duty of cooperation among States. The Commission considered 
that the sovereign equality of States informs the manner in which they must cooperate 
for common ends…”34 
                                                            
30
 Ibid, para 14 at 6. 
31
 See further Chapter Five, Section VI.  
32
 ILC, “Third Report on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters” (31 March 2010) UN Doc 
A/CN.4/629 (“Third Report on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters”), para 64-65 at 23-24. 
33
 UNGA, “Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses” UN 
GAOR 49th Session Supp No 10 UN Doc A/49/10 (1994); Article 8, Convention on the Law of the Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (adopted 21 May 1997, entered into force 17 August 
2014) (1997) 36 ILM 700, UN Doc A/RES/51/229. 
34
 Third Report on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters, para 70 at 25 (n32.  
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Hence non-intervention role, which reflects a State’s sovereignty, has to be 
considered alongside State’s duty of cooperation and legal obligations at general 
international law. To support his view, the Special Rapporteur cited the separate 
opinion, which is non-binding, of Judge Alvarez in the Corfu Channel case (1949):   
 
Moreover, as some jurists have argued, the concept of sovereignty itself places obligations on States. 
Already in 1949, Judge Alejandro Álvarez of the International Court of Justice explained that: 
 
By sovereignty, we understand the whole body of rights and attributes which a State possesses in its 
territory to the exclusion of all other States, and also in its relations with other States. Sovereignty confers 
rights upon States and imposes obligations on them.35 
 
Observe, therefore, the Special Rapporteur’s reasoning which led him to limit non-
intervention’s content during disasters. First, we are told that even Vattel considered 
the rendering of help during disasters to be an “instinctive”36 reaction, thereby 
justifying the ILC’s progressive development of international law in this field. Second, 
there is an acknowledgement of sovereignty’s importance, a point which Vattel also 
validated. Next, although sovereignty is important, the ILC had already expressed, in 
its work on navigational waterways, the relations between sovereignty and a duty of 
cooperation at general international law.  
 
Finally, for good measure, the ICJ also confirmed that legal sovereignty comprises a 
“collection” of rights and obligations.37 At international law, a State is sovereign 
precisely because it can be bound by legal obligations at general international law. 
The descriptive and evaluative vagueness of non-intervention, as explained by Vattel 
must be determined by “decision-makers” at general international law, in this case by 
UN organs.  
III. Background to Non-Intervention’s Historical “Origins”: Lassa Oppenheim   
1) “Dictatorial interference”: a vague expression in evaluative terms 
 
This section builds on the previous discussion of Vattel by demonstrating how 
Oppenheim’s works regarding non-intervention were absorbed by and now belong to 
general international law. This advances the core proposition because it shows how 
far (and deeply) the rules of general international law shape the current content of 
                                                            
35
 Third Report on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters, para 75 at 26 (n32); see The 
Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v Albania) (Merits) [1949] ICJ Rep 4, as well as the separate 
opinion of Judge Álvarez at 43.  
36
 n30.  
37
 Generally James Crawford, Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law (8th ed) (Oxford: OUP, 
2012) at 448. 
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non-intervention. In other words, the regional content of non-intervention can be 
distinctive because ASEAN organs can make such law, but any regional law-making 
will be subject to the strong influence of non-intervention’s vague content in 
descriptive and evaluative terms at general international law 
  
Through his expression “dictatorial interference”, Oppenheim has arguably 
contributed to our present understanding of non-intervention’s “historic origins”, which 
in turn shapes the contemporary content of non-intervention at general international 
law. He began his first paragraph on the character and concept of intervention (not 
non-intervention) as follows: “Intervention is dictatorial interference by a State in the 
affairs of another State for the purpose of maintaining or altering the actual condition 
of things, such intervention can take place by right or without a right, but it always 
concerns the external independence or the territorial or personal supremacy of the 
respective State, and the whole matter is therefore of great importance for the position 
of the States within the Family of Nations. That intervention is as a rule forbidden by 
the Law of Nations which protects the International Personality of the States, there is 
no doubt.”38                      
 
 
This chapter on intervention appeared in the first edition of Oppenheim’s treatise, 
International Law.39 First published in 1905, it was described by one reviewer as the 
most important English language international law treatise of the twentieth century.40 
His term “dictatorial interference”41 would also exert some influence on non-
intervention’s contemporary content.42 Oppenheim used this term eight times in his 
treatise.43 He was very clear about its meaning: “Intervention is dictatorial interference 
by a State in the affairs of another State for the purpose of maintaining or altering the 
actual condition of things.”44 
 
                                                            
38
 Lassa Oppenheim, International Law, A Treatise (Vol I: Peace) (London: Longman, Green & Co, 1905) 
(emphasis supplied) (“International Law”).  
39
 Ibid.  
40
 Mark W Janis, “The New Oppenheim and its Theory of International Law” (1996) 16 OJLS 330.   
41
 Its relevance was retained in the ninth edition. Longman first published the ninth edition as 
Oppenheim's International Law. Volume 1: Peace. (9th ed) (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts, eds) 
(London: Longman, 1992). In this study, I use the 2008 version by Oxford University Press: Oppenheim's 
International Law, (Volume 1 Peace), (Oxford: OUP, 2008): Jennings and Watts used “dictatorial 
interference” twice at 430 and 449. To stress the continuity in relation to non-intervention, I call this ninth 
edition the “Jennings and Watts edition”.  
42
 See further Section III, Part 2.     
43
 In the first edition of International Law at 49 (n38) (twice); 50; 112; 181; 182 (twice) and 257.   
44
 International Law at 181 (n38).  
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As an adjective, the word “dictatorial” can mean “overbearing”, or “domineering”, or 
“imperious”, or “inclined to prescribe the actions of others”.45 To Oppenheim, a 
specific act that counts as “intervention” at international law must be very serious. But 
he resisted an outright explanation of what “dictatorial interference” really meant in 
legal terms: “…it must be emphasised that intervention proper is always dictatorial 
interference, not interference pure and simple.”46 
 
In other words, “pure and simple” acts do not constitute intervention because they are 
lawful in Oppenheim’s time. They occur as a matter of legal “right” and Oppenheim 
specifically instanced good offices,47 mediation, intercession, and cooperation do not 
“imply a dictatorial interference”.48 In lieu of a legal right, Oppenheim explains a 
second type of lawful acts that does not form intervention as exceptions: “On the other 
hand, there is just as little doubt that this rule has exceptions, for there are 
interventions which take place by right, and there are others which, although they do 
not take place by right, are nevertheless admitted by the Law of Nations and are 
excused in spite of the violation of the Personality of the respective States they 
involve.”49 
 
Put simply, dictatorial interference’s content, which protects a sovereign State against 
unlawful intervention, has to be evaluated against legal rules in Oppenheim’s time. 
However, his treatise contained two perspectives that were specific to the early 
twentieth century, at that given point in time.50 First, it is lawful to act against certain 
State’s internal affairs to preserve a balance of power in military terms.51 The powerful 
States must be kept in check,52 because “no rules of law will have any force”.53 There 
are limits, however, to these legal rules on which to assess dictatorial interference’s 
content. Since every State must decide on its own “vital interests” based on “self-
preservation”, intervention is “de facto a matter of policy just like war.”54 As an 
example, Oppenheim instanced the restriction of Cuba’s external independence by 
                                                            
45 See the Oxford English Dictionary’s definitions, available at <http://www.oed.com/>.  
46 International Law at 181 (n38); see the Jennings and Watts edition at 432 (n41): “Interference pure 
and simple is not intervention”.  
47
 International Law at 182 (n38): “Good offices is the name for such acts of friendly Powers interfering 
in a conflict between two other States as tend to call negotiations into existence…”.  
48
 
International Law at 182 (n38) (original emphasis).  
49
 International Law at 182 (n38) (emphasis supplied).  
50
 See n38 at 72-76.  
51
 International Law at 186-187 (n38).  
52
 International Law at 185 (n38): “An equilibrium between the members of the Family of Nations is an 
indispensable condition of the very existence of International Law”.  
53 International Law at 73 (n38).  
54
 
International Law at 187 (n38).  
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the Treaty of Havana (1903) to justify the actions of the United States, against 
intrusions by the European powers.55 
 
Second, Oppenheim’s worldview was confined to the Euro-American system.56 In an 
astonishing paragraph, he wrote: “The Law of Nations as a law between States based 
on the common consent of the members of family naturally does not contain, any 
rules concerning the intercourse with and treatment of such States as are outside that 
circle. That this intercourse and treatment ought to be regulated by the principles of 
Christian morality is obvious. But actually a practice frequently prevails which is not 
only contrary to Christian morality, but arbitrary and barbarous. Be that as it may, it is 
discretion, and not International Law, according to which the members of the Family 
of Nations deal with such States as still remain outside that family.”57 
 
This second perspective, regarding “dictatorial interference”, which is specific to 
Oppenheim’s worldview in the early twentieth century is important. It is, I argue, a 
matter of choice that Oppenheim’s worldview is being rehabilitated today as an 
authoritative account of non-intervention’s “historical origins”. Consider the ninth 
edition of Oppenheim’s International Law in 1992, which was edited by Arthur Watts 
and Robert Jennings.58 Clearly, this is a different work from Oppenheim’s first edition 
of 1905. Yet on the subject of intervention, the unmistakable echoes of Oppenheim 
reverberate in the ninth edition. Now framed in a contemporary language of non-
intervention, Jennings and Watts say: “It must be emphasised that to constitute 
intervention the interference must be forcible or dictatorial, or otherwise coercive, in 
effect depriving the state intervened against of control over the matter in question. 
Interference pure and simple is not intervention.”59  
 
Jennings and Watts used “dictatorial interference” in a very different international 
legal system from that of Oppenheim’s world.60 Their assimilation of Oppenheim’s 
“dictatorial interference”, on non-intervention’s content, reflects the diffused inductive 
tradition of law-making.61 In other words, they advanced general propositions based 
                                                            
55
 See Section V, “Cuba’s Protectorate Status” of the Roxburgh edition (n57 at 223).   
56
 
Benedict Kingsbury, “Legal Positivism as Normative Politics: International Society, Balance of Power 
and Lassa Oppenheim’s Positive International Law” (2002) EJIL 401 at 402.  
57
 International Law at 34 (n38) (emphasis supplied). This passage was retained until the third edition of 
1920 and 1921, which was largely written by Oppenheim before his passing and then edited by Ronald 
F Roxburgh: see Lassa Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise (Volume 1) (3rd ed) (R. F. Roxburgh 
ed) (London: Longman, Green & Co, 1920) at 26 (“Roxburgh edition”).  
58
 See n41.  
59
 See n41 at 432.  
60
 See n55.  
61
 Philip Allott, “Language, Method and the Nature of International Law” (1971) 45 BYIL 79 at 102.   
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on particular developments: the Cold War had just ended, and the controversial 
reasoning of the ICJ in Nicaragua,62 on the customary status of the Friendly Relations 
Declaration (1970),63 had ebbed. As a matter of State practice, then, the judgment 
became less controversial and more acceptable.64 Therefore, it is arguable that the 
position by Watts and Jennings relied on the language of “dictatorial interference” 
created by Oppenheim who had expressed his attitude on the law, as it was in 1905.65 
 
Importantly, this rehabilitated use of “dictatorial interference” is not confined to 
International Law, the treatise. For years, this expression was used to advance the 
specific ends of accomplished writers.66 As an expression, “dictatorial interference” 
has some meaning at general international law. One striking example is the impact of 
“dictatorial interference” in shaping non-intervention’s content in diplomatic law, 
advanced through the ILC as a venue, which we examine next.    
2) How Oppenheim’s “Dictatorial Interference” shaped Article 41(1), 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961 Convention)67  
 
This part contributes to the core proposition by showing the adaptability (and 
influence) of general international law concerning the meaning of “dictatorial 
interference” and, therefore, the relationship of dynamic tension between the general 
and regional rules of international law. In this respect, the 1961 Convention is a 
                                                            
62
 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) 
(Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14.  
63
 Chapter Three, Section VII. 
64
 Chapter Three, Section VII.   
65
 Ibid.  
66
 The following is a non-exhaustive list: Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law (USA: Lawbook 
Exchange Ltd, 2004) at 63-64: “the ‘intervention’ prohibited by international law is usually described as 
dictatorial interference by a state in the affairs of another state”; Thomas’s Non-Intervention at 68 (n22): 
“a dictatorial interference is then defined as one involving the use of force or threat of such use”; Quincy 
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comprehensive formulation of contemporary diplomatic law.68 I focus on one 
provision, i.e., Article 41(1), which provides for non-intervention in diplomatic law, 
which states: “Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, it is the duty of all 
persons enjoying such privileges and immunities to respect the laws and regulations 
of the receiving State. They also have a duty not to interfere in the internal affairs of 
that State.”69 
 
The current position on Article 41(1) suggests that it applies to the activities or 
comments of a diplomat who is acting in a personal capacity,70 not having received 
any instructions from the sending State. Furthermore, Article 41(1) also appears to 
contain a diplomat’s “positive” duty to respect a receiving State’s national laws. But 
that is distinct from a “negative” duty not to interfere in that State’s internal affairs,71 
often through comments regarding the host State’s conduct.  
 
The ambiguity in Article 41(1) was one of the reasons why Special Rapporteur AEF 
Sandström declined, in 1957, to include non-intervention into the draft article, which 
eventually became Article 41(1).72 Non-intervention appeared in Article 41(1) of the 
1961 Convention because of a joint amendment by ILC members Padilla Nervo and 
Garcia Amador.73 This amendment says: “It is the duty of diplomatic agents to conduct 
themselves in a manner consistent with the internal order of the receiving State, to 
comply with those of its laws and regulations from whose application they are not 
exempted by the present provisions, and, in particular, not to interfere in the domestic 
or foreign politics of that State.”74 
 
Nervo did not use the language of “non-intervention”. He clarified that “intervention” 
in the context of diplomatic law:75 “…carried the connotations given to it by Professor 
Lauterpacht, namely, dictatorial interference in the sense of action amounting to a 
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denial of the independence of the State and implying a peremptory demand for 
positive conduct or abstention…”76 
 
Nervo’s clarification seemed to attribute the meaning of “dictatorial interference” to 
Hersch Lauterpacht, who had used it in International Law and Human Rights.77 Nervo 
went on to say: “Similar definitions (of dictatorial interference), quoted by Lauterpacht, 
had also been formulated previously by Professors Brierly, Oppenheim and 
Verdross.78  
 
Actually Oppenheim is the first person to use “dictatorial interference” in 1905.79 In 
his Hague Lectures of 1947, Lauterpacht attributed the term to Oppenheim’s 
International Law.80 Oppenheim’s influence is so extensive that it is no longer useful 
to ask by whom “dictatorial interference” was first used, and under what 
circumstances. In diplomatic law, “dictatorial interference” is now used as a general, 
valid, and binding definition of intervention.  
 
Nervo regarded “dictatorial interference” as the denial of a State’s independence. 
Therefore, if that State did not comply with “positive conduct or abstention”, dictatorial 
interference involves: “…threat to or recourse to compulsion, though not necessarily 
physical compulsion, in some form.”81 
 
This is a high threshold. Oppenheim did not use “dictatorial interference” in this way. 
As explained above, he used “dictatorial interference” with the plain meaning of 
“maintaining or altering the actual condition of things”.82 To Oppenheim, “dictatorial 
interference” is distinct from “intervention pure and simple”, for which he gave 
examples.83  
 
Put differently, the expression “dictatorial interference” has to be evaluated and 
adapted to express specific positions on non-intervention in different contexts. Hence, 
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in the ninth edition, Jennings and Watts argued that intervention has a “stricter 
meaning”84 at international law: it is “forcible or dictatorial or otherwise coercive”.85 By 
conjoining three elements, the vagueness of non-intervention in this evaluative sense 
aloowed Jennings and Watts to breathe contemporary meaning into the term 
“dictatorial interference”. Jennings and Watts are supported by the ICJ’s view in 
Nicaragua that coercion forms the “very essence” of prohibited intervention.86  
 
Returning to Nervo’s amendment, it triggered a confused debate among the ILC 
members concerning non-intervention’s scope in diplomatic law.87 For our purposes, 
the key point is that “dictatorial interference” became a frame of reference for the 
debate among the ILC members. A few construed it broadly and seemed to treat 
“intervention” as representations that are made by the sending State.88 One took a 
narrow view that only diplomats acting in a private capacity, and not on the 
instructions of the sending State’s government, were bound by non-intervention.89 
Another disavowed the whole notion as “absurd” in the context of diplomatic law.90 
Non-intervention is “unequivocally” covered by Article 2(4) of the UN Charter: it had 
nothing to do with simple meddling in the politics of the receiving State by the person 
of a diplomatic agent.91 
 
Garcia Amardor also expressed misgivings: Nervo’s definition of “dictatorial 
interference” would negate the goal of adding non-intervention into diplomatic law.92 
Kisaburo Yokota’s adaptation of Oppenheim’s authority reflects the latter’s persistent 
universality in non-intervention: “Mr. Padilla Nervo having defined "intervention" as meaning 
"dictatorial interference", it followed that intervention pure and simple was permitted to diplomatic agents. 
He doubted, however, whether any State would accept such a proposition.”93 
 
In 1958, the ILC produced the draft articles of the Diplomatic Intercourse and 
Immunities.94 Its commentary qualified non-intervention in Article 41(1) as follows:95  
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“The making of representations for the purpose of protecting the interests of the diplomatic agent's 
country or of its nationals in accordance with international law does not constitute interference in the 
internal affairs of the receiving State within the meaning of this provision.”96 
 
 
When Nervo tabled his joint amendment in 1957, he said that intervention carried the 
connotation of “dictatorial interference” – a high threshold.97 It is arguable that 
something of this threshold was retained by the ILC’s commentaries of 1958.98 
Diplomatic representations, whether made in an official or personal capacity (by its 
diplomats), are excluded from the “duty” against intervention in Article 41(1).99 James 
Crawford reminds us that: “The danger of editions of classic texts (Brierly and 
Oppenheim are examples) is that they atrophy by interpolation, become 
encrusted.”100 
 
As an expression, “dictatorial interference” is an abiding reference point for non-
intervention’s vague content in evaluative terms at general international law.101 There 
is no atrophy. Through the ILC, a permanent venue which creates general rules of 
international law, from Vattel to Oppenheim, both writers had something to say about 
intervention (and sometimes non-intervention) from their respective worldviews. Their 
relevance, then, to non-intervention’s contemporary content is the result of select 
choices made by organs of international organisations, which has a universalising 
effect at general international law at a given point in time. 
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IV. Non-Intervention in the Americas 
1) Purpose 
 
This section focuses on the regional law of non-intervention in the Americas, mainly 
advanced through the OAS. As a regional practice, non-intervention’s content is 
expressed negatively as a treaty obligation not to do something. Some limited (and 
individualistic) right of a Latin American State’s freedom to govern itself existed 
alongside the Monroe Doctrine (1823) of the United States. These contradictions 
shaped the regional law of non-intervention. As I shortly explain, despite being 
regional law in treaty form, non-intervention had little practical content when 
appraised against the Monroe Doctrine.  
 
This regional practice of the Americas matters. Their drafting language and 
experience with non-intervention would resemble the outcome of UN instruments, 
which are subsequently adopted by the General Assembly. The vagueness of non-
intervention in the Latin American instruments are manifested in descriptive and 
evaluative terms, which required decision-making by the OAS to determine its 
meaning at a given point in time. Both qualities of vagueness also facilitate 
contradictions in the UN era, as reflected in the shifting legal rules at general 
international law during and after the Cold War. There, non-intervention’s content 
would be significantly determined by the ICJ case law.102 
 
Therefore, this section furthers the study’s core proposition by explaining the regional 
content of non-intervention as it applied to the Americas. This approach matters 
because it facilitates the argument in the next section, which demonstrates how 
general international law, through the venue of the UN, partially absorbed the regional 
law of non-intervention generated in the Americas, further attesting to the relationship 
between general and regional international law.    
 
2) Non-Intervention Reflects Weakness Not Strength in Latin America  
   
This part advances the core proposition by demonstrating the relationship between 
general and regional international law. In this respect, general international law would 
adopt some aspects of this unstable regional content of non-intervention, as it applied 
in the Americas, at the UN after decolonisation. This outcome reflects a dynamic 
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tension in terms of how general rules of international law concerning non-intervention 
would powerfully shape regional law-making of non-intervention. To this extent, 
therefore, the language of non-intervention in the regional practice of the OAS is 
strikingly similar to the UN instruments. Consider this paragraph in the Friendly 
Relations Declaration (1970):103  
No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in 
the internal or external affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms 
of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its political, economic 
and cultural elements, are in violation of international law.104 
Note the words “directly or indirectly” and “all other forms of interference”. This broad 
wording is similar to the provision on non-intervention in the Charter of the 
Organisation of American States (1948).105 Article 15 of the OAS Charter states:106 
 
No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in 
the internal or external affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force 
but also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State or against 
its political, economic, and cultural elements.107  
With hindsight, scholars have become more inclined to review the Latin American 
practice as a contribution to non-intervention’s “long and noble textual foundation.”108 
There is a long tradition of regional law on non-intervention, which concerns States 
confined within the geographical area of Latin America.109 In the Act of Chapultepec 
(1945),110 a non-binding instrument, its participants endorsed the position that, since 
1890, they have incorporated in “their international law” the principle which 
included:111 
The condemnation of intervention by one State in the internal or external affairs of another (Seventh 
International Conference of American States, 1933 and Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance 
of Peace, 1936). 
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The term “non-intervention” appeared for the first time, as an inter-American treaty 
with the United States as a party,112 in Article 8 of the famous Montevideo Convention 
(1933):113 “No state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of 
another.”114 This was followed by the Inter-American Conference (1936) which agreed 
the Additional Protocol Relative to Non-intervention, also a treaty, as follows: 
The High Contracting Parties declare inadmissible the intervention of any one of them, directly or 
indirectly, and for whatever reason, in the internal or external affairs of any other of the Parties.115 
The treaty language on non-intervention is noteworthy. In 1936, non-intervention was 
declared “inadmissible”.116 In 1945, non-intervention was “condemned”.117 In 1948, 
the UN era, Article 15 of the OAS Charter provided no State at international law had 
a right: “to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or 
external affairs of any other State.”118  
The inconsistent treaty language suggested that non-intervention developed from a 
position of considerable weakness. As an instrument of foreign policy, the recourse 
to war was legal until its renunciation through the Kellogg-Briand Pact in 1928.119 In 
material terms, war implies that both sides are able to resist each other during a full 
scale engagement. For the Latin American States, they were relatively too weak, too 
small, and too isolated, to resist the United States.120  
Interventions by the United States in the Americas, as I shortly illustrate, were used 
as an intermediary measure, in lieu of war.121 The Latin American States wanted to 
enjoy some freedom to govern their own “internal affairs”,122 but their freedom was 
wholly dependent on the willingness of a powerful State (the United States) to respect 
and enforce the treaty obligations on non-intervention.   
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In marked contrast, to the United States, its starting point is the Monroe Doctrine 
(1823).123  Its actions were not interventions and non-intervention was irrelevant.124 
This was the core concern of the Monroe Doctrine:  
[W]e should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere 
as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European 
power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have declared their 
independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just 
principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or 
controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the 
manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.125 
 
In short, the actions of the United States in Latin America constituted collective self-
defence, as the law then stood (on the understanding of the United States).126 The 
United States wanted to prevent the European States from gaining a foothold in Latin 
American States, which indirectly threatened United States’ interests. Thus the words 
in the Monroe Doctrine, i.e., “we would not view any interposition” and “controlling”, 
gave it the widest latitude to act in ways, which advanced its interests in the western 
hemisphere.127  
 
The Roosevelt Corollary (1904) enlarged the Monroe Doctrine.128 This was a 
restatement that the United States would not accept any political control by European 
powers to collect debts from the Latin American States.129 European actions in Latin 
America might lead to occupation. This threatens the security and naval 
communications of the United States at the strategic Panama Canal.130  
Therefore, the Monroe Doctrine and Roosevelt Corollary implied that military 
consequences by the United States might arise: Latin America was its sphere of 
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influence.131 In its long reservation to the Montevideo Convention (1933),132 the 
United States formally and pointedly expressed its position on non-intervention: “no 
(i.e., Latin American) government need fear any intervention on the part of the United 
States under the Roosevelt Administration…the United States Government is as 
much opposed as any other government to interference with the freedom, the 
sovereignty, or other internal affairs or processes of the governments of other 
nations.”133 
From the United States’ perspective, its position did not reflect interventions which 
are illegal ones.134 To the Latin American States, in contrast, they had long viewed 
the United States’ actions as interventions into its own governing of “internal affairs”, 
as powerful indications of American imperialism and dollar diplomacy.135 
Therefore, when we review the regional law of non-intervention in the Americas, the 
competing values, which shaped its unstable content, bear emphasis: there was the 
freedom of the Latin American States to govern their “internal affairs”, in treaty form, 
against the United States’ resolve to protect its security through the Monroe Doctrine 
and Roosevelt Corollary. Non-intervention’s content in this region shifted from 
security interests (the Monroe Doctrine and Roosevelt Corollary) to communist 
concerns, through the OAS as a venue, according to prevailing rules at general 
international law. This shift is legally possible because the non-intervention content in 
the legal instruments are descriptively and evaluatively vague, of which the 
application on a set of facts must be determined by general rules of international law 
at a given point in time. The next example illustrates this point.   
3) Communist Threat in Guatemala (1954) 
 
In 1954, the OAS addressed the matter of communist activities within Guatemala’s 
political institutions.136 Ten OAS members States formally raised this matter before 
the Council of the OAS.137 They requested the convening of a meeting of foreign 
ministers to discuss the communist developments within Guatemala.  
                                                            
131
 See Theodore Roosevelt’s address of 1904 (n129 at 362): “We would only interfere with them (i.e., 
Latin American States) only in the last resort, and then only if it became evident that their inability or 
unwillingness to do justice at home and abroad had violated the rights of the United States or had invited 
foreign aggression (from the European States) to the detriment of the entire body of American nations”.   
132
 See n113.  
133
 See n113 (emphasis supplied): note the interchangeable use of “interference” and “intervention” in 
this reservation.  
134 See n126 at 649.  
135
 
See n22 at 51- 54.  
136
 See n22 at 192-193.  
137
 I.e., Nicaragua, Peru, Cuba, Honduras, Panama, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Brazil, Costa Rica and 
the United States. 
  
 
120 
 
 
Effectively, this was the triggering of an OAS mechanism to discuss the political 
developments, an internal affair, of one of its sovereign member States.138 Eventually, 
the OAS foreign ministers adopted the Caracas resolution, i.e., a non-binding 
instrument, which “condemns”139 the “activities of the international communism 
movement as constituting intervention in American affairs”.140 Mexico objected to this 
position.141 It argued that the OAS was involved in “collective intervention” of 
Guatemala’s internal affairs.142 In response, the final part of the Caracas resolution 
affirms that freedom of States to govern their own “internal affairs” on the basis that 
“this declaration of foreign policy made by the American republics in relation to 
dangers originating outside this Hemisphere is designed to protect and not to impair 
the inalienable right of each American state freely to choose its own form of 
government and economic system and to live its own social and cultural life.”143 
 
In other words, the legal rules to evaluate non-intervention’s content have shifted 
again. No longer is the United States concerned with European interventions in Latin 
American to collect debts. In 1954, communist activities were framed, at general 
international law, as an intervention,144 which impaired the free choice of government 
by OAS member States. A position against anti-communism was a “fact or situation 
that might endanger the peace of America”.145 In short, anti-communism is a regional 
rule of international law on which non-intervention’s descriptively vague content, as 
expressed in Article 15 of the OAS Charter, is determined.  
 
Accordingly, the OAS did its part to shape non-intervention’s content,146 by agreeing 
that the Caracas resolution as one of its institutional “measures and procedures”, on 
grounds of protecting collective security.147 This character of vagueness, in the 
Americas’ regional law of non-intervention, would be amplified when non-intervention 
was introduced to a larger venue – the UN General Assembly.   
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V. Non-Intervention’s Content at the General Assembly  
1) The Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference 
in the Internal Affairs of States (1981): A Neglected General Assembly 
Resolution 
 
This section advances the core proposition by showing the descriptive and evaluative 
vagueness of non-intervention’s content at general international law and, therefore, 
its influence on the regional content of non-intervention. As I shortly explain, there 
was hardly any agreement at specific times as to the precise content of non-
intervention, although certain key concepts were agreed in broad terms at the UN. 
The text in these UN instruments would form the core elements of non-intervention at 
general international law, which would in turn influence regional law-making by 
ASEAN regarding non-intervention as discussed in the next two chapters.  
 
At general international law, today it is reasonable to make two related claims 
regarding non-intervention’s content. First, it  potentially prohibits forcible and non-
forcible acts, but this wider prohibition concerning non-forcible acts has likely 
diminished after the ICJ’s case law on point.148 Second, the textual basis for the first 
claim as to prohibiting forcible and non-forcible interventions is the Friendly Relations 
Declaration (1970).149 Both claims are the signal outcome of the ICJ’s law-making in 
Nicaragua,150 which reflects the influence of general international law’s role in giving 
meaning to the descriptive and evaluative vagueness of non-intervention’s content.  
However, the Friendly Relations Declaration151 is not the only, or most complete, 
statement on non-intervention. This section elaborates on the inability of the General 
Assembly to agree on non-intervention’s content in the Friendly Relations 
Declaration’s final text, as a background to the next section.  
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 Chapter Three, Section VI.  
149
 For a contrary position, see Arangio-Ruiz at 547-561 (n120): as an Italian delegate and Rapporteur 
of the Special Committee to the Friendly Relations Declaration, Arangio-Ruiz spoke with authority when 
he delivered this general course at the Hague Academy of International Law. To this extent, he is an 
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It seems reasonable to agree with Arnagio-Ruiz’s view if one also accepts his worldview that international 
relations after decolonisation are still largely centred on accounts of encounters between Europe and 
the United States.    
150
 See n62.  
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 See n62.  
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In Section VI below, I argue that the ICJ exaggerated non-intervention’s legal 
significance in this instrument by giving the Friendly Relations Declaration 
prominence in Nicaragua, which shaped the present view that non-intervention is 
broader than Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.  My goal is to illustrate the unstable 
content of non-intervention, which is perpetuated by UN organs (i.e., ICJ) whose 
actions continually shift the rules at general international law to evaluate non-
intervention’ content.  
We begin with two General Assembly Resolutions 2131 (1965)152 and 36/103 
(1981),153 which specifically addressed non-intervention. The language in Resolution 
2131 was adopted in the Friendly Relations Declaration, a contentious move to which 
I return.  
In contrast, Resolution 36/103 is now a neglected,154 (non-binding) instrument, which 
is far more detailed on non-intervention’s scope than the Friendly Relations 
Declaration.155 It is this neglected resolution which merits some attention, which I 
discuss first. An old stalking horse of the Soviet Union,156 “friendly relations” was used 
at the UN General Assembly to push for peaceful co-existence.157 The word 
“peaceful” had a specific meaning during the Cold War. In the words of Nikita 
Khrushchev in 1961, peaceful co-existence was "a form of intensive, economic, 
political, and ideological struggle of the proletariat against the aggressive forces of 
imperialism in the international arena”.158 Therefore, in 1976, the Soviet Union 
laboured at the General Assembly to forge agreement on the inadmissibility of 
interference, which would advance “friendly relations”. Eventually, through Resolution 
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 UNGA Res 2131 (21 December 1965) UN Doc A/Res/20/2131.  
153
 UNGA Res 36/103 (9 December 1981) UN Doc A/Res/36/103.  
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 For a rare example of its use, see a statement by the Hong Kong Secretary for Constitutional and 
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Hong Kong Government News, "LCQ5: The Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong", Press 
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operation Among States” (1966-67)1 International Lawyer 96.  
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 Generally, Ivo Lapenna, "The Legal Aspects and Political Significance of the Soviet Concept of Co-
Existence" (1963) 12 ICLQ 737; Bernardo A. Ramundo, Peaceful Coexistence, International Law in the 
Building of Communism (USA: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967). 
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31/91 (1976),159 the General Assembly agreed to consider adopting a declaration on 
non-intervention every year, from 1977-1980.160  
The outcome is (although now neglected) Resolution 36/103: the Declaration on the 
Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States 
(1981).161 It contains “rights and duties”.162 To contemporary ears, there is even a 
paragraph on the “right and duty” of every State to “combat the dissemination of false 
and distorted news”,163 which loosely parallels current concerns in the 21st century 
with respect to “fake news”.164 
The voting outcome for Resolution 36/103 appeared significant enough because a 
majority of UN member States voted in favour.165 But the law-making effect166 of 
General Assembly resolutions is neither decided by numbers,167 nor determined by 
majoritarian fiat at the General Assembly.168 If that were true, the New International 
Economic Order would have prevailed, in terms of advancing the concerns of 
developing States.169  
 
I discussed Resolution 36/103 because, despite (and probably because of) its fuller 
content on non-intervention, its reception by the Great Powers was similar to the 
Friendly Relations Declaration. Despite the vote by the UK and United States against 
Resolution 36/103, the Great Powers did not oppose its adoption by other UN 
memner States at the General Assembly.170 However, the Great Powers’ ambivalent 
attitude ensured that no one would take both resolutions seriously. Yet, after ICJ’s 
actions in Nicaragua,171 the Friendly Relations Declaration became the “most 
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 UNGA Res 31/91 (14 December 1976) UN Doc A/31/91.  
160
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 See n153. 
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 See n153, Parts I-III. Generally see n66 at 355.  
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 See n153, Part III(d).  
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 For example, see “Outlaw or Ignore? How Asia is Fighting 'Fake News'”, BBC News (4 April 2018), 
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 Adopted by 100 votes with 22 against and 6 abstentions: except the Soviet Union and China, France, 
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at 149.  
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 On the early scepticism of the binding quality of General Assembly resolutions, see Prosper Weil’s 
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 On the General Assembly, generally see Alan Boyle and Christine Chinkin, The Making of 
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 UNGA Res 3201(S-VI) (1 May 1974) UN Doc A/Res/3201. 
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 In the context of customary international law, the “specially affected” States are important: North Sea 
Continental Shelf [1969] ICJ Rep 3, para 73 at 42. 
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important” UN resolution on non-intervention,172 a fate which sharply deviated from 
Resolution 36/103.173   
2) The twists and turns of non-intervention in the Friendly Relations Declaration 
 
This part contributes to the core proposition by illustrating the extent of descriptive 
vagueness regarding non-intervention’s content and, importantly, how this vagueness 
would later be used by international organisations (i.e., the UN organ, through the 
ICJ) to influence non-intervention’s content as a general rule of international law, with 
consequences for its influence on regional law. In this respect, therefore, the Friendly 
Relations Declaration was a political declaration to the (non-communist) Great 
Powers, particularly the United States and UK (as I shortly explain below).174 It was 
not intended to be binding. In the UN Charter, the Great Powers already accepted 
some prohibition, in treaty form, in their use of force.175 There was, therefore, no great 
enthusiasm for the Friendly Relations Declaration, certainly not in relation to the non-
intervention provisions. They disagreed that non-intervention prohibited less serious 
situations that did not involve the use of force.176 This is why they insisted that non-
intervention was already contained in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter.177 Otherwise, the 
legality of their actions is evaluated against their particular role178 in maintaining 
international peace and security.179   
 
In contrast, post decolonisation, the developing States used the General Assembly 
as a venue to demand freedom to govern their own “internal affairs”,180 an exercise 
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 See n66 at 353.  
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 For extemporaneous accounts of the scepticisms on the declaration in general and the non-
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 For an account in 1971 of how the North-South, communist, and non-communist States strongly 
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Development of International Law by the International Court of Justice (Tams and Sloan eds) (Oxford: 
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of external self-determination at general international law,181 in terms of broader 
prohibitions on non-intervention which did not just involve the use of force. Against 
this background, the Great Powers behaved, as powerful States do, by shaping non-
intervention’s content in their image. In 1963, a UN Special Committee, not the ILC, 
was formed in 1965 to work on the Friendly Relations Declaration.182 The Great 
Powers did not intend this declaration to become overly “legalistic”,183 a point which 
the ICJ disregarded in Nicaragua. The Sixth Committee was also involved in 
reviewing the Special Committee’s work.184  
 
On non-intervention, the developing States and Western States (led by the Great 
Powers) were stalemated. The Latin American and Asian-African groupings tried to 
produce compromise texts. As the Special Committee’s work faltered, the First 
(political and security) Committee was working on Resolution 2131 (1965),185 also on 
non-intervention, and evidently without reference to each other’s labour.186 When 
Resolution 2131 was adopted, on 21 December 1965, two features in its preambles 
reflected diplomatic success for the developing States.187  
 
First, there was reference to the right of self-determination in the colonial sense.188 
The freedom to organise its internal and external affairs (from intervention) flows from 
this legal right.189 Second, there was acknowledgement of previous practice on non-
intervention in Latin America and Bandung, by developing States.190 Returning to the 
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 For an example of how the ICJ struggled with this issue, see International Status of South-West 
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Friendly Relations Declaration, then, this is the reason why the Latin American and 
Asian-African groupings wanted to build on their earlier success in agreeing a broader 
content for non-intervention, as reflected in Resolution 2131 (1965).191  
 
Naturally, no good will existed on both sides in the end.192 The mood was so 
acrimonious that, from 1966-1970, the Special Committee193 avoided substantive 
discussions on non-intervention.194 Apparently, the delegates even considered 
deleting reference to non-intervention from the Friendly Relations Declaration 
altogether.195 Eventually, the final text of the Friendly Relations Declaration adopted 
four operative paragraphs on non-intervention,196 roughly based on the earlier 
Resolution 2131 (1965).197   
 
This descriptive vagueness as to non-intervention’s content allowed the Great 
Powers, particularly the UK and United States, to articulate its position as universal 
ones. As I explain in Chapter Four, it is precisely this descriptive vagueness of the 
four operative paragraphs at general international law which allowed a regional law 
of non-intervention of higher stringency, during the Kampuchean conflict, to be made 
by ASEAN.  
 
For now, we revert to the context of the Friendly Relations Declaration’s acrimonious 
negotiations. It was not disinterestedness for all States when a British delegate 
famously qualified the non-intervention as follows: “In considering the scope of 
‘intervention’, it should be recognized that in an interdependent world, it is inevitable 
and desirable that States will be concerned with and will seek to influence the actions 
and policies of other States, and that the objective of international law is not to prevent 
such activity but rather to ensure that it is compatible with the sovereign equality of 
States and self-determination of their peoples. . .”198 
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In terms of “influencing” the external affairs of another States, what was “inevitable” 
and “desirable” to the UK must be appraised from its specific legal and material 
standpoint in 1970. For similar reasons, the United States expressed its position on 
the legal status of General Assembly resolutions as follows: “It is not necessary to 
address the legal nature, if any, of such resolutions qua General Assembly resolutions 
to reach the conclusion that none of them evidences some "general and customary 
international law" independent of the substantive and procedural norms established 
by the Charter of the United Nations”.199 On the Friendly Relations Declaration, the 
United States pointedly said that “declaration is, by its own terms, not declaratory of 
"general and customary" international law independent of the provisions of the 
Charter, but rather reaffirms and elaborates the legal principles embodied in the 
Charter.”200 
  
This survey of the contrasting positions, by the Great Powers and the developing 
States who respectively adopted narrow and expansive positions concerning non-
intervention’s content, serves to underscore a manifest failure of agreement on non-
intervention’s content in the Friendly Relations Declaration, at a given point in time. 
The content in this declaration, therefore, was drafted in descriptively vague terms 
because there was neither agreement on its core meaning201 nor whether the form, 
as a General Assembly resolution, could be assessed as a general rule of 
international law. Put differently, the developing States (i.e., the Latin American and 
Asian-African groupings) wanted a broader content of non-intervention which also 
prohibited non-forcible acts, whereas the Western States (such as the United States 
and UK) wanted to restrict it to the use of force.  
 
Today, however, Friendly Relations Declaration is the “most important” statement on 
non-intervention202 because Nicaragua permits the indulgence of rehabilitating that 
acrimonious practice, from 1965-1970, as part of international lawyering. In deciding 
Nicaragua the way that it did, the ICJ was a decisive venue in determining current 
rules of non-intervention’s content.     
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 Counter-Memorial of the United States of America (Jurisdiction and Admissibility), Pleadings, Oral 
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VI. Nicaragua: The ICJ Makes the Contemporary Law of Non-Intervention 
 
1) Introduction 
 
The previous discussion explained how, as a matter of general international law, texts 
in UN instruments prescribed elements of non-intervention’s content, even in the 
absence of broad agreement regarding its precise content. The strength of general 
international law in determining the descriptively and evaluatively vagueness of non-
intervention is further developed in this section. Therefore, this section advances the 
core proposition by showing the powerful influence of the general international law of 
non-intervention in shaping regional law, after the ICJ’s signal law-making through 
case law.  
 
In Nicaragua the ICJ confronted nearly all the pressing issues of the international 
legal order in its day.203 This case is one of the most complex and intractable instance 
of serial litigation before the Court.204 To state the facts briefly: the contras, as 
opponents of the Sandinista government of Nicaragua, in 1981, started a guerrilla 
insurgency movement from bases in neighbouring States. The contras were funded 
and assisted, covertly and overtly, by the United States government. CIA personnel, 
in particular, had assisted in the mining of Nicaraguan harbours.  
 
Nicaragua claimed that the United States support of the contras was an unlawful use 
of force against it, as well as unlawful intervention in its internal affairs. El Salvador, 
Honduras and Costa Rica in turn claimed that Nicaraguan forces had engaged in 
military activities and assisted rebels on their territory.  
 
The litigation phases were also complex. During the jurisdiction and admissibility 
stage in 1984, the United States argued that the ICJ had no jurisdiction to hear 
Nicaragua’s application because of the so-called Contadora process, which was then 
ongoing and aimed to resolve the dispute.  The United States then argued that, with 
respect to the merits, it was acting in collective self-defence, at the request of the 
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three neighbouring States. The United States lost. The case proceeded to the merits 
phase without the participation of the United States.  
 
In 1985, the US withdrew its acceptance of jurisdiction under the optional clause, 
largely as a result of disagreement with the Court’s handling of the case. In 1990, 
Nicaragua’s bilateral relations with the United States only improved when the 
Chamorra government assumed power after elections. The contras were disarmed. 
The compensation owed by the United States to Nicaragua was suspended.205  
 
Against this complex situation that confronted the ICJ, this section draws attention to 
its role in creating non-intervention’s content.206 It bears explanation how the Court 
used non-binding instruments, especially the Friendly Relations Declaration, to argue 
that coerciveness is important to non-intervention’s content.207 I argue that, because 
of Nicaragua, a restrictive rule now exists at general international law against which 
we must consider, when determining non-intervention’s content in a given situation.  
2) The Contemporary Law of Non-Intervention Emerged the Day after 
Nicaragua 
 
This part furthers the core proposition by showing how the general rule of international 
law regarding non-intervention gradually emerged, which would shape the regional 
content of non-intervention. In an elegant account, James Crawford and Thomas 
                                                            
205
 “Nicaragua may revive $17 billion claim against U.S” (21 July 2011), available at 
<http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/americas/07/20/nicaragua.us.claim/>.       
206
 The literature on other aspects of this case is extensive. For recent analyses, generally see: Lori 
Damrosch, “The Impact of the Nicaragua Case on the Court and Its Role: Harmful, Helpful, or in 
Between?” (2012) 25 Leiden JIL 135; Paul Reichler, “The Impact of the Nicaragua Case on Matters of 
Evidence and Fact-Finding” (2012) 25 Leiden JIL 149; Marcelo Kohen, “The Principle of Non-Intervention 
25 Years after the Nicaragua Judgment” (2012) 25 Leiden JIL 157; S Oda ‘Reservations in the 
Declarations of Acceptance of the Optional Clause and the Period of Validity of Those Declarations: The 
Effect of the Shultz Letter’ (1989) 59 BYIL 1; A Chayes ‘Nicaragua, the United States and the World 
Court’ (1985) 85 ColumLRev 1445; MJ Glennon, “Nicaragua v. United States: Constitutionality of US 
Modification of ICJ Jurisdiction” (1985) 79 AJIL 682; J Sztucki, “Intervention under Article 63 of the ICJ 
Statute in the Phase of Preliminary Proceedings: The “Salvadorean Incident”’ (1985) AJIL 1005; K 
Highet, “Evidence, the Court and the Nicaragua Case” (1987) 81 AJIL 1; PW Kahn, “From Nuremberg 
to the Hague: The United States Position in Nicaragua v. United States” (1987) 12 YaleJIntlL 1; HG 
Maier (ed), ‘Appraisals of the ICJ’ Decision: Nicaragua v. United States (Merits)’ (1987) 81 AJIL 77; PM 
Norton, ‘The Nicaragua Case: Political Questions before the International Court of Justice’ (1987) 27 
VaJIntlL 459; W Czaplinski, ‘Sources of International Law in the Nicaragua Case’ (1989) 38 ICLQ 151; 
MH Mendelson, ‘The Nicaragua Case and Customary International Law’ (1989) 26 Coexistence 85. 
207
 Generally James R Crawford, “Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua Case 
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Viles explained how, on any given day, one cannot precisely determine what all of 
international law is.208 This determination is clearer the day after:209  
 
…by reference to the processes of the legal system which enable one to tell, more or less, what the law 
was at a given time…‘A legal system exists at any given moment if this moment is part of a period in 
which it exists’. In a way, it is the movement of the system across time (the continuing attitude of the 
actors to it across time) which comes first.  Its content at a given time is its product.210  
 
The above remarks by Crawford and Viles, with due adjustment to our case, are 
material to our identifying non-intervention’s content now: it started, on that given day, 
when the ICJ delivered its judgment in Nicaragua. Their reference to the “processes 
of the legal system”,211 I argue, includes law-making acts by a UN organ, i.e., the ICJ 
in our case.  
 
From the day after Nicaragua was decided, this case formed the definitive parameters 
of non-intervention.212 Its availability,213 as ICJ case law, is not a subsidiary means for 
determining the law of non-intervention. It has exerted a signal influence on legal 
actors (tribunals and scholars), and international legal persons (States and 
international organisations) who determined non-intervention’s content through their 
reliance on, and reaction to, Nicaragua.  
 
Therefore, Nicaragua represents a fresh point in which the descriptive vagueness of 
non-intervention’s content, in the Friendly Relations Declaration, is being determined 
as a universal rule by general international law, which is less stringent as a legal 
obligation. The following parts explain how this universal rule contributes to the 
restrictive content of non-intervention, as well as its influence as general international 
law to the regional content of non-intervention.  
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3) Non-Intervention as Customary International Law: the Fiction of 
Subjective Legal Belief 
 
This part supports the core proposition by showing the dynamic tension between the 
development of a general rule concerning non-intervention, and its influence on 
restricting the development of a regional content of non-intervention. To this extent, it 
bears repeating that non-intervention had no meaningful content in the Friendly 
Relations Declaration, despite its being adopted by consensus at the General 
Assembly. This is because the four operative paragraphs were descriptively vague 
and contained a potentially wide range of interventions, which could be prohibited by 
non-intervention at general international law. This vagueness in descriptive terms  
reflected the absence of an adequate legal belief that, among participating States in 
1970, the non-intervention provisions are broader than the rule prohibiting the use of 
force.214  
 
The ICJ’s reliance on the Friendly Relations Declaration to identify a customary rule 
of non-intervention, which it claimed prohibited both forcible and non-forcible acts, 
was an extrapolative act.215 The result is that the vexed matter of ascertaining non-
intervention’s content before Nicaragua no longer matters.  
 
This is because the ICJ, in Nicaragua, held that non-intervention is “part and parcel” 
of customary international law,216 although it admitted that “trespass” of non-
intervention is “not infrequent”.217 That means it is frequently breached. Strikingly, the 
subjective element of non-intervention’s customary status is, the Court asserts, 
backed by “substantial and established practice”.218  
 
Here the Court’s reasoning as to non-intervention’s content becomes, at best, 
unclear. It used non-binding instruments, especially the Friendly Relations 
Declaration, to support its claim of a subjective belief that the provisions on non-
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to bear” on the internal and external affairs of another State. Now contrast Higgins’s view with the ICJ’s 
ruling in Nicaragua (n62, para 241 at 124) that it was “clearly established” the financial support and 
training of the United States to the contras in Nicaragua constituted unlawful intervention in the internal 
affairs of a State. 
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intervention are binding. For good measure, it also referenced the “multiplicity of 
declarations”,219 mainly the Latin American practice and Helsinki Final Act.220 The 
Court’s goal was to prove that non-intervention is accepted by many States, including 
the United States.221  
 
This was a brave exercise,222 but the Court had to focus on customary international 
law. Before Nicaragua, acceptance by the United States of the Court’s compulsory 
jurisdiction was subject to the Vandenberg reservation (1946).223 The United States 
must agree to the Court’s jurisdiction before the latter can rule on “disputes arising 
under a multilateral treaty”,224 including the UN Charter.  
 
However, Nicaragua’s government relied on the UN Charter to advance a number of 
propositions. One of them was the customary rule prohibiting the use of force.225 The 
United States argued that the customary law prohibiting the use of force was based 
on the UN Charter - a treaty.226 The customary and treaty law prohibiting the use of 
force are related. Because of its Vandenberg reservation,227 the United States 
argued, Nicaragua’s argument must fail.228  
 
Against this background, the Court reasoned that the United States was bound by 
custom after all.229 It claimed that States, including the United States and Nicaragua, 
believed that they acted under the belief of a binding legal obligation,230 the subjective 
element of custom.231 Importantly, this proposition was deduced, by the Court, with 
“all due caution” from General Assembly resolutions.232  
                                                            
219
 See n62, para 205 at 107.  
220
 Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (adopted 1 August 1975) 
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In other words, it invented the “bindingness” of non-intervention based on past 
patterns of State practice.233  It is also here that the Court made a signal move of 
endorsing the Friendly Relations Declaration, as proof of an “attitude” by States, 
regarding the subjective element on the customary law which prohibits the use of 
force.234 However, it did not explain how the Friendly Relations Declaration, a non-
binding instrument, could reflect legal belief of its binding quality for non-intervention. 
 
It could not do so for two reasons. First, as explained above,235 there was the 
acrimony as to non-intervention’s content in the Friendly Relations Declaration. 
Second, because of this acrimony, it is hard to argue for the Court to elaborate on its 
assertion of an “attitude” by States in the non-binding Friendly Relations Declaration 
that it could reflect a legal belief as to the binding quality of non-intervention’s content. 
The Court simply asserted that the Friendly Relations Declaration did not just 
“reiterate” obligations in the UN Charter:236 it represented an “acceptance of the 
validity of a rule or set of rules declared by the resolution by themselves”.237  
 
To determine non-intervention’s content now, against general international law at this 
given point, we must have regard for the applicable law - Nicaragua.238 Time has 
erased the “undue caution”239 that ICJ warned about in using the Friendly Relations 
Declaration.240 Most importantly, the specific (Cold War) context of the Court’s 
reasoning on non-intervention is being universalised as general international law 
today.  
 
Given the competing claims of universal values (i.e., on the day after Nicaragua was 
decided), for instance in international cooperation of disaster management,241 the 
practical outcome is to restrict any State’s right to govern its “internal affairs” with a 
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significant whittling down of non-intervention’s content.242 For a case with specific 
facts that applied to the United States and Nicaragua during a particular moment of 
the Cold War, this principal UN organ played a part in shaping non-intervention’s 
descriptively vague content at general international law. This next part illustrates this 
argument by arguing how the potentially wide range of acts which are prohibited by 
non-intervention are weakened through the requirement of coercion, which we 
consider next.  
4) Coercion as the “Essence” of Prohibited Intervention.  
 
This part furthers the core proposition by showing the influence of general 
international law, in terms of how its descriptively vague content regarding non-
intervention, shapes the basis on which a regional law of non-intervention might be 
determined and assessed. To this extent, in Nicaragua, the Court’s reasoning on non-
intervention is inseparable from the rule that prohibits the use of force.243 A range of 
allegations, some forcible and others non-forcible, were levelled by Nicaragua against 
the United States.244 These allegations form a continuum of forcible and non-forcible 
acts by the United States. From 1981-1984, there was credible evidence that the 
United States provided funds to the paramilitaries in Nicaragua.245   
 
In plain language, then, some of these acts by the United States were “interventions” 
because the political objective was to change outcomes in Nicaragua. However, 
“intervention” and “non-intervention” are legal words that acquire meaning, when 
assessed against general international law at a given point. Thus when the United 
States justified its actions in the language of international law, it argued that they were 
acting in collective self-defence against an armed attack by Nicaragua.246 Nicaragua, 
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it was alleged, supplied arms to insurgents in El Salvador, Costa Rica and Guatemala, 
thereby destabilising the regional peace and security.247  
 
The Court rejected the United States’ defence of collective self-defence, in the 
absence of a request by the States who considered themselves as victims of an 
armed attack.248 As I shortly elaborate, the Court moved on to determine the legality, 
at general international law, of those actions by the United States, which necessarily 
occurred on a continuum of forcible and non-forcible acts. Since it could not use the 
treaty prohibition, i.e., Article 2(4), UN Charter, the ICJ explained why it used the 
customary basis to support its argument that the United States was still bound by the 
rule, which prohibited the use of force.  
 
On a customary basis, the Court laboured to find legal excuses for the use of force 
by the United States.249 The ICJ wanted to determine whether the United States were 
justified in taking counter-measures against Nicaragua’s conduct.250 Finally, at last, it 
is here that non-intervention becomes relevant:251  
 
“…the Court must enquire whether there is any justification for the activities in question, to be found not 
in the right of collective self-defence against an armed attack, but in the right to take counter-measures 
in response to conduct of Nicaragua which is not alleged to constitute an armed attack. It will examine 
this point in connection with an analysis of the principle of non-intervention in customary international 
law”. 
 
Put simply, the Court examined non-intervention “in connection” to determining 
justifications to the use of force by the United States.252 A majority of the Court found 
against the use of force for attacking Nicaraguan naval bases and patrol boats.253 
They also ruled that non-intervention was violated because the United States 
supported and financed the contras.254 For laying mines in Nicaragua’s territorial 
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waters, the United States breached the customary rule against using force and non-
intervention.255  
 
By saying that it only sought to “define” what “appears to be relevant to the resolution 
of the dispute”,256 the Court was not repeating a banal point that its reasoning only 
applied to the litigants, at the merits phase. At this point, the United States flatly 
refused to participate.257 Therefore, on this particular day, the Court was a venue for 
the creation of non-intervention's content, whose ramifications as a law-making act 
emerged the day after its judgment. This point is evident in the Court’s innovative 
conclusion that coercion was the “very essence” of non-intervention.258 In a canonical 
passage, it stated that “A prohibited intervention must accordingly be one bearing on 
matters in which State is permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide 
freely. One of these is the choice of a political, economical, social and cultural system, 
and the formulation of foreign policy.259  
 
The expression “bearing on matters” was immediately followed by this sentence, 
which said: “Intervention is wrongful when it uses methods of coercion in regard to 
such choices, which must remain free ones.”260 In other words, “methods” of coercion 
appear to be a factor in determining prohibited interventions “bearing on matters”, 
which impinge on a State’s free choices. Then the Court went on to say this about 
coercion:261 “The element of coercion, which defines, and indeed forms the very 
essence of prohibited intervention, is particularly obvious in the case of an 
intervention which uses force, either in the direct form of military action, or in the 
indirect form of support for subversive or terrorist armed activities within another 
State.262 
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The support of the contras by the United States was held, by the Court, to be a 
coercive act against the sovereign State of Nicaragua. Particularly, the ICJ decided 
that the financial support, training, supply of weapons, intelligence and logistical 
assistance a “clear breach of the principle of non-intervention”.263 It was coercive 
because the United States aimed to change Nicaragua’s government policies. 
Nicaragua was deprived of free choices. The Court did not decide whether these 
coercive acts were intended to be far-reaching enough to suggest that the United 
States wanted to force a change of government in Nicaragua.264 
 
In Nicaragua, it is clear why coercion formed part of the Court’s reasoning on non-
intervention. It is noteworthy that the ICJ did not directly refer, to the Friendly 
Relations Declaration265 or Helsinki Final Act,266 to support its claim that coercion is 
the “very essence” of intervention. Instead it said that the assistance by the United 
States to the contras was prohibited by the Friendly Relations Declaration, on the 
basis that they “involve the threat or use of force”.267 The Court added that “These 
forms of action are therefore wrongful in the light of both the principle of non-use of 
force, and that of non-intervention.”268  
 
In short, the Court was preoccupied with the rule that prohibited the use of force. The 
wrongfulness of this act, by the United States, allowed non-intervention to be 
concomitantly assessed, based on the Friendly Relations Declaration’s descriptively 
vague provisions on the range of potential interventions, on a continuum of forcible 
and non-forcible acts. Furthermore, the ICJ cited the Helsinki Final Act269 as evidence 
that the United States accepted the customary status of non-intervention, which has 
“universal application”.270  
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VII. Non-Intervention’s Content after Nicaragua.  
1) Purpose  
 
This section continues to advance the core proposition of this study by highlighting 
the ICJ’s role in bolstering the powerful influence of the general international law of 
non-intervention. In 2005, nearly twenty years after Nicaragua was decided, the 
subject of non-intervention again reached the Court. In laconic terms, the ICJ ruled 
that Uganda had breached non-intervention.  If Nicaragua is the “given day”271 that 
the contemporary law of non-intervention is made, then the DRC v Congo case 
represents the settled law on the “day after”.  
 
This final section elaborates on the ICJ’s decisive role in shaping non-intervention’s 
contemporary content which is confined to the requirement of coercion. The 
universalising character of this requirement, now part of general international law, is 
determined against the factual background of the use of force. Put another way, 
unless the factual matrix involves a civil strife, and certain actions are coercive along 
the lines of Nicaragua and DRC v Congo,272 it would be difficult to argue that non-
intervention applies. This marks, I argue, a considerable departure from those early 
efforts at the General Assembly, after decolonisation, and during the Cold War, to 
broaden non-intervention’s content beyond the rule which prohibits the use and threat 
of force.  
2) Non-Intervention in DRC v Congo273  
 
I focus on one submission by the DRC: that Uganda engaged in military and 
paramilitary activities against it.274 The DRC argued that Uganda occupied DRC’s 
territory and actively extended military,275 logistic, economic, and financial support to 
irregular forces within the DRC.276 Consequently, the DRC argued that the following 
principles of conventional and customary law were violated: the principle of non-use 
of force in international relations, including the prohibition of aggression; the obligation 
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to settle international disputes exclusively by peaceful means so as to ensure that 
international peace and security, as well as justice, are not placed in jeopardy; respect 
for the sovereignty of States and the rights of peoples to self-determination, and 
hence to choose their own political and economic system freely and without outside 
interference; the principle of non-interference in matters within the domestic 
jurisdiction of States, which includes refraining from extending any assistance to the 
parties to a civil war operating on the territory of another State.277 
 
In its judgment, the ICJ concluded in vague terms that Uganda had “violated certain 
obligations of international law”,278 including a breach by Uganda of the rule which 
prohibited the use of force.279  
 
It is this finding that opened the gap for non-intervention to apply in the context of civil 
strife. For a start, the Court held that the Friendly Relations Declaration280 is 
“declaratory” of custom.281 Approvingly, it cited two provisions:   
  
Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil 
strife or terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed 
towards the commission of such acts, when the acts referred to in the present paragraph involve a threat 
or use of force.282 
 
No State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities 
directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State, or interfere in civil strife in another 
State.283 
 
In terms of determining the subjective belief of the Friendly Relations Declaration, as 
custom, the Court conspicuously dropped its approach of “all due caution” in 
Nicaragua.284 The Court’s focus as to these two provisions concerned civil strife, 
which applied to the situation between the DRC and Uganda. In this respect, the First 
Paragraph,285 as cited by the Court, belongs to the first principle in the Friendly 
Relations Declaration: this proscribes the threat or use of force.286  
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Only the Second Paragraph,287 which the Court cited, belonged to the third principle 
of the Friendly Relations Declaration, concerning the duty not to intervene in matters 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any State”.288 In short, a fine line separates the 
forcible and non-forcible acts of Uganda on a continuum, as the Court’s determination 
on non-intervention in DRC v Congo shows: “…the Court made it clear that the 
principle of non-intervention prohibits a State “to intervene, directly or indirectly, with 
or without armed force, in support of an internal opposition in another State” (I.C.J. 
Reports 1986, p. 108, para. 206).”289  
 
Actually, in 1986, the ICJ did not say this in Nicaragua: paragraph 206 of the 1986 
judgment was not “clear” at all.290 In paragraph 206, the Court asked if there is any 
subjective belief as custom, which allows a State to intervene in another State’s civil 
strife. In a quasi-Socratic fashion, Paragraph 206 in Nicaragua in fact states: 
“However, before reaching a conclusion on the nature of prohibited intervention, the 
Court must be satisfied that State practice justifies it. There have been in recent years 
a number of instances of foreign intervention for the benefit of forces opposed to the 
government of another State. The Court is not here concerned with the process of 
decolonization; this question is not in issue in the present case. It has to consider 
whether there might be indications of a practice illustrative of belief in a kind of general 
right for States to intervene, directly or indirectly, with or without armed force, in 
support of an internal opposition in another State, whose cause appeared particularly 
worthy by reason of the political and moral values with which it was identified. For 
such a general right to come into existence would involve a fundamental modification 
of the customary law principle of non-intervention.”291  
 
The Court answered its own question in paragraph 209 (of Nicaragua) this way: “The 
Court therefore finds that no such general right of intervention, in support of an 
opposition within another State, exists in contemporary international law. The Court 
concludes that acts constituting a breach of the customary principle of non-
intervention will also, if they directly or indirectly involve the use of force, constitute a 
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breach of the principle of non-use of force in international relations.292 Therefore, 
returning to the DRC v Congo case: the DRC alleged that Uganda secured towns, 
airports in the DRC, and aided the “parallel activity of those engaged in civil war”.293 
These allegations involve acts which involve obvious use of force but also contained 
less serious ones. There is a continuum. Hence in its DRC v Congo judgment, the 
Court approved paragraph 209 of Nicaragua and concluded that “…it has been 
presented with probative evidence as to military intervention. The Court further affirms 
that acts which breach the principle of non-intervention “will also, if they directly or 
indirectly involve the use of force, constitute a breach of the principle of non-use of 
force in international relations” (ibid., pp. 109-110, para. 209).”294 
 
The words “coercion” and “coerce” did not appear in DRC v Congo case. But its 
importance is evident. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter (a treaty rule), sovereignty, and 
territorial integrity (principles), were merged with non-intervention. Pay attention to 
the Court’s compound analysis of non-intervention as “interference in the internal 
affairs of the DRC”: “In relation to the first of the DRC’s final submissions, the Court 
accordingly concludes that Uganda has violated the sovereignty and also the 
territorial integrity of the DRC. Uganda’s actions equally constituted an interference 
in the internal affairs of the DRC and in the civil war there raging. The unlawful military 
intervention by Uganda was of such a magnitude and duration that the Court 
considers it to be a grave violation of the prohibition on the use of force expressed in 
Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter.”295 
 
However, as explained already, before Nicaragua was decided by the ICJ, non-
intervention’s content appeared to contain both forcible and non-forcible prohibitions, 
especially in the now neglected Resolution 36/103 (1981). In Nicaragua,296 the Court 
used the Friendly Relations Declaration297 to establish non-intervention’s customary 
status. The facts in Nicaragua enabled the law-making of non-intervention to capture 
a range of forcible and non-forcible acts, which occurred on a continuum.298  
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When the subject of non-intervention again came before the ICJ in 2005, the Court’s 
approach on non-intervention’s content was more relaxed in DRC v Congo.299 It was 
less defensive about its legal basis.  Nicaragua already took care of that.  The 
outcome is the unstable effect on non-intervention’s content. Before Nicaragua was 
decided, it was still plausible, as part of general international law, to consider other 
General Assembly resolutions which elaborated non-intervention’s content in 
considerable detail.300  
 
That changed after Nicaragua. In terms of authoritative rules, at general international 
law, prohibiting direct or indirect intervention in a State’s internal affairs, our attention 
is now firmly directed at the Friendly Relations Declaration. The ICJ claimed, in 
Nicaragua, that this declaration is legally significant because it was adopted by 
consensus. If this consensus on non-intervention were significant, which I argued 
above that it was not, it is a direct result of the ICJ’s law-making in Nicaragua.  
 
To conclude this section, it is useful to consider the implications of the ICJ’s two major 
case law for the prospects of non-intervention’s content, including its status as a rule 
of customary international law in the 21st century. A recent example, in the form of 
Security Council Resolution 2249 (2015),301 suggests that non-forcible prohibitions 
are unlikely to be protected by non-intervention. Acting under its Chapter VII powers, 
the Security Council condemned the “horrifying terrorist acts” which were perpetrated 
by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).302 Sponsored by France,303 this 
resolution “unequivocally” denounced the attacks by ISIL, throughout 2015, in 
Tunisia, Turkey, over Sinai, Lebanon, and, of course, in France.304 It called on 
“Member States that have the capacity to do so to take all necessary measures”, 
consistent with international law, against ISIL.305  
 
It is reasonable to say that the most capable and willing are likely the permanent 
members of the Security Council. They are able or willing because they are Great 
                                                            
299
 See n272.  
300
 See Chapter Three, Section V.  
301
 UNSC Res 2249 (20 November 2015) UN Doc S/Res/2249. 
302
 Ibid, operative paragraph one.  
303
 See the statement by the President of the UN Security Council during a meeting related to “Threats 
to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts” (20 November 2015) UN Doc S/PV.7565.  
304
 A series of coordinated terrorist attacks occurred in Paris on 13 November 2015: Security Council 
Resolution 2249 (n301) was adopted on 20 November 2015.  
305
 See n301 at operative paragraph 5.  
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Powers.306 Or they act simply because their own security interests were directly 
undermined by ISIL. It is fair to conclude that, a range of the contested acts307 by the 
United States in the Nicaragua case, would be reprised by able and willing States 
against ISIL, with suitable adaptations for the 21st century.308  
 
If the Security Council were to exercise its Chapter VII powers, these actions would 
not be “coercive” at international law.309 They are “necessary measures”310 to 
maintain international peace and security. Since consent to the UN Charter is an 
exception to non-intervention, so non-intervention’s content is being modified and 
whittled down.311 This is because UN member States have already given consent in 
advance to the Security Council to take certain types of actions. Finally, because the 
Security Council actions are in accordance with Chapter VII powers and not legally 
coercive, so the customary rule of non-intervention arguably fails because it would be 
hard to argue that coerciveness is established, since it is the essence of prohibited 
intervention     
 
VIII. Conclusion  
 
This chapter has examined the content and extent of non-intervention over a period 
of time. Recall that, in Chapter Two, we examined how international organisations 
can (and do) create regional law, a result of the influence being exerted by general 
international law. By building on that argument in Chapter Two, this chapter has 
furthered the core proposition because it shows the powerful influence of general 
international law regarding non-intervention, which is largely shaped by international 
organisations. Importantly, this chapter has also argued that non-intervention’s 
content is a moving target, because of its descriptive and evaluative vagueness, from 
which choices must be made to articulate first what the general international law is, 
                                                            
306
 See n301: in another canonical passage, the ICJ stated, “intervention is perhaps still less admissible 
in the particular form it would take here; for, from the nature of things, it would be reserved for the most 
powerful States, and might easily lead to perverting the administration of international justice itself”: Corfu 
Channel Case (United Kingdom v Albania) (Merits) [1949] ICJ Rep 4 at 35. There is no question that 
Great Powers play an inevitable role in administering “international justice” (whatever that means). The 
key question is whether the Court would decide differently, had the UK acted within the Security Council’s 
competences.  
307
 See Section VI, especially Parts 3 and 4.  
308
 See n62, para 205 at 108.  
309
 I.e., the actions against ISIL are obviously intended to be “constraining”, through “force”, and therefore 
“coercive” (n301). See also n66 at 348: “…the essence of intervention is coercion…Coercion also goes 
to the core of the mischief that the non-intervention principle seeks to address.” 
310
 See n301, operative paragraph 5.  
311
 See further Article 2(7), UN Charter.  
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at any given point, and usually through the venue of an international organisation, 
before rules emerge to determine non-intervention’s content.  
 
A common theme, therefore, permeates all the sections in this chapter: the 
vagueness of non-intervention’s content. Despite the tenuous (even non-existent) 
connection to our modern international system of sovereign States, the ideas of 
European writers on non-intervention were borrowed and adapted by UN organs. We 
tend to view the Latin American practice, especially its contribution to non-
intervention’s “long and noble textual foundation,”312 as a precursor to the non-binding 
General Assembly resolutions at the UN. However, non-intervention during this 
period was practically devoid of content, when appraised against the Monroe 
Doctrine.  
 
At the UN General Assembly, there was no agreement, in the Friendly Relations 
Declaration, whether non-intervention’s content includes wider prohibitions, beyond 
the threat or use of force. This situation would change the day after Nicaragua was 
decided by the ICJ. From now, the general rule of international law for determining 
non-intervention’s content is to establish coercion as a requirement. Given the many 
competing values of global cooperation, I argued, the ICJ has constrained non-
intervention’s contemporary content.   
 
At every stage in the above examples, select choices were made to give meaning to 
non-intervention at particular points in time, which are advanced as persistent claims 
of universality, manifested as general international law, usually conducted the venue 
of international organisations. In this respect, I conclude this chapter with the views 
of Jennings and Watts in the ninth edition of Oppenheim’s International Law to 
demonstrate the ramifications of the ICJ’s role on non-intervention, the day after 
Nicaragua was decided.  
 
Jennings and Watts heavily relied on Nicaragua to support their determination of 
“State practice” on non-intervention.313 They wrote that intervention has a “stricter 
meaning” at international law.314 Notice that it is “intervention” (not non-intervention) 
which has a stricter meaning. To Jennings and Watts, intervention must be “forcible 
                                                            
312
 See n206 at 7.  
313
 For an impressive array of footnotes too numerous to repeat here, see n41 at 451.  
314
 Section 129, n41 at 431. 
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or dictatorial, or otherwise coercive”:315 “Interference pure and simple is not 
intervention”.316 Therefore, non-intervention’s content is determined negatively: if an 
act is not assessed to be coercive, it is reasonable to conclude that non-intervention 
does not apply. However, Jennings and Watts resisted an outright dismissal. Indeed, 
as a judge in the Nicaragua case, Jennings unequivocably affirmed non-intervention 
as an “autonomous principle of customary law”.317 Thus in a nicely dense sentence, 
Jennings and Watts said in the ninth edition of Oppenheim’s International Law: “…the 
practice of states does not yet permit the conclusion that intervention in strictly limited 
cases and in a manner not inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations is 
necessarily excluded.”318 
 
This is hardly a positivist statement319 that one might reasonably expect from the 
practitioner’s guide,320 which Oppenheim’s International Law had become.321 In one 
review of their ninth edition, it was observed that the “absence of a critical perspective” 
is the “mark” of a practitioner’s guide.322 This might be taken to mean that both authors 
knew the nuances of international law, but there was just no need to agonise over 
them in the real world. Yet the drawing of attention to absent critical perspectives is 
important. Jennings and Watts made inductive determinations, through select choices 
of Oppenheim’s early ideas, to advance general propositions which are (apparently) 
helpful to practitioners.  
 
Non-intervention’s content continues to be torn between the (dwindling) right of a 
State to govern its “internal affairs”, and interventions in “strictly limited cases” which 
are “not inconsistent” with the UN Charter. Presumably, these latter interventions 
promote some universal goals of cooperation, whose rules can be appraised against 
general international law. It is general international law that creates the vagueness of 
non-intervention’s content, permits its potential application to a range of interventions, 
as well as asserts its role in shaping, through international organisations, the content 
                                                            
315
 Section 129, n41 at 432.  
316
 Section 129, n41 at 432.  
317
 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), 
Merits [1986] ICJ Reports 14; see Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sir Robert Jennings at 524.   
318
 Section 131, n41 at 439: on the implications for “humanitarian intervention”, generally see Vaughan 
Lowe and Antionios Tzanakopoulos, Humanitarian Intervention (2011) MPEPIL; Simon Chesterman,  
Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2001). 
319
 For this view, generally see n40 at 336.  
320
 See their preface: “That is its status as a practitioner’s book, rather than as an academic treatise, and 
in its attempt to provide a helpful meaning for an inquiry into particular problems”. 
321
 See n38.  
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 Colin Warbrick, “Review of Oppenheim's International Law. Volume 1: Peace” (1993) 42 ICLQ 449 
at 449-450.  
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regional non-intervention.  The rest of this study illustrates these propositions with two 
case studies.  
  
 
147 
 
Chapter Four  
NON-INTERVENTION DURING THE KAMPUCHEAN CONFLICT  
I. Purpose  
 
This chapter illustrates the core proposition that the distinctive regional law of non-
intervention made by ASEAN is influenced by powerful external actors who aid the 
making of general international law. To this extent, it is useful to recapitulate how the 
previous chapters have advanced the core proposition so far.  
In Chapter One, we explored how the International Relations literature (“IR literature”) 
had extensively studied non-intervention with respect to ASEAN in specific ways, 
namely through its link to a diplomatic practice called the “ASEAN Way”. As explained 
already, it is not easy to determine the legal content of non-intervention in the IR 
literature. Most importantly, the IR literature’s approach did not distinguish acts by 
ASEAN States (which had acted individually as sovereign States) from the acts of 
ASEAN member States within ASEAN’s auspices, acting as a separate legal person.  
Therefore, the problem with the IR literature’s approach is that it is difficult to 
determine the legal content of non-intervention which is properly made by ASEAN, 
as a separate legal person. Be that as it may, the legal scholarship which addresses 
ASEAN has assimilated the IR literature’s conclusions regarding non-intervention.  
Chapter Two, therefore, first showed how specific rules of general international law 
shape and enable the law-making powers of international organisations (especially 
as to its separate legal personality). Second, it is also general international law which 
provides an analytical framework to identify and assess the regional quality of an 
international organisation’s law-making, in terms of it serving as a venue and outcome 
for law-making.    
Chapter Two concluded with a discussion of how both broad strands of general 
international law enabled the evaluation of ASEAN’s regional law-making, through its 
organs (i.e., the AMM) and in treaty form (i.e., the TAC). The distinctiveness of 
ASEAN’s regional law-making is its capacity to make regional laws, as a separate 
legal person. This, then, is the meaning of regional law made by ASEAN as being 
“distinctive”: it is distinctive because general international law influences and permits 
ASEAN to act separately from its ASEAN member States, which created the 
international organisation. Accordingly, this chapter developed the core proposition 
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with an analytical framework to explain the relationship between general and regional 
international law.   
Chapter Three furthered the core proposition by demonstrating how powerful general 
international law is with respect to the content of non-intervention. Despite non-
intervention’s unstable content, general international law has proved adaptable and 
influential. The content of non-intervention, as contained in the texts which were 
agreed at the UN, formed the basis for the ICJ to reinforce and expand the general 
rules regarding non-intervention through its law-making in the Nicaragua case.1  
Against this background, this Chapter explores through a case study the arguments 
which were raised in the previous chapters. It uses the conflict in Kampuchea (1978-
1991)2 to demonstrate how a distinctive regional law, as to non-intervention, emerged 
and was created after the end of this conflict.  
Furthermore, the roles of the United States and Soviet Union, as powerful external 
actors, also influenced the general international law regarding non-intervention during 
this long conflict. The proxy wars between these external powers meant that the 
general international law as to non-intervention, on the basis of regional peace and 
security, allowed ASEAN to advance the regional content of non-intervention: this 
included a prohibition against intervention in Kampuchea’s internal affairs (which was 
not an ASEAN member State) by installing another government in lieu of the Khmer 
Rouge government.  
In the early years following its creation as an international organisation in 1967, it was 
widely acknowledged that ASEAN was not “institutionalised”3 and had little recourse 
to law,4 including international law.5 Hence, against this context,  the Kampuchean 
conflict is a foundational moment for the political coming of age of “ASEAN”.6 
                                                            
1
 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) 
(Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14.  
2
 The international relations literature is numerous. For a selection, see Bilson Kurus, “Understanding 
ASEAN: Benefits and Raison D'être” (1933) 33(8) Asian Survey 819; Kishore Mahbubani, “The 
Kampuchean Problem: A Southeast Asian Perception”, Foreign Affairs, Vol 62, No 6 (1983/1984 Winter) 
407; Lau, Teik Soon “ASEAN and the Cambodian Problem” (1982) 22(6) Asian Survey 548. 
3
 Generally, Paul J Davidson, “The ASEAN Way and the Role of Law in ASEAN Economic Cooperation” 
(2004) 8 Singapore Yearbook of International Law 165 at 168. 
4
 Generally Tommy Koh, ‘ASEAN at Forty: Perception and Reality’ in Regional Outlook: Southeast Asia 
2008–2009 (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2008) at 8; Walter Woon, The ASEAN Charter: A 
Commentary (Singapore: NUS Press, 2016) at 40-48. 
5
 Pieter Jan Kuijper, James H. Mathis, Natalie Y. Morris-Sharma, From Treaty-Making to Treaty-
Breaking: Models for ASEAN External Trade Agreements (Cambridge: CUP, 2015) at 6-7.  
6
 Generally, Chan Heng Chee, “Southeast Asia 1976: The Handling of Contradictions,” (1977) Southeast 
Asian Affairs at 3; “The Interests and Role of ASEAN in the Indochina Conflict”, International Conference 
on Indochina and Problems of Security and Stability in Southeast Asia, Chulalongkorn University, 
Bangkok, 19-21 June 1981.  
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However, the use of “ASEAN” as a term during the Kampuchean conflict has to be 
treated with care:7 the IR literature rarely makes distinctions between acts by ASEAN 
States, from acts by ASEAN as a separate legal person. As explained already, just 
because ASEAN enjoyed low institutionalisation, with minimal recourse by its 
member States to (international) law, did not mean that ASEAN’s actions cannot be 
assessed for legality at general international law. Particularly, in relation to its conduct 
of external relations, the AMM already started to agree common positions in written 
form during these early years of low institutionalisation.  
For example, after Vietnam’s reunification in 1973,8 the AMM met to discuss its 
implications for the region of Southeast Asia. Obviously, the political dimensions of a 
communist “threat” are evident. However, in legal terms, it is the Bangkok 
Declaration’s aim of promoting “regional peace”, which justifies the AMM’s common 
position in 1973 of suggesting an enlarged Southeast Asia that includes Vietnam: “it 
was desirable to expand the membership of ASEAN at the opportune time to cover 
all the countries in Southeast Asia…”9  
Therefore, this study’s core proposition is illustrated through the conduct of ASEAN 
organs such as the AMM, during the Kampuchean conflict, which made for the first 
time a distinctive regional law of non-intervention with an ASEAN character. This 
regional quality of non-intervention’s content includes a fairly precise rule that arose 
from ASEAN’s first sustained effort to address an issue, which concerned the peace 
and security concerning the whole area of Southeast Asia. Hence, as a regional rule, 
non-intervention’s content reflected a shared value by ASEAN member States of 
opposing the overthrowing of the Khmer Rouge government, through Vietnam’s 
illegal use of force and occupation in Kampuchea. The ASEAN character, i.e., the 
regional content, of non-intervention draws from the influence of general rules of 
international law.  
This chapter proceeds as follows. I begin with an overview of the Kampuchean 
conflict. Next, I explore the murky area of how ASEAN, through the AMM and ASEAN 
                                                            
7
 See my earlier discussion on works by, for example, Acharya, Haack and Jones, in Chapter One, 
Sections II-III.  
8
 The Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, 27 January 1973, (1973) 12 ILM 
49.  
9
 Joint Press Statement of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting to Assess the Agreement on Ending 
the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam and To Consider Its Implications for Southeast Asia, 15 
February 1973, text is available at <https://cil.nus.edu.sg/category/all/>.  
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Standing Committee as ASEAN organs,10 acted as a separate legal person at general 
international law, from ASEAN member States. Finally, I examine the making of a 
distinct regional law of non-intervention, with an ASEAN character, which emerged 
from the long Kampuchean conflict and was facilitated through the venue of ASEAN.   
II. Kampuchean Conflict: A Brief Background11 
 
This section begins with a brief account of the political context that preceded the long 
Kampuchean conflict. The evidently bilateral nature of the antagonisms between 
Vietnam and Kampuchea, and the non-ASEAN membership status of both States 
bear emphasis. ASEAN acted, and created distinctive regional law, which applied to 
the region’s peace and security that included even Kampuchea and Vietnam. 
Therefore, this section supports the core proposition by drawing attention to the 
strength of the rules of general international law, which enable ASEAN to frame the 
acts of Vietnam (then not an ASEAN member State) in Kampuchea as a danger to 
the regional peace and security of Southeast Asia.    
The Communist Party of Kampuchea (Khmer Rouge) defeated General Lon Nol’s 
government and took control of Phnom Penh on 17 April 1975. The Khmer Rouge 
government renamed Cambodia as Democratic Kampuchea (DK).12 A xenophobic 
regime, the Khmer Rouge perpetrated state-sponsored killing and egregious 
violations of human rights. Over 1 million of Cambodia’s population (out of 7.3 million 
in April 1975) perished.13   
Vietnam invaded DK in December 1978 for at least two reasons. First, its government 
took the view Indochina had to be consolidated into one strategic unit.14 For this 
reason, Vietnam had already subjected Laos to a relationship of military and political 
dependency, through a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1975.15  
                                                            
10
 The ILC considers that an organ is “any person or entity which has that status according to the rules 
of the organization”: see Para 21, Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, with 
commentaries (ARIO), UN Doc. A/66/10 (2011) at 12.  
11
 Generally Thu-huong Nguyen-vo, Khmer-Viet Relations and the Third Indochina Conflict (USA & UK: 
Mcfarland & Company, 1992). 
12
 The Khmer Rouge government under Pol Pot was recognised by many Third World States, including 
Thailand and Indonesia: see Colin Warbrick, “Kampuchea: Representation and Recognition” (1981) 30 
ICLQ 234.  
13
 See Steven R Ratner, “The Cambodian Agreements” (1993) 87 AJIL 1 at p 2. Also see generally 
William Shawcross, SideShow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia, (London: Hogarth, 
1986) and David P Chandler, A History of Cambodia (4th ed), (Boulder: Westview, 2007)  
14
 Ralf Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF (London & New 
York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003) at 91.  
15
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Second, the DK made sustained territorial incursions into Vietnam. This resulted in 
deaths and destruction of arable land and harvests.16 Historical rivalry between 
Vietnam and Cambodia was persistent. The Cambodians had not forgotten their 
historical claim to the delta regions in southern Vietnam.17  
On 25 December 1978, Vietnam entered Kampuchea. By 9 January 1979, Phnom 
Penh fell to the Vietnamese. With Vietnam’s considerable support, Heng Samrin 
formed a new Cambodian government.18  The State was renamed the People’s 
Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). The Khmer Rouge was driven into the rural areas, 
near the Thai-Cambodian borders.19 This Khmer Rouge rump became the 
Government of Democratic Kampuchea (GDK).20  
III. The Regional Law-Making by ASEAN Organs: Common Positions that 
involve the Geographical Region of Southeast Asia  
1) Separate Actions of ASEAN Organs as Corollaries of Separate Legal 
Personality: A Murky Area 
 
This section contributes to the core proposition by demonstrating how, at various 
points, ASEAN organs make regional law particularly as to non-intervention. Most 
importantly, the identification and evaluation of ASEAN’s regional law-making as to 
non-intervention is based on the rules of general international law regarding non-
intervention.   
It is useful to begin with a caveat regarding the legal personality of an international 
organisation, including ASEAN. It is part of international lawyering, a legal technique, 
to say that acts of an international organisation (through its organs) are separate from 
its member States. Obviously, there is some artificiality in this exercise because the 
same people who make decisions in that organ21 are also representatives of their 
States.22  
                                                            
16
 Jürgen Haacke, ASEAN's Diplomatic and Security Culture (Origins, Development and Prospects), 
(London & New York: Routledge, 2005) at 81; Shawcross, n13 at 117-118 and 120. 
17
 I.e., Vietnam’s (as Annam) annexation of Kampuchea Krom for rice and cultivatable land in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: generally see Werner Draguhn, “The Indochina Conflict and the 
Positions of the Countries Involved”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol 5, No 1 (June 1983) 95.  
18
 Vietnam’s role is further attested to by its subsequent decision to replace Heng Samrin with Hun Sen 
in January 1985.  
19
 Ratner, n13 at 3.  
20
 Stefan Talmon, Recognition of Governments in International Law: With Particular Reference to 
Governments in Exile (1998), (Oxford: OUP, 2004, reprinted) at 121-122.   
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 Chapter Two, Section VI.   
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Recent attempts,23 however, to study ASEAN as a legal person, i.e., the legal effects 
of “genuine” ASEAN acts, have produced mixed results. For example, in a careful 
study of ASEAN’s external agreements, Marise Cremona et al noted that ASEAN 
organs have a habit of concluding treaties with the expression “collectively ASEAN”.24 
The ASEAN organs have conducted external relations regarding areas including, for 
example, agreements in transport25 and free trade.26 In fact, it is the ASEAN States27 
who concluded these instruments and ASEAN is not intended to be a party. The legal 
effects for ASEAN as a legal person are (deliberately) unclear.  
Marise Cremona et al rightly concluded that there are few genuine ASEAN external 
agreements.28 The authors tentatively urged a shift away from “formal categories of 
legal personality, contracting-party status, and responsibility for wrongful acts”.29 
Instead they suggest “indicators of collectivity”,30 on the basis that:  
ASEAN can be discerned as a collectivity which can take on a central and proactive role nonetheless.31 
The purpose of this brief survey is to stress the point that international lawyers have 
expertise in explaining the “formal categories”:32 analytical clarity in the use of “formal 
categories” is a core part of our discipline.33 The legal rules - personality, separate 
actions of the organs from member States, international responsibility, for instance – 
permit us to study the ASEAN character of non-intervention’s content.  
A fine line does separate the acts of ASEAN States34 from that of ASEAN member 
States.35 This is a murky area. But we must try, concertedly, to identify ASEAN actions 
and assess them as regional practice, based on extant rules which exist at general 
                                                            
23
 See Simon Chesterman, From Community to Compliance? The Evolution of Monitoring Obligations in 
ASEAN (Cambridge: CUP, 2015); Marise Cremona, David Kleimann, Joris Larik, Rena Lee & Pascal 
Vennesson, ASEAN’s External Agreements: Law, Practice and the Quest for Collective Action 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2015); Stefano Inama and Edmund Sim, The Foundation of the ASEAN Economic 
Community: An Institutional and Legal Profile (Cambridge: CUP, 2015). 
24
 Cremona et al, ibid, at 108-109 and 120-130.  
25
 Air Transport Agreement between the Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
and the Government of the People’s Republic of China (signed 12 November 2010): see Cremona et 
al’s Appendix 6 (ASEAN External Economic Instruments) (n23).  
26
 Framework for Comprehensive Economic Partnership between the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations and Japan (signed 8 October 2003).  
27
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ASEAN member States. 
28
 See n23 at 120.  
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 See n23at 120. 
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 See n23 at 121.  
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 See n23 at 121.  
33
 Generally Daniel Bethlehem, “The Secret Life of International Law” (2012) 1 Cambridge JICL (1) 23 
at 25.  
34
 I.e., acting in their individual, sovereign capacities: Chapter One, Section I.   
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international law.36 The next example shows how ASEAN actions by its organs, the 
Standing Committee and the AMM, count as regional practice because their actions, 
through statements, concerned a specific geographical area of Southeast Asia.  
2) ASEAN Standing Committee and AMM: Creating ASEAN Practice & the 
Acquiescence of ASEAN Member States 
 
This part advances the core proposition by showing how rules of general international 
law facilitate the view that ASEAN is able to conduct external relations on the 
international plane, a practice which attests to the regional law-making of non-
intervention. In this sense, ASEAN actions during the long Kampuchean conflict are 
fairly consistent. Through the AMM and ASEAN Standing Committee, these organs 
acted in accordance with their status in the Bangkok Declaration:37 They acted as 
organs with functions to carry out ASEAN’s objectives of maintaining regional peace 
and security.38 Consequently, these acts form the “established practice”39 of ASEAN, 
which had been acquiesced to by its member States.40 The established practice of an 
international organisation refers to a consistent practice of its organs which is 
acquiesced to by its member States. I return to this point below.41  
In ASEAN’s case, during the Kampuchean conflict, its member States’ acquiescence 
to how the AMM and ASEAN Standing Committee could issue statements marked 
the start of these organs’ implied powers42 to act for regional peace and security 
                                                            
36
 When the separate acts of ASEAN States and ASEAN member States are not differentiated, the legal 
conclusions can be idiosyncratic: for an example, see Helen Quane, “The Significance of an Evolving 
Relationship: ASEAN States and the Global Human Rights Mechanisms” (2015) 15 Human Rights Law 
Review 283.  
37
 1967 Bangkok Declaration (signed 8 August 1967) (1983) 1331 UNTS 235; see further Chapter Two, 
Section III.  
38
 To carry out the “aims and purposes” of the Bangkok Declaration (ibid), see its third declaration which 
creates: “(a) [An] Annual Meeting of Foreign Ministers, which shall be by rotation and referred to as   
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. Special Meetings of Foreign Ministers may be convened as required. 
              (b) A (i.e., an ASEAN) Standing Committee, under the chairmanship of the Foreign Minister of 
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other member countries, to carry on the work of the Association In between Meetings of Foreign 
Ministers.” 
39
 Article 2(j), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations 
or between International Organizations, 21 March 1986 (“1986 Vienna Convention”).  
40
 See Georg Nolte, “Third Report on Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation to 
the Interpretation of Treaties” (7 April 2015) UN Doc A/CN.4/683, para 82 at 30: “…it is clear that 
“established practice of the organization” encompasses a qualified form of practice by organs, one which 
has generally been accepted by the members of the organization, albeit sometimes tacitly.” 
41
 Chapter Four, Section IV, Part 2.  
42
 These are implied powers for at least two reasons. First, the Bangkok Declaration contains very sparse 
textual language to support an arguable case that the AMM and ASEAN Standing Committee have 
express powers to act with respect to the maintenance of regional peace and security. Second, in 
practice, ASEAN member States routinely insist that the competences of ASEAN organs exist only if 
they expressly agree to it. The making of statements by both organs are not expressly contained in the 
sparse textual language of the Bangkok declaration. For a general account of how ASEAN organs work 
from a political perspective, see Rodolfo C Severino, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community: 
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issues, thereby attesting to ASEAN’s separate legal personality. Accordingly, this part 
develops the core proposition by explaining how ASEAN (through the ASEAN organs) 
serve as a venue to create regional soft law instruments, through their interactive 
recourse to rules at general international law (UN Charter). In this respect, on 9 
January 1979, the Chair of the ASEAN Standing Committee43 issued its first 
statement on the Kampuchean conflict: 
The ASEAN member countries strongly regret the escalation and expansion of the armed conflict now 
taking place between the two Indochinese states. The ASEAN countries have expressed their great 
concern over the implications of this development and its impact on peace, security, and stability in 
Southeast Asia.  
The ASEAN member countries have again reaffirmed that peace and stability are very essential for the 
national development of each country in the Southeast Asian region.  
 
In accordance with the principles of the U.N. Charter and the Bandung Declaration, and bearing fully in 
mind the pledges made by states in Southeast Asia, they appeal to all countries in the region to firmly 
respect the freedom, sovereignty, national integrity, and political system of the respective countries, to 
restrain themselves from the use of force or threats of the use of force in the implementation of bilateral 
relations, to refrain from interference in the internal affairs of the respective countries, and dissociate 
themselves from engagement in subversive activities either directly or indirectly against one another, 
and to resolve all existing differences between these countries through peaceful means by way of 
negotiations in a spirit of equality, mutual understanding, and mutual respect.  
 
The ASEAN member countries are convinced that in the interest of peace, stability, and development in 
Southeast Asia, the countries concerned should fully honour those principles and pledges.44 
 
Indonesia, as Chair of the ASEAN Standing Committee, circulated this 9 January 
statement to the UN for the AMM.45 As I explain below, throughout this conflict, 
ASEAN organs would continue to circulate statements to the UN on the international 
plane. It is, I argue, the Kampuchean conflict from which an ASEAN practice gradually 
emerged that the ASEAN organs could act on the international plane, with the 
acquiescence of ASEAN member States.  
It is true that the 9 January statement’s cautious wording, i.e., its reference to “ASEAN 
member countries”, and not the ASEAN Foreign Ministers (i.e., the AMM), suggests 
that ASEAN member States did not acquiesce to giving the ASEAN organs any role, 
qua ASEAN as a separate legal person. Put simply, the 9 January statement merely 
reported the positions of ASEAN member States. However, we must compare this 
cautious statement of 9 January, with an earlier development which also affected the 
geographical region of Southeast Asia – the annexation of East Timor by Indonesia 
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in 1975.46 To this extent, the AMM did address the matter of East Timor, qua ASEAN, 
whose 1976 joint communique bear reproduction:  
The Meeting exchanged views on a variety of matters of common concern, including recent 
developments in the region and in Asia. In this connection, the Meeting heard with appreciation the 
explanation given by the Foreign Minister of Indonesia on the question of East Timor that recent 
developments in East Timor correspond with the provisions of, the United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions No. 384 of 22 December 1975, and No. 389 of 22 April 1976. 
 
Considering the expressed readiness of both Indonesia and the Provisional Government of East Timor 
to cooperate with the United Nations in the implementation of the above-mentioned Resolutions, the 
Meeting called on the United Nations to take cognizance of these assurances. In view of developments 
in that territory, the Meeting urged the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General, Mr. Vittorio 
Winspeare Guicciardi, to complete his mission as entrusted to him by the said Resolutions. 
 
The Meeting reaffirmed the view that the future of East Timor remains, in the final analysis, in the hands 
of the people of East Timor. 
 
The Meeting expressed the view that the solution of the East Timor question would contribute positively 
to the maintenance of peace and stability in the Southeast Asian region.47 
 
 
Effectively, therefore, ASEAN did not want to play any role in the resolution of the 
East Timor matter. The “solution” in this joint communique was left to the UN and, 
more importantly, left to time to yield a political fact, with some parallels to Vietnam’s 
actions during the Kampuchean conflict. There was no common position by ASEAN 
organs regarding East Timor. This is because the ASEAN member States lacked a 
consensus regarding Indonesia’s actions in East Timor.48  
In this respect, Singapore abstained from voting on both resolutions, a reflection of 
its specific misgivings, against Indonesia, as a tiny sovereign State in Southeast 
Asia.49 In contrast, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Malaysia voted against 
the strongly worded General Assembly resolutions 3485 (1975) and 31/53 (1976) that 
denounced Indonesia.50 For example, the Philippines clearly spoke in its individual, 
sovereign capacity as follows: “My Government strongly affirms its support for the 
principles of the historic Asian-African Conference held at Bandung in 1955, hosted 
by Indonesia....the emerging newly independent countries of the third world 
enunciated a number of precepts which were to form the foundation of a non-aligned 
movement. Among those precepts was the declaration of non-interference in the 
affairs of others and, implicitly, the acceptance of the idea that consideration should 
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be given to regional interests in the solution of questions which are primarily regional 
in nature. The acceptance of that principle by the international community as a whole 
has promoted peace and security...and has greatly facilitated the work of the United 
Nations itself”.51 
 
Similarly, the Malaysian delegate spoke at the UN for Malaysia (not ASEAN): “As 
East Timor had become part of the sovereign territory of Indonesia, his delegation 
(Malaysia) saw no justification whatsoever for any discussion on the matter. Such a 
discussion should only be interpreted as an interference in the internal affairs of the 
country (Indonesia) and would not serve the interests of the people of East Timor.52 
At the General Assembly, no statements (not even cautiously worded ones) were 
issued by the Chair of the ASEAN Standing Committee or AMM. The ASEAN States 
spoke, broadly in support of Indonesia, but expressly in their individual capacities as 
sovereign States in Southeast Asia.53 None of the statements that were expressed in 
these individual capacities were circulated to the UN as ASEAN documents.  
 
This account of the broader background of ASEAN’s (in)action regarding East Timor 
matters. The reason is because it is arguable that, in contrast, the ASEAN organs’ 
practice during the Kampuchean conflict marked a signal beginning of ASEAN’s 
conduct of external relations, with other legal actors on the international plane. There 
is some basis at general international law to distinguish proper acts by ASEAN organs 
qua ASEAN, from those of ASEAN States who were acting in their individual, 
sovereign capacities.   
To this extent, the Chair of the ASEAN Standing Committee would sometimes speak 
for the AMM. On other occasions during this (i.e., Kampuchean) conflict, the AMM 
would speak directly on the international plane during.54 The ASEAN practice was 
evolving, but it would gradually become an established practice of ASEAN,55 an 
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acquiescence by ASEAN member States to the roles of the ASEAN organs in matters 
regarding regional peace and security.  
In this respect, on 12 January 1979, it was the AMM which issued a statement:  
Determined to demonstrate the solidarity and cohesiveness of ASEAN in the face of the current threat 
to peace and stability in the Southeast Asia region, and recalling the Vietnamese pledge to ASEAN 
member countries to scrupulously respect each other's independence sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, and to cooperate in the maintenance and strengthening of peace and stability in the region, the 
Foreign Ministers of the ASEAN Member Countries met in Bangkok on 12 - 13 January 1979 and agreed 
on the following: 
 
1. The ASEAN Foreign Ministers reaffirmed the Statement issued in Jakarta on 9 January 1979 by the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia as Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee on the 
Escalation of the Armed Conflict between Vietnam and Kampuchea. 
2. The ASEAN Foreign Ministers strongly deplored the armed intervention against the independence, 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kampuchea. 
3. The ASEAN Foreign Ministers affirmed the right of the Kampuchean people to determine their future 
by themselves free from interference or influence from outside powers in the exercise of their rights of 
self-determination. 
4. Towards this end, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers called for the immediate and total withdrawal of the 
foreign forces from Kampuchean territory. 
5. The ASEAN Foreign Ministers welcomed the decision of the United Nations Security Council to 
consider without delay the situation in Indochina, and strongly urged the Council to take the necessary 
and appropriate measures to restore peace, security and stability in the area.56 
 
This “current threat to peace and security in the Southeast Asian region” was again 
repeated on 20 February 1979. This round, it was the Chair of the ASEAN Standing 
Committee which said that “The ASEAN countries are gravely concerned over the 
rapid deterioration of the situation in this region since the ASEAN Foreign Ministers 
meeting in Bangkok on 12 and 13 January 1979. The conflicts and tension in and 
around this region have gradually escalated into the use of arms and the expansion 
of trouble-plagued areas. The ASEAN countries reiterate their firm commitment to the 
principles of peaceful coexistence, the U.N. Charter and international law. The 
ASEAN countries urgently appeal to the conflicting countries to stop all hostile 
activities against each other, and call for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the 
areas of conflict in Indochina to avoid the deterioration of peace and stability in 
Southeast Asia. The ASEAN countries also appeal to the countries outside this region 
to exert utmost restraint and to refrain from any action which might lead to the 
escalation of violence and the spreading of conflict”.57 
Note, again, the term “ASEAN countries” in the above statement, which suggests that 
ASEAN did not act as a separate legal person but merely reported the common 
                                                            
56
 “ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Joint Statement of Special Meeting on Vietnam's Action in Kampuchea” 
UN Doc S/13025, (1970) UNYB 196.   
57
 “Statement by Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee” UN Doc S/13106, (1979) UNYB at 283 
and 296.  
  
 
158 
 
positions of all the ASEAN States.58 Significantly, though, these common positions 
were agreed, expressed through the AMM or ASEAN Standing Committee, and 
circulated as UN documents by ASEAN.59 In contrast to the East Timor practice by 
ASEAN States, this ASEAN Chair’s statement of 20 February 1979 suggests that they 
are not discrete statements of ASEAN States (i.e., “ASEAN countries”). This is 
because, if they were discrete statements, it would be issued separately, individually, 
and not be circulated as UN documents through ASEAN organs.   
Put simply, ASEAN member States acquiesced to an established practice of allowing 
both ASEAN organs, the ASEAN Standing Committee and AMM, to act in ways which 
accord with their functions in the Bangkok Declaration. It is true that this is a difficult 
legal argument to advance because the texts of these early ASEAN materials were 
almost entirely drafted by non-lawyers. However, unless we are prepared to concede 
that the entirety of ASEAN’s early actions is not subject to international law or legal 
analyses, then we must treat the ambiguities in these ASEAN texts as a necessary 
part of international lawyering in international politics.60 As alluded to in Chapter One, 
the reading of ASEAN texts required some appreciation of the “invisible” conduct of 
political decisions, which were not made public, but likely culminated in the text of (for 
example) an ASEAN treaty or ASEAN communiqué.61 
Three examples of such political decisions support this argument. First, it is widely 
accepted that the AMM played a key diplomatic role62 in forming the Coalition 
Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK),63 to facilitate international support 
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against Vietnam’s actions.64 For political reasons, the AMM played down its 
involvement and deferred to the leadership of the United States, Soviet Union, and 
China.65 Hence the AMM Joint Communique (1982) only referred to its “continued 
support for the efforts towards the formation of a Kampuchean coalition 
government”.66   
Second, the AMM and EEC issued joint statements on Vietnam’s illegal acts in 
Kampuchea.67 This included approval of the CGDK.68 All these statements are non-
binding, but they were expressly circulated as UN documents.69 The ASEAN organs 
wanted their content to be published on the international plane.    
Third, again through the AMM, ASEAN facilitated talks between the CGDK and 
Vietnam to create conditions for a comprehensive settlement.70 The reality was that 
the AMM primarily acted through the Indonesian Foreign Minister, who was “ASEAN’s 
interlocutor” between Vietnam and the CGDK.71 Therefore, although the practice of 
ASEAN organs in this area is not always easy to parse, but one must try to identify 
those acts with an ASEAN character from acts of individual ASEAN States. This is 
because regional law-making by ASEAN, as this study’s core proposition states, is 
shaped by and based on the rules of general international law.   
In its totality, therefore, the actions of the AMM and ASEAN Standing Committee 
suggest that an established practice of ASEAN organs emerged during the 
Kampuchean conflict. In other words, ASEAN member States have acquiesced to the 
capacity of ASEAN organs to make formal statements, as part of ASEAN’s conduct 
of external relations during the Kampuchean conflict. This point is supported by 
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ASEAN’s consistent practice of circulating its organs’ statements on the situation in 
Kampuchea, which condemned Vietnam’s actions, as UN documents from 1980-
1988.72  
Finally, it is not a coincidence that, by 2 September 1983, the Bangkok Declaration 
(which provides for the functions of the ASEAN organs, such as the AMM and ASEAN 
Standing Committee) was registered under Article 102, UN Charter,73 which indicates 
an intention at international law that this instrument can be binding against other legal 
persons. ASEAN member States had acquiesced to the way that the AMM and 
ASEAN Standing Committee had acted since the Kampuchean conflict began.74 This 
acquiescence affirms the ASEAN organs’ role of performing specific goals in the 
Bangkok Declaration, which seeks to “promote regional peace and stability through 
abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of 
the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter”.75  
Indeed, this acquiescence by ASEAN member States to the ASEAN organs’ role, in 
maintaining regional peace and security, had become sufficiently established that, by 
2001, they agreed in treaty form that the TAC High Council76 would be chaired by the 
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ASEAN Standing Committee.77 The TAC High Council, which comprises all the TAC 
parties, has a role in resolving disputes or differences (particularly political ones) in a 
peaceful way.78 Observe that ASEAN, an international organisation, is itself not a 
party to the TAC.79 Instead the TAC High Council, an ASEAN organ, is involved but 
under the chairmanship of the ASEAN Standing Committee. This underscores the 
significance that ASEAN member States attach to the ASEAN Standing Committee’s 
well-established role since the Kampuchean conflict.80 
 
To conclude: the Kampuchean conflict allowed ASEAN to become a venue in which 
the statements of its organs, which involve common concerns of the geographical 
area of Southeast Asia, can be evaluated for legality at general international law. It is 
this capacity of ASEAN organs to create regional law that arose here, i.e., concerning 
a geographical area of Southeast Asia, and its practice would contribute to a 
distinctively regional content of non-intervention, which we consider next.  
IV. Regional Law-Making by ASEAN Organs: Recognition of the CGDK as an 
Established Practice and Common Cause of ASEAN81  
1) The Credentials Issue    
 
In the section above, I discussed the emergence of an established practice of ASEAN 
organs, in which their conduct of external relations at general international law was 
acquiesced to by ASEAN member States. This section builds on this discussion by 
examining the ASEAN organs’ practice, particularly in their recognition of the Khmer 
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Rouge government (and later the CGDK) which is partially justified by non-
intervention at general international law.  
This section, therefore, advances the core proposition by examining a particular 
instance of ASEAN practice (and therefore regional law-making) regarding the link 
between non-intervention and recognition, both of which are assessed against and 
derive its legal basis from the general rules of international law. Additionally, this 
section explains the relationship between general and regional international law, by 
showing how powerful external actors, the United States and the Soviet Union, 
particularly influence (and permit) a fairly broad content regarding non-intervention, 
as generated by ASEAN organs within ASEAN and at the UN General Assembly.   
In pressing for the recognition of the CGDK, I argue that ASEAN organs made a 
regional law of non-intervention with an ASEAN character. Put another way, ASEAN’s 
position was that the recognition of Heng Samrin’s effective government violated non-
intervention, at general and especially regional international law, because Vietnam’s 
occupation of Kampuchea threatened the regional peace and security of Southeast 
Asia in its entirety. This is because Vietnam’s actions subsequently engaged the 
Great Powers (China, Soviet Union, and the United States) to become involved in 
conducting international relations with Southeast Asia, as powerful external actors, 
during the Cold War.  
Accordingly, though Kampuchea was not an ASEAN member State during this period, 
ASEAN, through the AMM, maintained a common position that Vietnam’s actions in 
Kampuchea affected the regional peace and security in Southeast Asia.82 The AMM’s 
common positions are significant because its member States did not share the same 
threat perceptions against Vietnam during this long conflict. Indonesia and the 
Philippines, in particular, were less affected because of its distance from the 
Indochinese States of Vietnam and Kampuchea. In contrast, Vietnam had provided 
rhetorical support to increasingly violent communist insurgencies in Thailand and 
Malaysia.83  
In other words, the AMM’s common positions, during this long conflict, reflected an 
agreement by all ASEAN member States concerning the common cause which 
pertained to the regional peace and security of Southeast Asia. The member States’ 
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willingness to allow the AMM to express these common causes, through circulated 
UN documents, reflected their acquiescence to the AMM’s role in expressing these 
common causes at general international law. It is against this context that, through 
ASEAN and the UN as venues, non-intervention acquired content with an ASEAN 
character.  
In other words, the regional quality of ASEAN’s law-making as to non-intervention is 
an assessment which is based on the general rules of international law. Particularly, 
it is general international law which enables an assessment that the ASEAN organs’ 
conduct was an established practice accepted as law (i.e., the opinio juris). On this 
basis, the ASEAN organs’ conduct, during this period, contributes to the development 
of a regional customary rule of non-intervention. The rule of non-intervention is 
contained in treaty form, in Articles 2(c) and 10 of the TAC, but it is the ASEAN organs’ 
conduct (i.e., a code of conduct) that gives rise to an established practice which is 
accepted in law. Therefore, the regional law-making of non-intervention by ASEAN 
organs can be assessed and understood in terms of customary rule formation and 
treaty interpretation: this approach matters to the core proposition because it 
underscores, again, the strong influence of general rules in creating a regional law 
(i.e., the ASEAN character) of non-intervention. The regional law of non-intervention 
is normative because the general rules, which develop the regional variety of non-
intervention, crystallise the reality of Southeast Asia as a coherent geographical area 
with common causes. However, general international law also has the ability to 
constrain the scope of this distinctive regional law-making, as demonstrated in 
Chapter Five.   
As indicated already, with Vietnam’s assistance, the government of Heng Samrin was 
a political fact by January 1979, under the newly named PRK. However, in every 
General Assembly resolution on “the Situation in Kampuchea”84 from 1979-1989, its 
last preambular paragraph applies non-intervention as follows: “Reaffirming the need 
for all States to adhere strictly to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, 
which call for respect for the national independence, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of all States, non-intervention in the internal affairs of States, non-recourse 
to the threat or use of force, and peaceful settlement of dispute”.85 
                                                            
84
 In 1979, this item was included in the General Assembly’s agenda for the first time by the five 
permanent representatives of ASEAN Member States: see n82.   
85
 UNGA Resolutions 34/22 (1979); 35/6 (1980); 36/5 (1981); 37/6 (1982); 38/3 (1983); 39/5 (1984); 40/7 
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Alongside these General Assembly resolutions, the AMM persistently denounced 
through its ASEAN joint communiques Vietnam’s continued military occupation in 
Kampuchea as a violation of international law, including “non-interference in the 
internal affairs of a sovereign state”, and as posing a “grave threat to peace and 
security in Southeast Asia, thus endangering international peace and security”.86 
Therefore, this part explains how ASEAN’s action regarding the credentials issue, 
despite the effectiveness of Heng Samrin’s government over Kampuchea’s territorial 
boundaries, developed non-intervention’s content as a distinct regional law whose 
content is influenced by general international law.   
 
The matter of who represented Kampuchea arose before the UN credentials 
committee. Credentials matters are considered by the Credentials Committee 
(“Committee”). This is usually a formality as the Committee examines the submitted 
documents87 from a member State under Rules 28-29.88 In short, it is generally a 
technical process in which the Committee approves a delegate as his government’s 
representative. However, when there are rival submissions of credentials from the 
same State, like the DK and PRK in Cambodia, the Committee must make a decision 
unguided by Rules 27-29.89 It is in this sense that issues concerning the 
“representativeness”, i.e., the qualitative aspects of a State’s government arises.90  
 
Seating the Democratic Kampuchea’s representative (i.e., Khmer Rouge 
government) at the UN was an important diplomatic goal for ASEAN, which has been 
                                                            
86
 Paras 5 and 19, “Joint Communique Of The Tenth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting Singapore” (5-8 July 
1977); Para 21, “Joint Communique Of The Twelfth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting Bali” (28-30 June 1979); 
Para 16, “Joint Communique Of The Thirteenth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting Kuala Lumpur” (25-26 June 
1980); Para 30, “Joint Communique Of The Fourteenth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting Manila” (17-18 June 
1981); Para 20, “Joint Communique Of The Fifteenth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting Singapore” (14-16 
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 Rule 27 of the General Assembly Rules of Procedure (“The Rules”) provides that credentials of 
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UN Doc A/520/Rev.15 (1985).  
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 Generally see Matthew Griffith, “Accrediting Democracies: Does the Credentials Committee of the 
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discussed elsewhere.91 For our purposes, I focus on the AMM’s use of non-
intervention, in 1981, to support their recognition of the Khmer Rouge government, 
which states: “The Foreign Ministers also reaffirmed that they continue to recognize 
the Government of Democratic Kampuchea and to extend their support for its 
continued representation at the United Nations. They stressed that the grounds for 
their support for the credentials of Democratic Kampuchea were based on the 
fundamental principles that foreign intervention must be opposed and that any change 
in the recognition of Democratic Kampuchea's credentials would be tantamount to 
condoning Vietnamese military invasion and occupation of Kampuchea. They saw 
absolutely no justification for other States to overthrow the legitimate government of 
another State as such action violated the internationally recognized principles 
governing interstate relations as enshrined in the United Nations Charter. The Foreign 
Ministers, therefore, called upon member states of the United Nations to up-hold the 
principle of non-intervention and to support the continued recognition and 
representation of Democratic Kampuchea at the United Nations”.92 
 
One year later, in 1982, the AMM said that “the Foreign Ministers reaffirmed their 
continued recognition of Democratic Kampuchea and their support for its 
representation at the United Nations. They emphasized that the grounds for their 
support for the credentials of Democratic Kampuchea were based on the fundamental 
principles of respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of 
States, non-interference in the internal affairs of States and non-use of force in 
international relations. The Foreign Ministers, therefore, called upon member States 
of the United Nations to uphold these principles and to support the continued 
representation of Democratic Kampuchea in the United Nations”.93 
 
In both joint communiques, the AMM referred to “internationally recognized”94 and 
“fundamental principles” contained in the UN Charter, a treaty.95 The non-binding 
instruments, i.e., General Assembly resolutions and AMM joint communiques, were 
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 Generally see Ang Cheng Guan, Singapore, ASEAN and the Cambodian Conflict, 1978-1991 
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Singapore’s Foreign Policy: Coping with Vulnerability (London: Routledge, 2000) at 85.  
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used together with the rights and obligations in the UN Charter to advance two 
arguments regarding non-intervention’s content.96  
First, to seat the Democratic Kampuchean delegate at the UN is to recognise the 
Khmer Rouge government, partially regrouped as the CGDK.97 Second, and 
conversely, to recognise the effective government of Heng Samrin would violate the 
non-intervention and was thus inconsistent with the “fundamental principles” of the 
UN Charter. Hence the recourse by the AMM, in using treaty (i.e., UN Charter) and 
non-binding instruments (ASEAN joint communiques of 1981-1982) to make non-
intervention’s content, was interactive and facilitated through the venue of the UN, 
especially at the credentials committee. It bears emphasis that this practice of the 
AMM is not just regional in character because it contains a geographical scope, but 
that this regional law-making are acts of ASEAN organs, qua ASEAN as an 
international legal person.  This position is shaped by the rules of general international 
law, such as those pertaining to separate legal personality and non-intervention, 
facilitate the regional law-making.  
Accordingly, ASEAN had developed non-intervention’s regional content with an 
ASEAN character, in terms of how States are entitled at law to govern their own 
“internal affairs”, even for governments like the Khmer Rouge. As I explain below, this 
development would become a fairly precise rule of non-intervention’s content, as a 
code of conduct in the TAC, which assured newer member States like Myanmar to 
seek admission to ASEAN in the 1990s.  
Returning to the Kampuchean conflict, at this given point there were divergent views 
on communism during the Cold War and how States might respond,98 whether in 
favour of or against it.99 The Cold War, in other words, made it harder at general 
international law to assess whether it was legally relevant that the Khmer Rouge 
government had a murderous past, regarding its continued representation at the 
UN.100 Nonetheless, general rules at general international law not to recognise the 
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results of an unlawful intervention did exist.101 Therefore, the AMM’s position that 
Heng Samrin’s effective government is the result of Vietnam’s illegal actions at 
international law, and the seating of Heng Samrin delegate at the UN would implicitly 
condone Vietnam’s actions,102 is shaped and justified by the general rules of 
international law that exist.  
Therefore, a proposal by the credentials committee to leave the Cambodian seat 
vacant, which would avoid “taking sides” between the DK and PRK,103 was rejected 
by the General Assembly.104 Although it would be simpler to treat the seating of a UN 
delegate as primarily a technical issue of presenting the proper credentials, the 
General Assembly consistently accepted the credentials of DK (i.e., with the Khmer 
Rouge’s involvement), and not the effective PRK government under Heng Samrin 
which was supported by Vietnam.105 Here ASEAN member States lobbied hard 
against the vacant seat option because,106 in diplomatic and political terms, it would 
indicate an inconclusive condemnation of Vietnam’s actions in Kampuchea, of which 
Heng Samrin’s effective government had already become a political fact.  
I have already mentioned that evaluating State practice of ASEAN organs is a murky 
area, which is manifest in ASEAN’s role regarding the credential issue at the UN. To 
adapt Grant’s views, politics is to be found somewhere in the background of all formal 
statements.107 Hence despite the widely recognised role of ASEAN diplomacy in 
lobbying for the acceptance of DK’s credentials,108 the UN materials concerning the 
credentials matter do not contain express statements by the ASEAN organs. Instead 
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it was the United States and China, which insisted and succeeded in prevailing on 
the credentials committee to adhere to its “procedural” mandate of accepting DK’s 
credentials, in accordance with its rule of procedure.109  
It bears stressing that, ordinarily, it is already not easy to determine “pure” separate 
acts of international organisation’s organs, but in ASEAN’s case, the deeply political 
context of the proxy war between the Soviet Union, United States, and China 
complicate analysis in legal terms. Nevertheless, attempting a legal analysis of this 
nature is still preferable to adapting the conclusions of the International Relations 
literature on non-intervention during the Kampuchean conflict, which do not separate 
acts of ASEAN States from those of ASEAN member States, and of ASEAN organs 
acting qua ASEAN.  
Against this context, therefore, we must evaluate the separate acts of ASEAN through 
the conduct of ASEAN organs in the AMM joint communiques of 1981-1982,110 which 
uphold non-intervention because it prohibits the overthrowing of “legitimate”111 
governments (which includes unpopular ones like the Khmer Rouge). Non-
intervention would be violated if the PRK delegate (i.e., Heng Samrin’s government, 
sponsored by Vietnam) were seated, or if the Cambodian seat were left vacant 
(because that would implicitly approve Vietnam’s actions). Considered in its totality, 
as an early ASEAN practice, the AMM achieved some success in creating a regional 
rule of non-intervention, as attested to by the seating of the DK delegate to represent 
the Khmer Rouge government at the UN.112  
Furthermore, this regional rule of non-intervention as created by ASEAN organs, i.e., 
especially against the overthrowing of legitimate governments, received some 
approval at general international law.  When bilateral relations warmed between the 
United States and Soviet Union in 1988 and the Cold War started to thaw,113 it became 
possible to resolve the Kampuchean conflict. This was initially conducted at the 
General Assembly, in which the second operative paragraph of Resolution 43/19 
(1988) states: 
Reiterates its conviction that the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Kampuchea under effective 
international supervision and control, the creation of an interim administering authority, the promotion of 
national reconciliation among all Kampucheans under the leadership of Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, 
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the non-return to the universally condemned policies and practices of a recent past, the restoration and 
preservation of the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and neutral and non-aligned status of 
Kampuchea, the reaffirmation of the right of the Kampuchean people to determine their own destiny and 
the commitment by all States to non-interference and non-intervention in the internal affairs of 
Kampuchea, with effective guarantees, are the principal components of any just and lasting resolution 
of the Kampuchean problem.114 
 
In other words, at this point, another extant rule of general international law exists to 
shape non-intervention’s content – internal self-determination. In a post-conflict 
Kampuchea,  then, Vietnam would withdraw forces and Kampuchea (now Cambodia) 
would be neutralised, non-aligned, administered through a power-sharing entity,115 
and subject to some form of international supervision under the UN.116 Kampucheans 
would be given some choice, through the UN as a venue, to vote for a government 
leadership.117 Here non-intervention’s content still included and protected the right of 
a State to govern its “internal affairs”, although the nature of its government is subject 
to international supervision.118 As explained in Chapter Three, the descriptive and 
evaluative vagueness of non-intervention, at general international law (including the 
non-intervention provisions in the Friendly Relations Declaration), affirms non-
intervention’s content as a moving target, whose content is assessed relative to 
general rules of international at a given point in time. It is also especially the 
descriptive vagueness of non-intervention at general international law that enables 
the regional law-making of non-intervention by ASEAN organs to include non-
overthrowing of a legitmate government (despite the Khmer Rouge’s involvement) 
during this period. 
To summarise: I have examined two instances of the ASEAN organs’ practice. First, 
I discussed the early practice of the AMM and ASEAN Standing Committee in using 
joint communiques to form common positions in conducting their external relations, 
an established practice concerning the ASEAN organs’ role in maintaining regional 
peace, which was acquiesced to ASEAN member States. Second, I explored the 
ASEAN organs’ role and statements regarding the credentials issue, after Vietnam’s 
occupation became a political fact. In both instances, the ASEAN organs were acting 
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qua ASEAN, an international organisation. They were making regional law, in relation 
to their respective functions as organs in the Bangkok Declaration, and also in 
creating non-intervention’s content with an ASEAN character as to the prohibition 
against overthrowing legitimate governments like the Khmer Rouge.  
Specifically, with respect to the common positions about Vietnam’s actions in 
Kampuchea and the credentials issue, the established practice of ASEAN organs is 
undertaken with a sense of legal obligation concerning what non-intervention and 
recognition are at general international law, which are accepted as law (i.e., opinio 
juris). It is regional law because it contains common causes that involve the regional 
peace and security of Southeast Asia. On this basis, it contributes to the coherence 
of Southeast Asia as a geographical region. Moreover, as explained in Chapter Three, 
the descriptive and evaluative vagueness of non-intervention’s content at general 
international law allows this legal assessment that ASEAN organs can act during the 
Kampuchean conflict out of legal obligation as to non-intervention. However, the 
precise content of non-intervention is determined against general international law, at 
that given point, and the stringency of non-intervention’s obligation is quite low.  
Accordingly, it is important to stress the relationship of this regional law with general 
international law. It is general international law that provides the relevant legal 
construct (i.e., ASEAN’s separate legal personality) and its legal rules (regional law 
regarding shared values and geographical association) to give substance to the 
regional content of non-intervention with an ASEAN character. Importantly, this 
regional law-making is advanced through and affirmed within ASEAN as a venue. 
This relationship between regional and general international law, as well as its 
development of the core proposition, is elaborated on in the final part below, in terms 
of the TAC’s provisions on non-intervention.  
2) Regional Law of Non-Intervention: A Code of Conduct that is determined 
by General International Law 
 
This part advances the study’s core proposition by showing how the body of ASEAN 
practice during the Kampuchean conflict, already examined above as the established 
practice of ASEAN regarding non-intervention’s content, which eventually emerged 
as a code of conduct in the intramural relations between and with ASEAN member 
States in Southeast Asia. General international law shapes this view because, after 
the Kampuchean conflict, ASEAN served as a venue to affirm the relevance of this 
regional law of non-intervention with an ASEAN character. Particularly, the general 
rule of interpreting treaties at international law, in Article 31 of the 1969 Vienna 
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Convention, is examined here.119 To advance this core proposition, first we consider 
two provisions on non-intervention in the TAC. Under “Purpose and Principles,” Article 
2, TAC states: 
 
In their relations with one another, the High Contracting Parties shall be guided by the following 
fundamental principles:  
a. Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity 
of all nations;  
b. The right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or 
coercion;  
c. Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another;   
d. Renunciation of the threat or use of force.120  
 
Although Article 2(c), TAC, is unclear in content, it is clear that TAC parties agree 
non-intervention applies in the broad context of their conducting intramural “relations 
with one another” (under Article 2, TAC). Article 10 gives context to this broad context, 
in which non-intervention applies: “Each High Contracting Party shall not in any 
manner or form participate in any activity which shall constitute a threat to the political 
and economic stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of another High Contracting 
Party”.121 
 
Recall that this broad context of the TAC can be traced back to ZOPFAN,122 an 
unsuccessful attempt to neutralise Southeast Asia from the involvement of the United 
States, China, and Soviet Union.123 As a political compromise, ZOPFAN produced 
fourteen guidelines on the code of conduct between States in Southeast Asia (and 
not just confined to ASEAN member States), of which six were adopted in Article 2, 
TAC.124  
  
During the Kampuchean conflict, the sustained actions of ASEAN organs against 
Vietnam and Heng Samrin’s effective government is a body of practice which gave 
meaning to the text of Articles 2(c) and 10, TAC. In other words, the TAC’s broad 
context necessitates the taking into account of the ASEAN organs’ practice during 
the Kampuchean conflict, an established practice125 of ASEAN, which can be 
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interpreted against the rules of subsequent practice of a treaty (i.e., in relation to the 
TAC), in accordance with the customary rules of treaty law.  
 
Before we consider this argument, it is useful to recapitulate the ASEAN organs’ 
common position on non-intervention as follows: strict adherence to non-
intervention as a principle of the UN Charter in conducting international relations, 
breach of which was impermissible during the Kampuchean conflict; 126 although 
Article 2(7), UN Charter addresses non-intervention in a vertical sense 
(intervention by the UN in matters internal to a State),127 the Friendly Relations 
Declaration include vertical non-intervention and also horizontal non-intervention 
(by one State in another’s internal affairs);128 ASEAN’s push to seat the 
Democratic Kampuchean representative at the UN;129 because the use of force 
by Vietnam was illegal, the political fact of Heng Samrin’s government was also 
illegal;130 its role as part of a comprehensive settlement in a post conflict 
Kampuchea, which include neutralisation and a power-sharing coalition.131  
 
Vietnam’s actions in Kampuchea, the invasion and continued involvement in the Heng 
Samrin government,132 threaten the regional peace and security of ASEAN member 
States in Southeast Asia. The Cold War was ongoing. The United States, China, and 
the Soviet Union were drawn into this conflict between Vietnam and Kampuchea, a 
proxy war between great powers which implicated Southeast Asia’s peace and 
security as a non-communist zone.133   
 
It is this Cold War context that facilitated non-intervention’s relevance and shaped its 
content. Obviously, this bipolar world, in which the United States’ ideologies 
contrasted with that of the Soviet Union and China, shaped the legal rules at general 
international law. It was possible to “take sides”, on ideological grounds, for (or 
against) Vietnam’s actions in Kampuchea. Despite the political fact of Heng Samrin’s 
effective government, the Cold War context allowed UN member States to agree 
                                                            
126
 See n85.   
127
 Also see Article 2(7), UN Charter for treaty language on non-intervention and this article’s 
obsolescence in UN practice, generally see Kawser Ahmed, “The Domestic Jurisdiction Clause in the 
Un Charter: A Historical View” (2006) 10 Singapore Yearbook of International Law 175; see further 
Chapter Three, Section V.  
 
128
 Generally James Crawford, Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law (8th ed) (Oxford: OUP, 
2012) at 448.  
129
 See n112.  
130
 See nn92-93.  
131
 See n115.  
132
 Chapter Four, Section II.   
133
 Generally Daniel Seah, Foreign Policy and International Law in Singapore, Master of Jurisprudence 
thesis (unpublished), University of Birmingham (2008), at 178.   
  
 
173 
 
resolutions, through the General Assembly,134 to repeat the illegality of Vietnam’s 
continued involvement in Kampuchea from 1979-1989.  
 
Before a détente in bilateral relations between the United States and Soviet Union, 
there was no realistic prospect, during the Cold War, of counting on the Security 
Council to resolve the Kampuchean conflict.135 This situation allowed the ASEAN 
organs, at the General Assembly and within ASEAN, to press the argument regarding 
the continued illegality of Vietnam’s actions at general international law, which directly 
affected Southeast Asia’s peace and security. This is because Vietnam’s actions in 
Kampuchea were supported by the Soviet Union, in military, material, and ideological 
terms.136 In other words, ASEAN member States were conducting their intramural 
relations in accordance with their obligations in Articles 2(c) and 10, TAC with respect 
for non-intervention, and without threatening the political, economic or social integrity 
of each TAC party.   
 
More importantly, this body of practice that was conducted through the ASEAN 
organs during the Kampuchean conflict constituted the acts of ASEAN, i.e., arguably 
a subsequent practice137 in the application of Articles 2(c) and 10, TAC.138 In other 
words, this body of practice has an ASEAN character: its legal effects (and content) 
must be assessed against rules of general international law, especially the general 
rule of interpreting treaties as contained in the 1969 Vienna Convention, which has 
customary status.139   
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(3 June 2014) UN Doc A/CN.4/L.833, Draft Conclusion 6: “Texts and titles of draft conclusions 6 to 10 
provisionally adopted by the Drafting Committee on 27 and 28 May and on 2 and 3 June 2014”.  
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Subsequent practice has a “relational character”:140 it must present “objective 
evidence” of a party’s understanding with respect to a treaty.141 In other words, 
different types of practice can be related to each other, if they collectively present 
evidence (based on the ILC’s non-binding rules) as subsequent practice as to the 
application of treaty provisions.  
 
Furthermore, what counts as subsequent practice can be construed broadly or 
narrowly. Starting with the narrow view, in accordance with Article 31(3)(b), Vienna 
Convention: after a treaty’s conclusion, it is legally relevant to consider the conduct 
of all the parties which establishes an agreement regarding the interpretation of that 
treaty’s terms.142 In contrast, the broader view is that “other subsequent practice” not 
confined to Article 31(3)(b), Vienna Convention can be considered to interpret the 
“object and purpose” of the treaty on point.143  Significantly, the ILC had concluded 
that subsequent practice, whether construed broadly or narrowly, can take a “variety 
of forms”.144  
 
In this respect, the ILC explored the “established practice” and “general practice” of 
international organisations. It did not conclude that both terms have distinct legal 
meanings. Rather, the ILC seems to approve of “established practice”, based on its 
earlier work on the 1986 Vienna Convention, as an open category of conduct of the 
organs of an international organisation, so long as it is largely contained in its 
constituent instrument and acquiesced to by its member States.  
 
As for “general practice”, the ILC referred to this as the combination of the practice of 
the organs of international organisations and that of its member States (i.e., when its 
representatives express positions as a member States for its government). In this 
sense, the ILC suggested that subsequent practice, whether through the pathways of 
“established practice” or “general practice”, can be used as an interpretative aid to 
clarifying the terms of a treaty.145 For these reasons and for brevity, throughout this 
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 “First Report on Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation to the Interpretation 
of Treaties” (19 March 2013) UN Doc A/CN.4/683 (“Nolte Report”), para 111 at 43.  
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study, I use the expression “established practice” to include both the established and 
general practice of an international organisation.    
 
Moreover, in evaluating subsequent practice, the weight which we attach to this 
“variety of forms” depends on its specificity and repetition.146 In a decentralised 
international system, it would be hard to expect different legal tribunals to offer 
consistent guidance on matters of treaty interpretation. The ILC’s laissez-faire 
approach, then, is a practical suggestion to use international organisations’ practice, 
as another pathway.  
  
This survey of the legal rules at general international law, which shape the meaning 
of subsequent practice in interpreting treaties, influences our evaluation of ASEAN’s 
regional practice: the meaning of treaty terms  (i.e., the non-intervention provisions in 
Articles 2(c) and 10, TAC) evolve over time because of the ASEAN organs’ conduct 
during the Kampuchean conflict.147 Therefore, for instance, the ILC’s guidance on 
repetition is relevant to the actions of ASEAN organs during the Kampuchean conflict. 
Its repeated invocation of non-intervention at the AMM148 and General Assembly149 
underscored the regional rule of non-intervention.  
 
Put differently: if the ASEAN organs did not take a position against Vietnam (despite 
its not being a party to the TAC during the Kampuchean conflict), this omission to 
act150 would be contrary to the obligations of ASEAN member states, under Article 
10, TAC, to conduct intramural relations in a manner which did not threaten their 
“political and economic stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity”.  Hence although 
Vietnam was not an ASEAN member State, during the Kampuchean conflict, its 
actions in Kampuchea directly implicated Southeast Asia, which implicated ASEAN’s 
regional peace and security because external powers such as the United States and 
USSR became involved in Southeast Asia’s international relations. To this extent, 
Vietnam’s actions had a direct geographical link to ASEAN and its member States’ 
shared values, in regional terms, to apply non-intervention in favour of the Khmer 
Rouge’s government in Kampuchea.   
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 Draft Conclusion 3 (n139).  
148
 See its Joint Communiques (n86).  
149
 See the UNGA resolutions (n85).  
150
 See my discussion regarding the issuing of common positions immediately after the Kampuchean 
conflict started and the credentials issues in Chapter Four, Sections III-IV.  
  
 
176 
 
This shared value has a regional, hence ASEAN, character but it is largely grounded 
in the universal (and Western) value that, at general international law, individual 
States have a legal right to govern its “internal affairs”, which includes the widely 
reviled Khmer Rouge government of Kampuchea. Governance of a State’s internal 
politics is an internal matter. The ASEAN organ’s iteration of non-intervention during 
the Kampuchean conflict had the regional law-making effect of proposing an 
interpretation of non-intervention's content, which supported the legal right of a 
government to govern largely on its own terms. 
 
The practice of ASEAN organs supports this argument in five ways. First, when the 
Kampuchean conflict ended, it is significant that the ASEAN Summit,151  as ASEAN’s 
supreme organ, and not the AMM, pointedly and consistently approved the TAC as a 
“code of conduct”152 for intramural relations in Southeast Asia.153  
 
A “code of conduct” usually (but not always) expresses a non-binding commitment.154 
Second, however, in relation to the TAC, the expression “code of conduct” is a binding 
and rather precise rule as to the content of non-intervention, as a subsequent practice 
regarding the interpretation of Articles 2(c) and (especially) 10, TAC.  As explained 
earlier, Article 10, TAC proscribes activities that threaten a party’s “political and 
economic stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity”.  
 
Third, Vietnam’s occupation of Kampuchea, its removal of the Khmer Rouge 
government, and installation of Heng Samrin’s effective government, constituted a 
threat within the terms of Article 10, TAC. Displaced Kampucheans who were located 
alongside the Thai-Kampuchean border threatened Thailand’s borders and, more 
general, the regional security of all ASEAN States. This is because it raised issues 
concerning which ASEAN member States should receive the displaced 
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Kampucheans, with deeper implications for the political and social fabric of the 
receiving State.155 Moreover, in the Cold War context, China, the Soviet Union, and 
United States became involved in the internal affairs of ASEAN States.156  
 
Fourth, since 1987, towards the end of the Kampuchean conflict, the TAC was 
amended to encourage “neighbouring States of the Southeast Asian region” to 
accede to this treaty: Vietnam, Kampuchea and Lao.157 Both developments affirm, in 
legal terms, the argument that the Kampuchean conflict was one which directly 
affected Southeast Asia as a whole region, even though Vietnam and Cambodia were 
(then) not a TAC party.  
 
Fifth, before their admission as ASEAN member States in the 1990s, Cambodia, 
Myanmar, Lao, and Vietnam, as “neighbouring States” in Southeast Asia, had to 
accept this code of conduct, through accession to the TAC,158  Finally, in 1992, the 
ASEAN Summit, as an organ, sponsored159 a General Assembly resolution160 to 
ensure broad acknowledgement that, at general international law, the TAC is 
consistent with the UN Charter.161  
 
In the light of this body of practice by the ASEAN organs during the Kampuchean 
practice, a code of conduct as affirmed by the ASEAN Summit and AMM reflects a 
fairly precise but certainly binding rule in Articles 2(c) and 10, TAC. This rule as to 
non-intervention’s content with an ASEAN character, in particular, contains the 
prohibition against the overthrowing of legitimate governments, which partly forms the 
TAC’s code of conduct. Accordingly, a TAC party is legally entitled to govern its 
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“internal affairs” largely on its own terms, despite the Khmer Rouge government’s 
murderous history. The Khmer Rouge, then, was one stark instance.  
 
Put another way, to overthrow a legitimate government, on grounds of moral 
repugnance (however that is defined at law) against it, is an activity which threatens 
the economic, political, and territorial integrity of a TAC party. Despite not being a 
TAC party during the Kampuchean conflict, its actions in Kampuchea affected the 
regional peace and security of Southeast Asia,162 by involving external powers such 
as the United States, USSR, and China, who participated in the international relations 
of Southeast Asia. For these reasons, over time, the specific activity of making 
comments against a TAC party, whose domestic governance did not conform to 
practices of democratic governance at general international law, perhaps formed part 
of this code of conduct, a development which was acknowledged in Australia’s 
accession to the TAC.163  
 
Hence, the expression “code of conduct” has become a subsequent practice in the 
application of conducting intramural relations, in accordance with the TAC. This code 
of conduct contains fairly precise regional rules on non-intervention, while remaining 
vague enough to absorb other prohibitions in due course, were significant in 
persuading Myanmar, Cambodia, and especially Vietnam to seek admission as 
member States of ASEAN. Their accession, as a pre-condition to ASEAN 
membership, attests to the binding status and their acceptance of the code of 
conduct, as contained in the TAC.     
 
The binding status of the TAC as a code of conduct is evident in the accession 
practice of Australia and the United States.164 The interpretative declarations by both 
States confirm that non-intervention’s content with an ASEAN character contains 
fairly precise rules, which must be limited for good measure, upon accession. The 
accession practice of Australia and the Unites States also suggests that the code of 
conduct,165 as a form of subsequent practice in the regional application of Articles 2(c) 
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and 10, TAC, can be binding and be evaluated against general rules of international 
law.  
 
Turning first to Australia, its legal position as expressed in its interpretative declaration 
specifically addressed non-intervention, as defined in Article 2(c), TAC. Its National 
Interest Analysis (NIA) said that non-intervention under Article 2(c), TAC did not affect 
Australia’s rights and obligations under the UN Charter.166 Since non-intervention is 
not expressly contained in the UN Charter, Australia invoked the UN’s purposes, 
namely the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.167 Non-intervention 
on this view does not apply to the engagement and comments by Australia on issues 
of “international interest” concerning a TAC party.  
 
To the United States, non-intervention did not apply at all. On its accession to the 
TAC, it said: “the United States’ accession to the TAC does not affect the United 
States’ rights and obligations under other bilateral or multilateral agreements, and, 
noting Article 10, does not limit actions taken by the United States that it considers 
necessary to address a threat to its national interests”.168 
 
The sweeping rejection by the US of Article 10 with one word – “noting” – reflected 
the more specific position of the US Senate, when it gave its advice and consent to 
the accession of the TAC on the international plane: “…the TAC does not limit the 
authority of the US government—either the executive branch or the Congress—to 
take actions that it considers necessary in pursuit of US national interests in the region 
or with respect to any individual nation.” 
  
In response to the interpretative declarations of Australia and the United States,169 
the Chair of the ASEAN Summit (i.e., ASEAN Chair) tellingly said:170 “(they are) 
expressed on a non-prejudice basis to the integrity and the object and purpose of the 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia”.171 
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Therefore, despite the legal positions of Australia and USA towards non-intervention’s 
content, their interpretative declarations were still “without prejudice” to the code of 
conduct as it applied to non-intervention as agreed by all ASEAN member States. 
From the core proposition’s standpoint, the accession practice of Australia and the 
United States attests to an important point concerning the dynamic tension in the 
relationship between general and regional international law. Australia and the United 
States, through their interpretative declarations as to non-intervention, acknowledged 
the regional (i.e., ASEAN character) content of of non-intervention in Articles 2(c) and 
10, TAC, as a regional code of conduct.  
 
Importantly, this acknowledgement is manifested in their accession practice by 
“forcing” the ASEAN character of the TAC’s non-intervention content back to 
thgeneral rules of international law, which diminished the stringency of non-
intervention. Thus Australia’s invocation of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
and the United States’ broad language of noting the TAC’s Article 10, are 
assessments of non-intervention’s content at general international law, by taking 
advantage of its descriptive and evaluative vagueness.  
 
Likewise, the ASEAN’s Chair’s response to the Australian and United States’ 
interpretative declarations on a “non-prejudice basis” to the objectives of the TAC is 
an (likely unsuccessful) attempt to emphasise the regional content of non-
intervention, as a code of conduct with a higher stringency in terms of its obligations 
between TAC parties inter se. However, the regional law of non-intervention with an 
ASEAN character must still be located and defined in relation to the general rules of 
international law. As Australia and the United States have indicated, these general 
rules will include considerations of human rights, fundamental freedoms, as well as 
matters which involve the participation of Great Powers in maintaining international 
peace and security.  
V. Conclusion 
 
At the outset of this chapter, I explained that the International Relations (IR) literature 
had correctly studied the Kampuchean conflict as a foundational moment, although 
in assessing its significance for “ASEAN”, the IR literature did not always differentiate 
its actions as a legal person from its member States. This chapter used one case 
study, i.e., ASEAN’s actions during the long Kampuchean conflict, to demonstrate the 
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study’s core proposition that a distinctive regional law regarding non-intervention 
emerged and was made by ASEAN organs. Discerning the content of this law, and 
its regional scope, require recourse to general international law standards. 
Accordingly, this chapter illustrated the core proposition in two broad ways.  
 
First, and in a significant way for the first time, ASEAN organs served as a venue to 
advance a distinct regional law of non-intervention. Because of their sustained 
practice during the Kampuchean conflict, the AMM and ASEAN Standing committee 
confirmed their functions as ASEAN organs, effectively an established practice, in 
accordance with its founding instrument, i.e., the Bangkok Declaration 1967.  
 
Second, it is general international law which provides the rules to appraise the 
functions of ASEAN organs as an established practice. More importantly for this 
study, general international law permits the framing of the ASEAN organs’ practice, 
in making non-intervention’s content as a distinct regional law, on grounds of its 
practice being consistently connected to a geographical area or shared values in this 
area of Southeast Asia.  
 
General international law, i.e., the rules of treaty law in Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention, also allows us to embrace longitudinal perspectives on the relationship 
between the TAC’s provisions on non-intervention. The TAC was signed in 1976 
before the Kampuchean conflict. But the ASEAN organs’ subsequent practice, during 
the Kampuchean conflict from 1979-1990, formed the application of the TAC 
provisions concerning non-intervention.  
 
Non-intervention’s regional content emerged, after the Kampuchean conflict, as a 
code of conduct which applies to all TAC parties’ intramural relations in Southeast 
Asia. As explained already, this code of conduct includes a prohibition against the 
overthrowing of legitimate governments. Practically, of course, as a code of conduct, 
its exact meaning in relation to non-intervention’s content is left unclear.172 
  
However, the prospects of its legal consequences were taken seriously enough by 
the treaty practice of Australia and the United States, when they acceded to the TAC. 
The interpretative declarations of these two TAC parties demonstrate the strength 
and influence of general international law on regional law. Non-intervention’s content, 
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then, is circumscribed by these general rules “out there”, typically on grounds of 
functional concerns,173 such as human rights protection and democratic governance 
(whatever this means),174 which necessitate international cooperation. It follows that 
the regional code of conduct, in the TAC, has to change, in a manner which is 
consistent with the rules of general international law. The next chapter explains how 
it happens.       
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“International community” is a construct that we use to sound good. It’s something we use when we want 
to make somebody else feel bad ~ Bilahari Kausikan, former Ambassador-at-Large (Singapore).1 
Chapter Five 
NON-INTERVENTION, “DEMOCRATIC” GOVERNANCE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: 
MYANMAR     
I. Purpose  
 
This chapter illustrates the core proposition with a second case study of ASEAN 
practice. It shows instances of distinctive regional law-making by ASEAN organs as 
to non-intervention, with respect to one ASEAN member State – Myanmar. It argues 
that, while the ASEAN organs make this distinctive form of regional non-intervention, 
other general rules of international law are gradually influencing and constraining the 
contours and regional content of non-intervention with an ASEAN character.    
 
Throughout this study, I have discussed various rules that occur at general 
international law. I have explained the separate legal personality of international 
organisations (including ASEAN) and its corollaries, namely the separate acts of its 
organs, and the international responsibilities which might arise.2  Additionally, I 
examined the possibility of regional law, based on geographical links or shared 
values, at international law which is the result of rules permitting its limited existence 
alongside general international law.3   
 
Particularly, in relation to non-intervention’s content, I reviewed the present rule of 
coercion as an element for applying non-intervention.4 Pertinently, this rule was 
formed against the background of the Cold War and communism, both developments 
which profoundly shaped general international law at a given point in time. Therefore, 
in the regional law of non-intervention with an ASEAN character, non-intervention was 
applied by ASEAN organs against Vietnam’s actions in Kampuchea, despite the 
removal of a murderous Khmer Rouge government.5  Accordingly, the actions of 
ASEAN organs created a fairly precise regional rule regarding non-intervention: the 
right to govern its “internal affairs”, including murderous regimes such as the Khmer 
Rouge government. As explained in Chapter Four, this regional rule of non-
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intervention, a code of conduct in managing intra-mural relations between TAC 
parties, is a subsequent practice in the application of the TAC provisions on non-
intervention.  
 
The key argument in this chapter is that ASEAN’s regional practice in relation to 
Myanmar suggests that its regional rule of non-intervention, i.e., the right of a State 
to govern its “internal affairs”, has waned. The vagueness of non-intervention had to 
be descriptively assessed and evaluated against rules against general international 
law, at a given point in time. ASEAN’s regional law-making of non-intervention is 
demonstrated through the acts of ASEAN organs towards Myanmar. As ASEAN’s 
conduct of external relations, with other legal persons, to maintain regional peace and 
security has grown, so its regional law of non-intervention has changed too. In this 
respect, I focus on the practice of ASEAN organs’ in two areas, democratic 
governance and disaster management, which have become linked to human rights 
law. The content of non-intervention, particularly its regional quality (i.e., ASEAN 
character), is created by ASEAN when its other law-making acts in treaty form, as 
well as emerging rules at general international law, are considered. The code of 
conduct, which emerged as a subsequent practice in the application of Articles 2 (c) 
and 10, TAC, concerning non-intervention must be reappraised in the light of new 
common causes for ASEAN’s conduct of external relations as an international 
organisation. The law-making acts of ASEAN contains a regional quality, i.e., carries 
an ASEAN character, because of the common causes concerning disaster 
management and towards Myanmar. As explained in Chapter Two, the geographical 
“fact” of Southeast Asia is defined and affirmed by these common causes, which aids 
its regionality. The case study in this chapter, then, advances the core proposition by 
showing the extent in which regional non-intervention has to change because of the 
encroaching influence of general rules at international law.  
 
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, it starts with a background to Myanmar’s 
admission as an ASEAN member States and the relevance of the TAC, as a code of 
conduct, to Myanmar and ASEAN. Second, I examine the Depayin incident of 2003 
in Myanmar,6 which resulted in the house arrest of Aung Sang Su Kyi. Third, I explore 
a series of internal developments within Myanmar which led to its government’s 
forfeiture of the ASEAN Chairmanship in 2005.7 Fourth, I analyse the ASEAN organ’s 
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statement of “revulsion” regarding Myanmar’s internal affairs during the “saffron 
revolution” in 2007. Fifth, I assess the ASEAN organs’ practice during Cyclone Nargis 
in 2008 and explain the relevance of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management 
and Emergency Response (“AADMER”),8 as a paradigmatic regional law of giving 
technical assistance, without express reference to human rights law, during disasters.  
These sections demonstrate the distinctive regional character of law-making by 
ASEAN organs, which shapes non-intervention’s content with an ASEAN character. 
In other words, they are acts that addressed common goals and values of a specific 
geographical area.9 Against this broad context, I discuss, in the final section, the 
potential impact of the ILC’s work on disaster management and explore its prospects 
as general rules of international law in constraining the regional rule of non-
intervention by ASEAN organs.     
II. Myanmar’s Admission as Member State of ASEAN (1997) 
 
This section briefly introduces the background to Myanmar’s admission as an ASEAN 
member State. It supports the core proposition by drawing attention to the purpose of 
a distinctive regional law of non-intervention in admitting new ASEAN members, in 
the form of a code of conduct concerning intramural relations in Southeast Asia, which 
was made by ASEAN organs during the long Kampuchean conflict. This reference to 
the regional content of non-intervention matters. As ASEAN increases its conduct of 
external relations with other States, the general rules of international law, which shape 
cooperation conducted under external relations, are influencing the current content of 
regional rules regarding non-intervention.   
 
Upon taking power in 1988, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) 
in Myanmar were pragmatic about ASEAN membership.10 The Myanmar government 
was wary of foreign interventions,11 after its previous experiences with the UK,12 
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12
 Generally Douglas Peers, “Anglo-Burmese Wars (1823–1826, 1852–1853, 1885–1886)” (2011) The 
Encyclopedia of War.   
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Japan,13 and China.14  Myanmar was reassured by the TAC’s “code of conduct”, by 
which ASEAN member States regulated intramural relations in Southeast Asia.15 It 
saw itself as an effective government authority16 in defending the ceasefire with 
armed ethnic groups across Myanmar.17  
 
On Myanmar’s admission as a member State in 1997,18 its Prime Minister said at the 
ASEAN Summit (1998) that “we remain confident that the solidarity of our Association 
can be further consolidated by reaffirming our basic fundamentals and the code of 
conduct as laid down in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. The guiding principles 
of respect for sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of one another 
remain valid today as they were enunciated”.19 To ASEAN, Myanmar’s admission was 
vital to consolidating the TAC’s aims of maintaining regional peace and security in 
Southeast Asia.20 The AMM’s joint communique said that “a firm foundation for 
common action to promote regional cooperation in Southeast Asia is being 
accomplished. The Foreign Ministers affirmed their commitment to heighten 
collaboration with Laos and Myanmar to facilitate the integration of both these 
countries into the mainstream of ASEAN activities.21  
 
III. The Waning of Non-Intervention’s Content with an ASEAN Character 
 
1) Depayin Incident (2003) 
 
This section contributes to the core proposition by discussing three developments in 
Myanmar, in which ASEAN organs were actively involved and thus participated in 
making a distinctive regional law as to non-intervention.  These developments show 
attempts by ASEAN organs to retain by affirming the distinctive regional content of 
                                                            
13
 Jürgen Haacke, Myanmar's Foreign Policy: Domestic Influences and International Implications 
(Oxford: Routledge, 2006) at 61-83. 
14
 Ibid at 25-41.  
15
 See further Chapter Five, Section III.  
16
 I.e., Article 1(c), Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (adopted 26 December 
1933, entered into force 26 December 1934) (1933) 165 LNTS 19.  
17
 Also see statement by Singapore’s Representative at a UN Security Council meeting on Myanmar 
(S/PV.5753) on 5 October 2007 at 19: “…we have to be pragmatic. The military is a key institution in 
Myanmar that cannot be wished away. Any peaceful solution to the crisis will have to involve all parties, 
including the military. If the military is not part of the solution, there will be no solution.”  
18
 I.e., 23 July 1997.  
19
 “Opening Remark by HE Senior General Than Shwe, Prime Minister of Myanmar” (15 December 
1998), at the Sixth ASEAN Summit, available at <http://asean.org/asean/asean-structure/asean-
summit/>.  
20
 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (adopted 24 February 1976) (1976) 1025 UNTS 
15063: on the TAC, see n15.  
21
 Para 2, “Joint Communique of the 30th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting” (24-25 July 1997).  
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non-intervention, while being increasingly subject to the strong influence of general 
rules of international law. In particular, this section also instances the role of a 
powerful external actor, the United States, in contributing to the strength of general 
international law, through its conduct of external relations with ASEAN.  
 
ASEAN’s actions are distinctly regional because its organs, in this case, acted with 
respect to Myanmar (a member State). But the regional character, and its 
distinctiveness, of non-intervention cannot be sustainably isolated from general 
international law because the issues which engaged non-intervention are of a global 
(hence general) nature. It is, therefore, arguable that there a dynamic tension 
between the influence of general international law on the distinctive regional law-
making of non-intervention by ASEAN (organs).  
 
On 30 May 2003, a convoy which carried Aung San Suu Kyi and her supporters was 
apparently attacked by a government sponsored mob.22 This occurred at Depayin, 
the Northwest of Myanmar. It was alleged that more than 70 persons were killed by 
the mob.23 Aung Sang Suu Kyi was subsequently placed under house arrest by the 
Myanmar government. Consequently, in June 2003, the AMM said that “we discussed 
the recent political developments in Myanmar, particularly the incident of 30 May 
2003…we urged Myanmar to resume its efforts of national reconciliation and dialogue 
among all parties concerned leading to a peaceful transition to democracy. We 
welcomed the assurances given by Myanmar that the measures taken following the 
incident were temporary and looked forward to the early lifting of restrictions placed 
on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD members”.24 
 
 
It is legally significant that the AMM singled out this “incident”. If there were no 
consensus within an ASEAN organ at this senior level, no statement would be made 
in the joint communique.25 Therefore, the statements of ASEAN organs, especially at 
the Summit and AMM levels, reflect a considerable degree of agreement on specific 
                                                            
22
 Generally, Jürgen Haacke, “The Myanmar Imbroglio and ASEAN: Heading towards the 2010 elections” 
(2010) 86 International Affairs 153 at 156.  
23
 For this claim, see “Written statement submitted by the Asian Legal Resource Centre (ALRC),  
a non-governmental organization in general consultative status to the Philippines’s Committee of Human 
Rights”, available at <alrc.asia/wp-content/uploads/2004/03/ALRC-11b-Depayin_Myanmar.rtf>.   
24
 See Para 18, “Joint Communiqué of the 36th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting Phnom Penh” (16-17 June 
2003) (emphasis supplied).  
25
 In contrast, for the first time in 2012, the AMM did not issue a Joint Communique at its 45th Meeting 
because there was no consensus on developments in the South China Sea. The importance of the joint 
communique was attested to by a subsequent statement of the AMM on 20th July 2012, “ASEAN’s Six-
Point Principles on the South China Sea”, which are “consistent with” the TAC and ASEAN Charter.  
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issues.26 The statements of these organs are separate from its member States and 
constitute ASEAN practice,27 as I elaborate shortly, from which legal conclusions can 
be drawn.  
 
Returning to the June statement (2003), the AMM indicated that a desirable outcome 
of Myanmar’s political transition should contain some form of “democracy”.28 
Pertinently, the AMM stated that its discussion of the Depayin incident with Myanmar, 
as an ASEAN member States, was “without prejudice to the cardinal principle of non-
interference”.29 Subject to some qualifications that I shortly indicate,30 it is arguable 
that non-intervention’s content regarding the right of a state to govern its “internal 
affairs”, and against the overthrowing of governments, still applies as the TAC’s code 
of conduct.31  
 
Consequently, Myanmar responded with a “seven step” roadmap that would result in 
a “disciplined flourishing democracy”, which would involve some form of participation 
in an  election.32  At the highest level, through the ASEAN Summit, ASEAN reacted 
cautiously to Myanmar’s plans, as an international organisation:  
                                                            
26
 In contrast, after the South China Sea Arbitration award (PCA Case No 2013-19) was handed down 
on 12 July 2016, the AMM expressly mentioned the subject of the South China Sea: however, the PCA’s 
award was conspicuously omitted because ASEAN member States did not agree on its inclusion, see 
Paras 110 and 174-181, “Joint Communique of the 49th ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting” (24 July 
2016). For good measure, the Foreign Ministers significantly repeated their “common position” on the 
South China issue in a separate statement: see Para 4, “Joint Statement of the Foreign Ministers of 
ASEAN Member States on the Maintenance of Peace, Security, and Stability in the Region” (July 2016).   
27For another example, see Para 2, “Full Text of Ambassador Stanley Loh's (i.e., Singapore’s 
ambassador to China) Letter to Global Times (China) Editor-In-Chief Hu Xijin, in response to an article 
by Global Times, dated 21 September 2016”: “…the proposal to update the Southeast Asia paragraphs 
in the NAM (i.e., Non-Aligned Movement) Final Document was not done at the last minute nor by any 
single ASEAN country. There was a common and united ASEAN position. It was a consensus position 
of all ten ASEAN members, based on agreed language from the Joint Communique of the 49th ASEAN 
Foreign Ministers Meeting.  As the current ASEAN Chair, Laos conveyed the group’s common position 
through a formal letter to the former-NAM Chair Iran in July 2016” (emphasis supplied), available at 
<https://www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/media_centre/press_room/pr/2016/201609/full-text-of-
ambassador-stanley-loh-s-letter-to-global-times-edi.html>.   
28
 See further Para 50, “Chairman’s Statement of the 16th ASEAN Summit “Towards the Asean 
Community: from Vision to Action”” (9 April 2010): “We underscored the importance of national 
reconciliation in Myanmar and the holding of the general election in a free, fair, and inclusive manner, 
thus contributing to Myanmar’s stability and development.” 
29
 See n24, para 15.  
30
 See the ASEAN Summit’s Press Statement, 2003 (n33).  
31
 See n24, para 27. 
32
 See “Speech by H.E General Khin Nyunt, Prime Minister of the Union of Myanmar on the 
Developments and Progressive Changes in Myanmar Naing-ngan” (30 August 2003) (Myanmar 
Information Committee, Information Sheet No C-2746). The seven steps are as follows: 
(1) Reconvening of the National Convention that has been adjourned since 1996. 
(2) After the successful holding of the National Convention, step by step implementation of the process 
necessary for the emergence of a genuine and disciplined democratic system. 
(3) Drafting of a new constitution in accordance with basic principles and detailed basic principles laid 
down by the National Convention. 
(4) Adoption of the constitution through national referendum. 
  
 
189 
 
 
The Leaders welcomed the recent positive developments in Myanmar and the Government’s pledge to 
bring about a transition to democracy through dialogue and reconciliation. The roadmap as outlined by 
the Prime Minister of Myanmar that would involve all strata of Myanmar society is a pragmatic approach 
and deserves understanding and support. The Leaders also agree that sanctions are not helpful in 
promoting peace and stability essential for democracy to take root.33  
 
Its (non-binding) statement on democratic developments in Myanmar can be 
assessed against international legal rules.34 The reason is because although there is 
no right to democratic governance at general international law,35 there is some legal 
basis to political participation,36 election monitoring,37 and broad notions of democracy 
in the recognition of States.38  
 
For our purposes regarding democratic governance, most of these general rules are 
contained in the (non-binding) Vienna Declaration on human rights in 1993.39 The 
AMM’s response to the Vienna Declaration (1993) was to affirm its commitment to 
this declaration.40 It accepted the right of (internal) self-determination to advance the 
people’s freedom to “full participation in all aspects of their lives”,41 including a right 
to determine their “political, economic, social and cultural systems”.42 Moreover, in 
terms of legal implications that arise for the Depayin incident of 2003, the AMM 
already affirmed in the Vienna Declaration that protecting human rights through 
                                                            
(5) Holding of free and fair elections for Pyithu Hluttaws (Legislative bodies) according to the new 
constitution. 
(6) Convening of Hluttaws attended by Hluttaw members in accordance with the new constitution. 
(7) Building a modern, developed and democratic nation by the state leaders elected by the Hluttaw; and 
the government and other central organs formed by the Hluttaw. 
33
 “Press Statement by the Chairperson of the 9th ASEAN Summit and the 7th ASEAN + 3 Summit Bali” 
(7 October 2003), at para 25.  
34
 “Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action” (25 June 1993) UN Doc 17/Conf 157/24, paras 8-9.  
35
 Generally Thomas Franck, “Emerging Right to Democratic Governance” (1992) 86 AJIL 4; Susan 
Marks, “What has Become of the Emerging Right to Democratic Governance?” (2011) 22 EJIL 507. Cf 
Franck’s more restrained piece, by the late 1990s, in “Dr. Pangloss Meets the Grinch: A Pessimistic 
Comment on Harold Koh's Optimism” (1998–1999) 35 Houston LR 683 at 698: “…it may be a fallacy 
that democracies are more amenable than authoritarian societies to penetration by international rules 
and legal culture”. 
36
 See the European Union’s restrictive measure (i.e., sanctions) in Recital (3), Council Decision 
2010/232/CFSP (26 April 2010) against Myanmar: “…the absence of substantive progress towards an 
inclusive democratisation process, notwithstanding the promulgation of a new electoral law and the 
announcement of the Government of Burma/Myanmar of multi-party elections to be held in 2010.” In 
Council Regulation (EC) No 194/2008, Feb. 25, 2008, 2008 O.J. (L 66/1), EU member states may not 
act contrary to the restrictive measures which are “… incompatible with the principles of liberty, 
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, which are common 
to the Member States.” 
37
 Gregory H Fox, “Election Monitoring: The International Legal Setting” 19 Wisconsin International Law 
Journal (2000–2001), 295; Judith Kelley, “Assessing the Complex Evolution of Norms: The Rise of 
International Election Monitoring” (2008) 62 International Organization, 221–55. 
38
 “Declaration of Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Former 
Soviet Union”, text in (1993) 4 EJIL 72; Colin Warbrick, "Recognition of States" (1992) 41 ICLQ 473. 
39
 UN Doc A/CONF.157/23 (25 June 1993).    
40
 Para 16, “Joint Communique of the 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting” (23-24 July 1993).  
41
 Para 8, ibid.  
42
 Para 8, n34. 
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ASEAN as a venue is subject to “respect” for “non-interference in the internal affairs 
of States”.43  
 
In 1993, this common position of the AMM reiterated the salience of Articles 2(c) and 
10, TAC, as a code of conduct, borne out of the Kampuchean conflict. By 2003, 
however, the ASEAN Summit agreed that intramural relations inter se must be 
conducted on a “higher plane”,44 which expressly included the promotion of a “just, 
democratic and harmonious environment”.45 This, then, is the legal background of 
evolving rules at general and regional international law, on which we must appraise 
the ASEAN organs’ statements in response to Myanmar, after the Depayin incident 
in 2003.  
 
Accordingly, non-intervention’s content did not just change. It has waned. This point 
is evident when we contrast the AMM’s practice against Vietnam’s continued military 
occupation in Kampuchea: no mention of democracy was made by the AMM because 
the qualitative aspects of the Khmer Rouge’s internal governance were legally 
immaterial. In contrast, when the AMM made its statement in 2003 concerning the 
Depayin incident, which was “without prejudice” to non-intervention, the implications 
were apparent. As a code of conduct, non-intervention’s vague content in evaluative 
terms has to be determined by emerging rules at general international law. The next 
part illustrates this argument, with respect to the legal obligations of Myanmar as an 
ASEAN member State.   
2) Myanmar’s Forfeiture of the ASEAN Chair (2005)  
 
In 2004, the AMM concluded that Myanmar’s “roadmap”46 was unsatisfactory with 
reference to the AMM’s joint communique of 2003:47  
 
We recalled and emphasized the continued relevance of the Joint Communique of the 36th AMM and 
the Chairman’s Press Statement of the 9th ASEAN Summit. In this regard, we underlined the need for 
the involvement of all strata of Myanmar society in the on-going National Convention. We encouraged 
all concerned parties in Myanmar to continue their efforts to effect a smooth transition to democracy.48 
 
                                                            
43
 Para 17, “Joint Communique of the 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting” (23-24 July 1993).  
44
 Para 1, “ASEAN Security Community”, in Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (ASEAN Summit, 7 
October 2003).  
45
 Ibid.  
46
 See n32.  
47
 See n24.  
48
 Para 15, “Joint Communique of the 37th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting” (29-30 June 2004) (emphasis 
supplied).  
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The words “all concerned parties in Myanmar” referred to the necessity of involving 
Aung Sang Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy (NLD) in the push 
towards democracy. These statements, agreed at a senior level, have probative value 
in determining the application of the TAC’s provisions (i.e., Articles 2(c) and 10) on 
non-intervention. Whereas Article 2(c) TAC is a general provision that prohibits 
intervention in the conduct of intramural relations, the TAC’s Article 10 is more 
specific. Article 10, TAC, prohibits intervention that threatens the political, economic, 
and social aspects of a TAC party.  
 
In other words, the extant – and fairly precise – regional rule against overthrowing 
governments still applies, however repulsive in moral terms, but this is changing, in 
terms of the qualitative (i.e., democratic) changes that such governments must make. 
This part, therefore, develops the core proposition by examining the evolving rules at 
general international law, which influences (and encroaches onto) the regional 
content of non-intervention. This point is evident in the AMM’s 2004 statement, which 
noted Myanmar’s fledgling (but still inadequate) attempt to democratise, and its 
implications for Myanmar’s putative assumption of the ASEAN’s chairmanship in 
2005.49  
 
For instance, since the Depayin incident (2003), the United States enacted national 
laws whose goal is manifest in its title: the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act 
(BFDA).50 The BFDA clearly required intervention in Myanmar’s internal affairs: the 
act imposed sanctions against the military government,51 aimed at the strengthening 
of “Burma’s democratic forces”,52 recognised the NLD as a “legitimate representative” 
of the Burmese people.53 Relatedly, the United States also banned Myanmar imports 
and export of financial services into Myanmar.54 The sanctions are subject to 
Myanmar satisfying specific conditions, which are established in the BFDA.55 The 
following BFDA conditions are relevant at general international law: the Myanmar 
government must make “substantial and measureable progress to end violations of 
                                                            
49
 Third Declaration(a) of the 1967 Bangkok Declaration (1983) 1331 UNTS 235 provides for an annual 
AMM based on rotation: it was Myanmar’s turn.  
50
 117 STAT 864 (28 July 2003). 
51
 I.e., SPDC (see n10).  
52
 See Preamble and Section 3(b), n50.   
53
 Section 2(14), n50.  
54
 I.e., Executive Order 13310, "Blocking Property of the Government of Burma and Prohibiting Certain 
Transactions” (23 July 2003).  
55
 Generally, the sanctions were ineffective because Myanmar had alternative trading partners, see 
Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung & Paul Sarno, “Myanmar Impasses: Alternatives to Isolation and 
Engagement?” (2006) 14 Asian Journal of Political Science 40.  
  
 
192 
 
internationally recognised human rights”;56 the Myanmar government must implement 
a democratic government that includes freedom of speech, the press, and of 
association.57 
 
Against this clear position of the United States’ national law, the unilateral statements 
by its high ranking representatives on the international plane are legally material. For 
example, Colin Powell, as Secretary of State, said that he would “press the case” with 
ASEAN to exert more pressure on “thugs” (i.e., Myanmar government) who have 
refused to restore democracy.58 Furthermore, at the Security Council in 2007, the 
United States advanced a powerful claim of universality as follows: “This is an issue for 
the entire international community. The United States has done its part to back up its words with actions 
that will serve to ratchet up pressure on the regime…Burma’s neighbours have a special role and 
responsibility. We also urge ASEAN and its member States to build on their efforts to increase pressure 
on the Burmese regime”.59 
 
It is against this important context with implications for ASEAN’s conduct of external 
relations with the United States that, on 11 April 2005, Myanmar’s chairmanship was 
discussed by the AMM, as expressed by the ASEAN Chair, then held by Singapore’s 
foreign minister:    
 
ASEAN (AMM) ministers expressed their frank views on the issue. We re-affirmed that ASEAN cannot 
interfere in the domestic affairs of Myanmar…On ASEAN's part, there is great reluctance to take away 
Myanmar's Chairmanship as this will set a bad precedent. However, ASEAN is in danger of being 
dragged into Myanmar's internal politics because of the Chairmanship issue which in turn could 
complicate Myanmar's internal political situation. It would be best to decouple the 2 (sic) issues. 
 
The Myanmar Foreign Minister listened carefully and said that he would convey these views back to 
Yangon. We realise that this is a tough decision for Myanmar to make… 
 
I am not unhopeful. During PM Lee's recent visit to Myanmar, he had met with the top Myanmar 
leadership. They had expressed to PM Lee that Myanmar was not a "selfish" country and would take 
into account ASEAN's views and consider ASEAN's interests.60  
  
                                                            
56
 Section 3(3)(a), n50. 
57
 Section 3(3)(b), n50. Also see the Security Council draft resolution which was sponsored by the United 
States and UK (UN Doc S/2007/14, 12 January 2007): Operative Para 6 states “Calls on the Government 
of Myanmar to begin without delay a substantive political dialogue, which would lead to a genuine 
democratic transition, to include all political stakeholders…”.  
58Colin Powell, “It’s Time to Turn the Table on Burma’s Thugs”, Wall Street Journal, 12 June 2003: 
notably, this op-ed piece is archived on the website of the US Department of State, available at 
<http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2003/21466.htm>.   
59
 “Statement by the United States representative at Security Council Meeting” (5 October 2007) UN Doc 
S/PV.5753, at 12.  
60
 “Remarks to the media by Singapore Foreign Minister George Yeo following the AMM retreat” (11 
April 2005), access available at   
<https://www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/overseasmission/manila/press_statements_speeches/press_rele
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Myanmar did forgo its chairmanship, to which the AMM replied as follows:61  
 
We have been informed by our colleague, Foreign Minister U Nyan Win of Myanmar that the Government 
of Myanmar had decided to relinquish its turn to be the Chair of ASEAN in 2006 because it would want 
to focus its attention on the ongoing national reconciliation and democratisation process… We also 
express our sincere appreciation to the Government of Myanmar for not allowing its national 
preoccupation to affect ASEAN’s solidarity and cohesiveness. The Government of Myanmar has shown 
its commitment to the well-being of ASEAN and its goal of advancing the interest of all Member 
Countries…62 
 
A year later, in 2006, the AMM again addressed Myanmar’s democratisation process 
and concluded: 
We expressed concern on the pace of the national reconciliation process and hope to see tangible 
progress that would lead to peaceful transition to democracy in the near future. We reiterated our calls 
for the early release of those placed under detention and for effective dialogue with all parties concerned. 
We expressed our support for the constructive role taken by the Chairman of the 39th ASEAN Standing 
Committee and further discussed the outcome of his visit to Myanmar on 23-24 March 2006.63 
 
The nature of ASEAN actions, as an organ, in this 2006 statement bears emphasis. 
This is because the AMM, in fact, agreed a common position on the release of Aung 
San Suu Kyi from her house arrest, expressed through the Chair of the AMM.64 
Finally, the ASEAN Summit justified ASEAN had to act this way towards a member 
State because “we agreed on the need to preserve ASEAN’s credibility as an effective 
regional organization by demonstrating a capacity to manage important issues within 
the region”.65  
 
Though the obligations of the ASEAN Charter were not yet in force, Myanmar had 
already acceded to, on its admission as an ASEAN member State on 23 July 1997, 
“all ASEAN Declarations, Treaties (i.e., including the TAC) and Agreements”.66 The 
AMM particularly “noted” Myanmar’s accession to the TAC two years before its 
admission.67  
 
Returning to the AMM’s 2006 statement, therefore, ASEAN “credibility as an effective 
regional organization” was being undermined by Myanmar for failing to adhere to the 
fundamental aim of maintaining regional peace and security in the TAC and Bangkok 
                                                            
61
 Its first chairmanship would be a decade later in 2016.   
62
 “Statement by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Vientiane” (26 July 2005).   
63
 Para 79, “Joint Communique of the 39th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting” (25 July 2006). Emphasis 
supplied.  
64
 Ibid, paras 79-80.  
65
 “Chairperson’s Statement of the 12th ASEAN Summit H.E. the President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo: 
“One Caring and Sharing Community”” (13 January 2007).  
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  See second preambular paragraph of the 1997 Declaration on the Admission of the Union of Myanmar 
into the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, available at <https://cil.nus.edu.sg/database/single-
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67
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Declaration (1967),68 to which Myanmar had agreed in 1997. The reason is because 
the United States had become involved in shaping how ASEAN should conduct its 
external relations because of Myanmar’s lack of democratisation and protection of 
human rights,69 of which both can be appraised in legal terms at general international 
law.  
 
As an example, observe the unilateral but public statements which were made by 
senior members of the United States government, although the United States did not 
formally express a public position to ASEAN within the venue of international 
organisations. The Secretary of State Colin Powell said that “we also speak out 
frequently and strongly in favor of the National League of Democracy, and against 
the SPDC. I will press the case in Cambodia next week when I meet with the leaders 
of Southeast Asia, despite their traditional reticence to confront a member and 
neighbor of their association, known as Asean”.70 
 
Since ASEAN now conducts external relations with other international legal persons, 
this common cause of being a “primary driving force”71 in the regional peace and 
security of Southeast Asia suggests that the legal space that is left to determine non-
intervention’s regional content with an ASEAN character, then, has diminished in 
terms of its stringency as an obligation, as the next part shows.  
3) The AMM Expresses “Revulsion” Against Myanmar  
 
This part builds on the core proposition by demonstrating the changes to the regional 
content as to non-intervention, under the influence of general international law, with 
respect to democratic governance. In August 2007, mass protests across Myanmar 
erupted. This was a reaction to the sudden removal of fuel subsidies that affected the 
cost of living.72 Because of the government’s aggressive response, the “saffron 
revolution” (led by monks) erupted briefly.73 There were reports of automatic weapons 
being used against the demonstrators.74 A military presence encircled the 
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 I.e., Second Declaration (2) to promote regional peace and security through respect for the UN 
Charter, n49. 
69
 See statements by Secretaries of State Colin Powell in Wall Street Journal, “Get Tough on Rangoon”, 
12 June 2003, reproduced in Congressional Record Volume 149, Number 86, available at 
<https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2003-06-12/html/CREC-2003-06-12-pt1-PgS7823-2.htm>.  
70
 Ibid.  
71
 See discussion in Part (3) below.  
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“Burma Leaders Double Fuel Prices”, BBC News (15 August 2007), available at 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6947251.stm>.  
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 Haacke, n22 at 151 and 156.  
74
 “Statement by ASEAN Chair, Singapore's Minister for Foreign Affairs George Yeo in New York, 27 
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monasteries and streets across cities.75 Hence, on 27 September 2007, the AMM 
agreed a remarkable statement in its joint communique which said that it “expressed 
their revulsion to Myanmar Foreign Minister Nyan Win over reports that the 
demonstrations in Myanmar are being suppressed by violent force and that there has 
been a number of fatalities”.76  Alluding once more to the consequences of Myanmar’s 
ASEAN membership, the AMM added that “the developments in Myanmar had a 
serious impact on the reputation and credibility of ASEAN.77 
 
Since the Cold War ended, ASEAN had long claimed its role as a “primary driving 
force” of regional peace and security.78 By 2003, the ASEAN Summit approved closer 
cooperation by member States through an ASEAN Political and Security Community. 
Its purpose is to be “open and outward looking” in its engagement of dialogue 
partners.79 The ASEAN Charter codified these goals of conducting external relations 
in treaty form.80  
 
It is against this background that ASEAN’s statements in 200681 and 200782 can be 
read as acts of regional law-making regarding non-intervention’s content, which 
involve States from a geographical area who share common causes in maintaining 
its regional peace and security. Accordingly, because the domestic governance of 
Myanmar, an ASEAN member State, appears to fall below the general rules of 
international law, i.e., by denying Aung San Suu Kyi her political participation in 
elections, this affects ASEAN’s effective conduct of external relations with other legal 
persons, especially the United States. As a Great Power, the tacit acknowledgment 
by the United States of ASEAN’s “centrality” in the regional peace and security of 
Southeast Asia is indispensable. This is evidenced by the United States’ accession 
to the TAC, which signified its endorsement of ASEAN’s role in creating a code of 
conduct in Southeast Asia.83  
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 See n59 at p 13.  
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 See n74.  
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 See n74.  
78
 Para 4, “ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), A Concept Paper” (1995): the ARF is an annual multilateral 
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 I.e., “Joint Communique of the 39th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting” (25 July 2006)(n63).   
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 I.e., “Statement by ASEAN Chair, Singapore's Minister for Foreign Affairs George Yeo in New York, 
27 September 2007” (n74).   
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Compared with the ASEAN organs’ practice with respect to the murderous past of the 
Khmer Rouge government during the Kampuchean conflict, it would appear that the 
content of non-intervention in a regional context had waned by this point. Previously, 
non-intervention’s content concerned the prioritisation of condemnation and non-
recognition of Vietnam’s occupation, even if that meant the support of a murderous 
regime as the Kampuchean government. In other words, the vague content of non-
intervention, both descriptively and evaluatively, must be reappraised in the light of 
ASEAN’s new common causes (which engage the general rules of international law) 
in contrast to the Kamphucean conflict. This part, therefore, supports the core 
proposition by showing the dynamic tension in the relationship between general and 
regional international law, and how regional non-intervention gradually loses its fairly 
precise rule to govern its “internal affairs”. 
 
To conclude this part, three points bear stressing. First, from the Depayin incident, to 
Myanmar’s forfeiture of its ASEAN chairmanship, and finally the AMM’s expression 
of “revulsion”, the ASEAN organs were acting in a separate capacity at international 
law from its member States. Second, then, ASEAN member States had agreed and 
acquiesced to the capacity of ASEAN organs at senior levels to act this way. Third, 
therefore, the statements by the ASEAN organs in relation to Myanmar are regional 
law-making and form an established practice,84 in relation to non-intervention’s 
content in Articles 2(c) and 10, TAC. In this respect, the ASEAN organs’ established 
practice against Myanmar points to changes (i.e., diminutions) in non-intervention’s 
content as a code of conduct between member States.85 The next section develops 
this proposition by examining ASEAN’s practice during cyclone Nargis.  
IV. Cyclone Nargis: The Regional Character of & Law-Making by ASEAN Organs   
1) Purpose  
 
This section furthers the core proposition by analysing the distinctly regional acts of 
ASEAN organs, with respect to its regional disaster management. It highlights specific 
developments, i.e., the regional acts of various ASEAN organs, accorded significance 
by general international law. In short, the general rules of international law (on treaties 
                                                            
84
 I.e., a body of practice which forms an integral aspect of that international organisation’s rules: see 
Para 25, ILC, “Draft articles on the law of treaties between States and international organizations or 
between international organizations with commentaries” (1982) Vol II, ILC Yearbook Part Two at 21; 
endorsed by ICJ in para 22, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa 
in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (Advisory Opinion) 
[1971] ICJ Rep 16.  
85
 See further Chapter Four, Section III.   
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and international responsibility) permit our identification of these specific 
developments as distinctively regional acts. The regional content of non-intervention 
is embodied in these specific developments, rules which were designed to reserve 
control and direction exclusively to member States’, as part of their “internal affairs”.  
  
This section, therefore, shows how ASEAN organs act separately from ASEAN 
member States, in creating a regional law of non-intervention under the TAC. The 
State practice of this period is qualitatively different from the Kampuchean practice, 
which I argue marks a change in ASEAN’s practice regarding non-intervention. I start 
with an overview of Cyclone Nargis’s immediate effects on Myanmar that 
necessitated some kind of regional response from ASEAN. Next, I explore the 
practice of the ASEAN Emergency Rapid Assessment Team (ERAT) and Tripartite 
Core Group (TCG), organs which performed functions for ASEAN during Cyclone 
Nargis in 2008. Non-intervention’s content, I argue, is determined through an 
evaluation of ASEAN’s regional practice, an accretion of established practice in 
relation to Myanmar, against ASEAN treaties and general international law.  
2) Cyclone Nargis’s Background 
 
The powerful cyclone Nargis struck and devastated Myanmar on the night of 2 May 
2008. By July, the dead and missing were estimated to be 140,000 people.86 At least 
2.4 million people were affected by this tragedy.87 The Myanmar government 
responded the next morning,88 but the scale of the devastation overwhelmed its 
resources.89 It determined that external assistance would be supplied bilaterally. 
Assistance was only to be channelled, through the government, to the victims.90   
 
The pertinent rules of general international law bear emphasis. The ASEAN Charter 
was signed on 20th November 2007.91 It would enter into force on 15 December 2008, 
after the cyclone struck on 2 May 2008. All member States, including Myanmar, are 
obliged at law not to act in ways which defeat the object and purpose of the Charter, 
                                                            
86
 For the death toll, see “Post Nargis Joint Assessment (Report by Myanmar Government, ASEAN and 
UN)” (July 2008) (2008) UNYB 422, 883 and 1037.  
87
 For a formal account by the ASEAN Secretariat, see Compassion in Action: The Story of the ASEAN-
Led Coordination in Myanmar (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2010) (“Compassion Report”) at 11.  
88
 Para 1, “ASEAN Emergency Rapid Assessment Team Mission Report” (9-18 May 2008), available at 
<http://www.asean.org/uploads/archive/21558.pdf>.   
89
 Ibid. 
90
 See Compassion Report, n87 at 22.  
91
 This treaty entered into force on 15 December 2008, after Cyclone Nargis. For an early view of this 
treaty, see Daniel Seah, “The ASEAN Charter” (2009) 58 ICLQ 197.    
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in accordance with the customary rule92 in Article 18, 1969 Vienna Convention.93 
ASEAN’s actions from 2 May 2008 and the consequences for non-intervention’s 
content, therefore, can be appraised against the legal backdrop of the ASEAN Charter 
being about to come into force.  
 
3) The ASEAN Emergency Rapid Assessment Team (ERAT)  
 
This part advances the core proposition by showing how ASEAN’s law-making 
actions during Cyclone Nargis, with respect to Myanmar, are intrusive acts which 
undercut non-intervention’s regional content when we assess them against general 
rules of international law. In this respect, Southeast Asia is a disaster prone region 
and forms 40 percent of the world’s total natural disasters in the last decade.94  After 
the devastating earthquake and tsunami in the Indian Ocean on 26 December 2004,95 
ASEAN member States agreed the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and 
Emergency Response (“AADMER”).96 A technical, operational, and regulatory 
agreement,97 the AADMER was inspired by the Hyogo Declaration (2005)98 and 
prioritises99 disaster risk reduction,100 through “effective mechanisms” to reduce loss 
of life and early warning.101  
 
Put simply, the AADMER adopts the established cycles of disaster management 
starting from mitigation,102 preparedness,103 and finally response.104 Therefore, the 
treaty’s objective is to provide “effective mechanisms” to address these cycles of 
disaster management.105 The operational (and practical) emphasis of the AADMER 
bears emphasis because it must now be evaluated alongside the ILC’s recent work, 
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 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) (Judgment) [1997] ICJ Rep 7 at 38. See also Para 
14, Anthony Aust, “Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969)”, (2006) MPEPIL.  
93
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 
1155 UNTS 331.  
94
 Debby Guha-Sapir, Femke Vos, Regina Below, and Sylvain Ponserre, Annual Disaster Statistical 
Review 2011 (The Numbers and Trends) at 29, available at <https: 
//cred.be/sites/default/files/2012.07.05.ADSR_2011.pdf>.   
95
 See Hyogo Declaration, n98.  
96
 I.e., ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (n8).  
97
 I.e., ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (n8): see Para 21, 
“Chairman’s Statement of the 11th ASEAN Summit” (12 December 2005); Paras 35 and 36, “Joint 
Communique of the 38th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting” (26 July 2005). 
98
 “Hyogo Declaration and Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015” (18-22 January 2005) UN Doc 
A/COnF.206/6. 
99
 Parts II and III, AADMER (n8). 
100
 Article 6(2), AADMER (n8).  
101
 Article 2, Part IIs and III, AADMER (n8). 
102
 Article 6, AADMER (n8). 
103
 Articles 7-9, AADMER (n8). 
104
 Articles 10-16, AADMER (n8). 
105
 Article 2, AADMER (n8). 
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which as I explain below is an (unwelcome) candidate for progressive development 
of international rules regarding disaster management. Accordingly, the overarching 
principles of the AADMER are as follows: respect for the treaty parties’ “sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and national unity” in accordance with the TAC; 106 affected State 
who requests assistance has “overall direction, control, co-ordination and 
supervision”.107  
 
The AADMER does not use the language of “duties”, a term which the ILC had 
introduced into its work on disaster management, which I discuss below.108 Instead 
the AADMER clearly uses the term “general obligations”109 which are binding but 
expressly confined to the following: cooperation during the three cycles of disaster 
management, which includes agreeing to standby arrangements for disaster relief 
and emergency response; immediate response by the affected State to a disaster 
within its territories; parties of AADMER are to respond promptly to a request for 
assistance from an affected State.  
 
In other words, because the AADMER is an agreement in treaty form between 
ASEAN member States regarding these areas of cooperation, disaster management 
is not just a sovereign matter for an ASEAN member States. Disaster management 
is not exclusively an “internal” matter for an affected ASEAN member State, in relation 
how it treats its victims during a disaster situation.  
 
Be that as it may, the words “human rights” also did not appear in the text of the 
AADMER. Indeed, Article 3(1) of AADMER alludes to the code of conduct, i.e., non-
intervention, and affirms the TAC’s relevance, as follows: “the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and national unity of the Parties shall be respected, in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast 
Asia, in the implementation of this Agreement.”   
 
As I explain in the next section, the AADMER’s content in this respect must now be 
evaluated against general rules of international law on human rights. For now, and 
returning to the matter of cyclone Nargis, I draw attention to the actions of the ASEAN 
organs. First, the ASEAN Secretariat was quick to offer assistance after the cyclone 
struck Myanmar. On 9 May 2008, the ASEAN Secretary-General wrote to relevant 
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 Article 3(1), AADMER (n8). 
107
 Article 3(2), AADMER (n8). 
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 See Chapter Five, Section V.   
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Myanmar ministers requesting “quick admission of the ASEAN relief and rescue 
teams to assist in Myanmar’s ongoing relief efforts”.110 He conveyed a similar 
message by inviting Myanmar’s head of mission in Jakarta to the ASEAN 
Secretariat.111   
 
That same day, the Myanmar Government apparently requested that the ASEAN 
Secretary-General send an ERAT to assess the nature of the damage inside 
Myanmar.112 With some subtlety, the Secretary-General said that “we have worked 
24/7 to raise a level of trust and to allow our rapid assessment team in. We are trying 
to get around a lot of suspicion and sensitivities and mistrust.”113  
Only the ERAT was allowed access to the severely afflicted Delta region in Myanmar 
from 9-18 May 2009.114 Although the ERAT’s establishment was not fully operational 
when the cyclone struck, ERAT had only participated in simulations115 and, in this 
context, it comprised firefighting and medical teams, as well as experts on hazardous 
materials from Brunei, Cambodia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore.  
Practically, ERAT basis as part of AADMER’s “regional standby arrangements”116 
was contained in a non-binding document called “Regional Standby Arrangements 
and Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Operations.”117 
In short, the legal basis for ASEAN’s preparedness for disasters, i.e., its regional 
“standby arrangements”, is rooted in Article 8(2) of the AADMER.118 Hence it was 
                                                            
110
 ASEAN Secretariat Press Release, “ASEAN Stands Ready to Help the Affected Population in 
Myanmar in Response to Cyclone Nargis”, available at <http://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/asean-
stands-ready-help-affected-population-myanmar-response-cyclone-nargis>.   
111
 Ibid.  
112
 Media Release ASEAN forms Emergency Rapid Assessment Team for Myanmar, ASEAN 
Secretariat, 13 May 2008: “The team is being assembled by the ASEAN Secretariat in coordination with 
the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM) and the Government of Myanmar”, available 
at http://asean.org/media-release-asean-forms-emergency-rapid-assessment-team-for-myanmar/ 
(emphasis supplied)  
113
 ASEAN Secretariat Media Release, “ASEAN to lead International Coalition of Mercy for Myanmar, 
Secretary General of ASEAN Surin Pitsuwan to meet World Bank President Robert Zoellick in 
Washington DC” (13 May 2008), access available at <http://asean.org/media-release-asean-to-lead-
international-coalition-of-mercy-for-myanmar-secretary-general-of-asean-surin-pitsuwan-to-meet-
world-bank-president-robert-zoellick-in-washington-dc/>. 
114
 See n87 at 35. 
115
 Announcement by the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM), “ASEAN’s Regional 
Emergency Response and Humanitarian Assistance Capacities Put to the Test in Simulated Typhoon 
Disaster Scenario” (22 August 2008).  
116
 Article 8(2)(a), AADMER (n8). 
117
 Para 27, “Standard Operating Procedure for Regional Standby Arrangements and Coordination of 
Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Operations” (March 2008). 
118
 Articles 8(2), AADMER (n8): “The Parties shall, as appropriate, prepare Standard Operating 
Procedures for regional co-operation and national action required under this Agreement including the 
following: a. regional standby arrangements for disaster relief and emergency response...” 
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against this background that, when cyclone Nargis struck and the Myanmar 
government requested an assessment team from ASEAN, ERAT had already existed.  
Pertinently, the ASEAN organs acknowledged the ERAT’s functions during a 
disaster,119 through the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management 
(“Committee”)120 and the AMM.121 Particularly, the Committee’s competence to 
produce the standard operating procedures is based on the AADMER, which justifies 
the ERAT’s actions on grounds of  facilitating an effective joint response during a 
disaster.122 
Legal rules, though being progressively developed, at general international law also 
form a basis to evaluate the legality of the ERAT. Under Article 6(1), ARIO, the 
conduct of an organ or agent, in the performance of a function can be considered an 
act of that international organisation.123 In this respect, the ASEAN Secretariat 
recognised the ERAT as including “experts with specific knowledge in coordination 
and liaison, water and sanitation, health, logistics and food”.124 
 
Therefore, there is arguably an organic link between ASEAN and the acts of ERAT 
members.  ERAT members were acting as “agents”125 who performed ASEAN acts 
on the international plane.126 An agent is any person or entity, other than an organ, 
which helps an international organisation to carry out its functions.127 Through 
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 “11th Meeting of the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management” (March 2008).  
120
 Under Annex 1 of the ASEAN Charter, this Committee is an ASEAN Sectorial Ministerial Body, which 
in turn is provided for in Article 10 of the Charter.  
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 Para 34, “Joint Communique of the 41st ASEAN Ministerial Meeting” (21 July 2008): “We also looked 
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 Article 8(2), AADMER:” The Parties shall, as appropriate, prepare Standard Operating Procedures 
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 See Chapter Two, Section III, Part 4.  
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 See ICJ in Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations [1949] ICJ Rep 174 
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 Article 2(d), ARIO. For clarity, I am not referring to the distinct issue of an international organisation 
acting as an agent for a member State. In this specific and rare sense, the consent of the State (as 
principal) must be unequivocal: see Dan Sarooshi, International Organization and Their Exercise of 
Sovereign Powers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), especially Chapter 4. See also Reparation, 
n125 at 177. 
127
 Article 6(1), ARIO (see n125): see further Para 2, “ASEAN Emergency Rapid Assessment Team 
Mission Report” (9-18 May 2008) (“ERAT Report”) at 1: “In line with the provisions under the AADMER 
(i.e., ASEAN Treaty, n7), the ACDM (i.e., Committee, n120) organised, constituted and deployed for the 
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adoption of conduct by ERAT, ASEAN organs, namely the ASEAN Summit,128 
Secretary-General,129 and Committee130 have also endorsed the ERAT’s actions and 
functions in non-binding instruments.131 Instructively, after Cyclone Nargis, technical 
reports which involved ERAT’s participation were prepared based on the AADMER,132 
a development which was acknowledged by the AMM in its joint communiques.133 
ASEAN, therefore, served as a venue to permit more intrusive acts which undercut 
non-intervention’s content in the months after Cyclone Nargis, as the next part 
explains.  
4) The ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting of 19 May 2008134 
 
This part supports the core proposition by showing the dynamic tension between 
regional and general international law, and how the general rules strongly influence 
changes to extant regional law regarding non-intervention. After the devastation of 
Cyclone Nargis, there was an urgent need to coordinate humanitarian issues. There 
                                                            
words raise issues of effective control that concerns the international responsibility of ASEAN: this matter 
is beyond the scope of this chapter.   
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Jurisdiction: Understanding ASEAN's Role in Myanmar's Disaster, Cyclone Nargis” (2008) 5 Asian 
Journal of International Law 55 at 81-82. See also: “ACDM Joint Statement on the Occasion of the 4th 
Ministerial Conference for Disaster Risk Reduction” (25-28 October 2010) at para 6;  “Chairman’s 
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on Disaster Management” (16 December 2015) at para 3.  
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 See “ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) (Work 
Programme for 2010 – 2015)” at 48 and 119; “Strategy and Priorities for AADMER Programme Phase 2 
(2013-2015)” at 7 and 39; “AADMER Work Programme (2016-2020)” at 107 and 123. 
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 For high-level acknowledgement of the work programmes (ibid), see Para 42, “Joint Communiqué of 
the 43rd ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting” (19-20 July 2010); Para 43, “Joint Communiqué of the 46th 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting” (29-30 June 2013); Para 70, “Joint Communiqué of the 49th ASEAN 
Foreign Ministers Meeting” (24 July 2016).  
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were problems related to clean water, shelter, and well-being of the Myanmar 
populace.135 Furthermore, as explained already, recall that ASEAN’s conduct of 
external relations had already faced challenges because of Myanmar’s domestic 
governance. Myanmar’s slow reception of international assistance in the aftermath of 
the cyclone further tested ASEAN’s claims of playing a central role in maintaining 
regional peace and security,136 which included humanitarian assistance.137 It is 
against this context that the ASEAN Foreign Ministers met for a special session on 
19 May 2008: 
 
The Foreign Ministers have agreed to establish an ASEAN-led coordinating mechanism…this 
mechanism will facilitate the effective distribution and utilisation of assistance from the international 
community, including the expeditious and effective deployment of relief workers, especially health and 
medical personnel. International assistance to Myanmar, given through ASEAN, should not be 
politicised. On that basis, Myanmar will accept international assistance. 
To this end, the Ministers agreed to establish a Task Force, to be headed by ASEAN Secretary-General 
Surin Pitsuwan, which will work closely with the UN as well as a central coordinating body to be set up 
by Myanmar, to realise this ASEAN-led mechanism. The meeting agreed that this ASEAN-led approach 
was the best way forward.138 
On 21 July 2008, the ASEAN Chair added that “ASEAN’s response to Cyclone Nargis 
demonstrated ASEAN’s unity, and showed that ASEAN member countries 
recognised the responsibilities and obligations of membership.139 Both statements of 
19 and 20 May 2008 can be appraised against Articles 2(c) and 10, TAC (1976), a 
code of conduct for intramural relations, and the AADMER (2006). Because Myanmar 
had already ratified the AADMER on 7 November 2006 before cyclone Nargis,140 it 
was obliged not to undermine the object and purpose of the AADMER, which is 
consistent with the general rules of international law.141 Hence specific actions, by 
ASEAN organs, inside Myanmar’s sovereign territory are legally permitted without 
threatening its political stability.142 This is why, on 19 May 2008, the ASEAN Foreign 
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 See Paras 3-9, ERAT Report (n127).  
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 Article 41, ASEAN Charter. 
137
 For diplomatic reaction by various States against Myanmar, see Daniel Seah, “The Treaty of Amity 
and Cooperation in Southeast Asia: The Issue of Non-Intervention and its Accession by Australia and 
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 “Chairman's Statement of the Special ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting” (19 May 2008) (emphasis 
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Ministers Meeting agreed as an organ to create an “ASEAN-led mechanism” to allow 
access into Myanmar for relief purposes.143  
In short, non-intervention’s content has changed. This point is evident when we 
consider the obligations of membership on Myanmar,144 a member State,145 to ensure 
that ASEAN can conduct its external relations, according to the ASEAN Charter, as 
a “primary driving force in regional arrangements that it initiates and maintains its 
centrality in regional cooperation”.146 What was protected by non-intervention during 
the Kampuchean conflict (i.e., disregard for the type of government that the Khmer 
Rouge were) no longer obtains in the 21st century, as a code of conduct, with respect 
to Myanmar.  
 
Indeed, to this extent, ASEAN, through the ASEAN Chair in 2009, sponsored a 
General Assembly resolution on cooperation between the UN and ASEAN, and 
expressly drew attention to the acts of ASEAN organs during cyclone Nargis.147 When 
assessed against general international law, i.e., the ICJ’s claims in Nicaragua that 
coercion is a condition of applying non-intervention,148 it is therefore arguable that the 
acts by ASEAN organs inside Myanmar are legally permissible. Non-intervention did 
not apply because the acts of ASEAN organs are not legally coercive. The law-making 
acts of ASEAN organs regarding non-intervention’s content are evident in their 
creation of a unique “ASEAN-led” mechanism, the Tripartite Core Group (TCG), to 
which we turn.   
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 See n138.  
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5) The TCG as a Regional and “ASEAN-led” Mechanism  
 
This part advances the core proposition by demonstrating how general international 
law gives a basis for identifying separate acts of ASEAN organs qua ASEAN, which 
in turn shapes the regional content of ASEAN’s disaster management with 
consequences for the regional content of non-intervention with an ASEAN character.  
In this respect, we consider the TCG which was an innovative mechanism.149 It was 
established as an outcome of the Foreign Ministers Meeting of 19 May 2008,150 in 
which Myanmar agreed to accept international assistance through an “ASEAN-led 
mechanism”. The TCG was based in Yangon and contained nine members.151 It 
expressed its functions with respect to international assistance within Myanmar as 
“an ASEAN-led mechanism to facilitate trust, confidence and cooperation between 
Myanmar and the international community in the urgent humanitarian relief and 
recovery work after Cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar”.152 
 
The TCG was chaired by the Myanmar government, which contained three 
representatives.153 It retained primary role in control and coordination of the 
international assistance. The UN had three representatives.154 The remaining three 
members were representatives from the ASEAN Committee of Permanent 
Representative (i.e., ambassadorial rank) and ASEAN Secretariat.155 On 21 July 
2008, the ASEAN Chair endorsed the TCG as follows: “While not perfect, the ASEAN-
led tripartite process bridged the gap of trust between the Myanmar authorities and 
the international community to facilitate the flow of emergency aid to the disaster 
victims. Only the international community had the capacity to address the effects of 
                                                            
149
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150
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151
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Cyclone Nargis, and ASEAN welcomed Myanmar’s willingness to continue with the 
tripartite cooperation”.156 
 
The AMM’s statement was instructive in terms of defining ASEAN’s role in the relief 
effort. It served as a venue to facilitate delivery of aid from a range of non-State actors. 
At some risk of simplification, the TCG broadly existed to assure the Myanmar 
government that any politicisation of relief by other actors in relation to 
democratisation would be “deflected” by ASEAN.157  
 
Particularly, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting explicitly stated that an “ASEAN-
led mechanism” was part of the “responsibilities and obligations of membership”.158 
Put another way, the TCG’s conduct is in accordance with the specific functions being 
given to it, which are accordingly acts of ASEAN on the international plane.  For these 
reasons, under Article 6(1) ARIO, the three ASEAN representatives in the TCG were 
effectively agents for ASEAN.159  
 
The role of ASEAN, through the TCG in this case, was to serve as a venue on which 
we appraise non-intervention’s character with an ASEAN character. One example of 
this is apparent in the TCG’s practice of issuing visas in 2008.  In its first press release, 
the TCG said that “visas for UN and foreign aid workers would be given and their 
access to cyclone-affected areas would be allowed. Requests for visas, visa 
                                                            
156
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ASEAN Summit, consultation will prevail, generally see Walter Woon, The ASEAN Charter: A 
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extensions and permits to travel are now channeled through the TCG for rapid 
facilitation”.160 
 
Articles 2 and 10, TAC protect a State’s “sovereignty”. This is a “catch-all” term to 
underscore a State’s legal internal competence to govern generally on its own terms, 
which is independent of another State’s particular consent.161 Hence the issuing of 
visas by the Myanmar government for non-citizens, to enter Myanmar’s territory, is a 
paradigmatic exercise of (sovereign) competence.  
 
In this respect, it is reasonable to conclude that this competence is delegated by the 
Myanmar Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the TCG. Before cyclone Nargis, under the 
Myanmar government’s settled practice, an assisting actor162 had to request visas 
from a line ministry, with whom it had signed a MOU.163 The line ministry would 
process and submit the applications to the Foreign Affairs Policy Committee, which 
makes the final decision.164  
 
However, from 9-30 June 2008, the TCG took over this function. It issued 249 visa-
related documents to a range of assisting actors.165  This expedited the assisting 
actors’ access to the severely affected Delta area.166 From the standpoint of general 
international law, the TCG’s legal competence to issue visas is arguably grounded in 
treaty form under Article 14(b), AADMER, which states a receiving party (Myanmar) 
shall “facilitate the entry into, stay in and departure from its territory of personnel and 
of equipment, facilities and materials involved or used in the assistance.”167 
 
Under Article 16(2), AADMER,168 it was agreed that the ASEAN Coordinating Centre 
for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA Centre) would play a supporting role.169 Instead 
the TCG assumed its competences, an outcome of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ 
                                                            
160
 See PONJA Report (n151).  
161
 James Crawford, Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law (8th ed) (Oxford: OUP, 2012) at 
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Meeting of 19 May 2008.170 Because the TCG’s practice during Cyclone Nargis was 
successful, the AHA Centre’s functions were elaborated anew, in a new treaty: the 
AHA Centre Treaty.171 Therefore, this encrusting of functions onto the AHA Centre, 
after cyclone Nargis, was expressly agreed by ASEAN member States in treaty 
form.172 It is arguably a subsequent practice in the application of the AADMER. 
Particularly, the AHA Centre Treaty is an instance of a subsequent agreement173 of 
the AADMER.174  
 
Based on the experience of cyclone Nargis, ASEAN organs began to focus on the 
operational aspects of disaster management:  risk assessment, prevention, 
preparedness and recovery.175 On 6 September 2016, the ASEAN Summit agreed in 
a non-binding instrument to “achieve faster response, mobilise greater resources and 
establish stronger coordination to ensure ASEAN’s collective response.176  
 
These are acts by ASEAN organs on the international plane. The law of treaties, the 
legal rules on agents and organs, permit a legal conclusion that there is a regional 
character to ASEAN’s law-making of disaster management. Common goals that 
affected the geographical region of Southeast Asia were identified by the ASEAN 
Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in its joint communique of July 2008 as follows: 
“Recognising Southeast Asia as one of the most natural disaster prone regions, we 
reaffirmed our commitment to intensify our cooperation as well as with other countries 
and international organisations in the areas of disaster relief and management.177  
 
Because of the ASEAN organs’ consistent actions during cyclone Nargis, the ASEAN 
Summit confirmed at the highest level that the AADMER reflects a coherent, regional 
approach that is “the main regional policy backbone and common platform for 
cooperation for implementation of the One ASEAN, One Response”.178 
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In this respect, since 2002, the ASEAN Chair has sponsored biannual General 
Assembly resolutions on cooperation between ASEAN and the UN.179 From 2008, 
these resolutions included matters related to disaster management.180 Through these 
resolutions, ASEAN is committed to a “timely and effectively response” in “global 
issues of mutual concern”.181 In 2012, the same commitment became an operative 
paragraph in General Assembly Resolution 67/110.182 By 2014, General Assembly 
Resolution 69/110 repeated this commitment but acknowledged the enhanced role of 
the AHA Centre.183  
 
Consequently, the ASEAN practice during cyclone Nargis presents, I argue, indicates 
that the regional practice regarding non-intervention’s content in the TAC has waned. 
There remains the prospect that, despite the waning of non-intervention’s regional 
content based on the TAC, a general custom of non-intervention still applies to 
ASEAN with a more stringent obligation. I address this prospect in the next section.  
 
Returning, then, to the waning of non-intervention’s content based on the TAC, its 
diminished stringency, as an obligation, indicates the narrowing of the internal affairs 
(i.e., the domestic jurisdiction) of an ASEAN member State which is protected by the 
non-intervention rule. This dimunition is a legal assessment based on the evaluative 
vagueness of non-intervention’s content as a code of conduct, embodied in Articles 
2(c) and 10, TAC: because ASEAN intends to conduct external relations on the 
international plane which involve “global issues of mutual concern” in disaster 
management,184 so the general rules at international law shapes the dimunition of 
non-intervention’s regional content. Put simply, in its conduct of external relations with 
Myanmar, the ASEAN organs created a regional content of non-intervention. This 
point is demonstrated in the ILC’s recent work, which will likely shape the regional 
practice of ASEAN and the consequences for non-intervention’s content. We consider 
this development in the next section.  
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V. Protecting Persons in the Event of Disasters: The ILC’s Liberal-Meliorism.  
1) Human Rights Approach   
 
This section builds on the previous section by contributing to the core proposition in 
two ways. First, it shows how (despite the broadly operational focus of disaster 
management, as agreed by ASEAN, which encapsulates a regional content of non-
intervention) general international law, through human rights law and the progressive 
functions of the ILC, increasingly influence ASEAN’s own disaster management laws. 
Second, the regional quality is gradually eroded by the general rules of international 
law. The outcome is that non-intervention’s content also changes and weakens.  
 
In 2001, before his appointment to the ILC, Martti Koskenniemi visited the UN 
agencies in Geneva. He asked his UN interlocutors what the ILC could do for their 
respective fields.185 Their reply to Koskenniemi was expressed with characteristic 
bonhomie but the message was clear: do nothing.186 The ILC should “keep out of this 
field, please”.187 This anecdote has a particular salience in the ILC’s work on the 
protection of persons,188 which aims to facilitate an “adequate and effective” response 
to meeting the essential needs of a person.189  To appreciate how far the ILC had 
pushed the emerging general rules of disaster management at international law, this 
part starts by explaining how a rights-based approach pervades its draft articles.  
 
In general, the field of international disaster management has been addressed by 
“bottom up” approaches.190 The focus is technical and operational. It includes disaster 
risk reduction, or early warning systems at the national levels.191 By comparison, the 
ILC’s work shifts the focus of disaster management to a rights-based approach, a 
point which I explain further below.192 From the start, the ILC was resolved to produce 
an outcome that was different. It did not want to duplicate the operational work of 
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international disaster management and did not want to tweak existing instruments.193 
It is the ILC’s function to codify and progressively develop international law in this 
area,194 although its work on disaster management is largely based on progressive 
development.  
 
Generally, the ILC’s work regarding disaster management contains the following 
elements:195 concrete guidelines on immunities and protection of relief personnel; 
human rights guidelines based on “dignity”, “humanity”, and “neutrality” (whatever 
these mean); an affected State’s “duty” to request assistance; an affected State’s 
consent to receive assistance.  
  
The “duty” and “consent” of an affected State is contained within a potentially wide 
human rights approach, which I shortly explain. To facilitate this explanation, it is 
useful to indicate the ILC’s approach as to an affected States’ duty and consent during 
disasters.196 According to the ILC, an affected State: is under a positive, proactive 
duty to seek external assistance197 but only for a “calamitous” event; 198 is encouraged 
to seek external assistance for disaster situations of a lesser magnitude; 199 shall give 
consent before external assistance can be provided;200 as to protection of persons 
and provisions of assistance, both matters are “under its (affected State) jurisdiction 
and control”;201 shall not withhold consent for external assistance “arbitrarily”;202  
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“may” place conditions on the provision of external assistance, but “in accordance 
with the present draft articles”, and taking into account the “identified needs” of 
persons affected by disasters and the “quality” of the assistance.203  
The ILC’s “two steps forward, one step backwards” approach regarding duties and 
consent must be understood against its insistence on a human rights approach in 
disaster management. On the one hand, the ILC clarified that its work is not a 
specialised human rights instrument. Instead the human rights language in Draft 
Article 5 reflects the victim’s “broad entitlement” to human rights protection, and 
serves as a “reminder” to States as to their compliance with human rights obligations 
during the pre-disaster and disaster phases.204 
On the other hand, the ILC tells us that this vagueness is intentional because its 
enforcement is subject to discretion, the relevant rules in question, and the 
“limitations” of international human rights law.205 For these reasons, then, the ILC’s 
commentaries on the core elements of its human rights approach are extraordinary 
in its potential ambit because “the reference to “human rights” is, accordingly, to the 
whole of international human rights law, including in particular its treatment of 
derogable and non-derogable rights”.206 
 
A few States endorsed the inclusion of human rights as “principles in informing relief 
operations”.207 Because the ILC’s work is not a separate human rights instrument, the 
Red Cross208 pressed for “specific guidance as to what it meant in practice”.209 In this 
respect, the Commission stated that “the general reference to “human rights” 
encompasses human rights obligations expressed in relevant international 
agreements and those in customary international law”.210  
One example of a human right which the ILC cited was the right to life during a 
disaster situation.211 In response, the United States properly clarified that “the 
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commentary incorrectly refers to the right of life, and specifically to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 6, paragraph 1, as an example of a 
human right applicable in the context of a disaster and in responding to such a 
disaster. That provision prohibits the arbitrary deprivation of life through State action 
and requires protection of that right by law. There is no basis for regarding this 
provision as the source of any international obligation of a State to address the threat 
or jeopardy to life caused by a disaster or calamitous event affecting that State”.212 
 
Furthermore, the ILC also acknowledged the role of “best practices” in “non-binding” 
instruments.213 According to the ILC, examples of these best practices include the 
Inter-Agency Standing Committee Operational Guidelines on the Protection of 
Persons in Situations of Natural Disasters, and the Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement.214 It is unclear why and how these two (non-exhaustive) examples 
came to be determined as “best practices”. Exactly who determines best practices, 
which triggers the recourse to “best practices” in non-binding instruments, during a 
disaster situation is also unclear.  
Also, under the rubric of “humanitarian principles” in Article 6,215 the Special 
Rapporteur introduced three elements with doubtful legal basis, which included 
“response to disasters shall take place in accordance with the principles of humanity, 
neutrality and impartiality”.216 He concluded that these principles were “originally 
found in international humanitarian law and in the fundamental principles of the Red 
Cross, are widely used and accepted in the context of response to disasters”.217 
 
In short, “humanity” is affirmed as a “cornerstone” in protecting persons during 
disasters,218 to which Greece replied it was “hardly measurable in legal terms”.219 
Furthermore, “neutrality” does not bear the legal meaning in an armed conflict 
context.220 The ILC claims that “neutrality” indicates the “apolitical nature of disaster 
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response”,221 an “operational mechanism to advance the ideal of humanity”.222 Finally, 
“impartiality” is a “distributive mechanism”223 that is already contained in the IFRC 
guidelines because (impartiality)224 “requires that responses to disasters be directed 
towards full respect to and fulfilment of the needs of those affected by disasters…that 
gives priority to those who are particularly vulnerable”.225 
 
Therefore, to adapt the words of an ILC member, the Commission is progressively 
developing general legal rules regarding disaster management on the international 
plane, almost out of “thin air”.226 Most importantly, the putative practicalities of the 
ILC’s work on disaster management are doubtful. Consider, in this respect, the 
AADMER’s operational emphasis on preparedness, mitigation, and response. It is 
unclear how those general rules, progressively developed by the ILC, regarding 
duties227 and human rights protection will co-exist alongside the AADMER.228  
VI. The Dimunition of Non-Intervention during a Disaster  
 
Having surveyed this rights-based approach taken by the ILC towards the 
international law regarding disaster relief, we turn to the implications for non-
intervention’s content with an ASEAN character. Therefore, this section contributes 
to the core proposition by suggesting how general international law might potentially 
exert a powerful influence on ASEAN’s distinctive regional law of non-intervention.  
After receiving comments on the legal relevance of non-intervention in disasters 
management from specific States,229 the Special Rapporteur stressed that the 
“overarching principles of sovereignty and non-intervention inform the whole draft”.230 
In the final draft articles of 2016, the commentaries referred to sovereignty and non-
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intervention as “fundamental principles”,231 an assertion which is at variance with the 
language of the draft articles. This is because the ILC’s entire draft contains one 
reference to “sovereignty”. It is contained in the fifth preamble.232 Pertinently, there is 
no express reference to non-intervention in the draft articles itself. The significance of 
non-intervention and sovereignty in the ILC’s work must be interpolated, whether as 
“overarching” or “fundamental” principles.  
Moreover, in contrast, consider the words “dignity”,233 “humanitarian principles”,234 
and “human rights”235, which are frequently used. Indeed, the Special Rapporteur’s 
early treatment of non-intervention, in 2010, offers a more reliable indication of the 
ILC’s final perspective. In 2010, after giving a brief account of the legal basis which 
supports non-intervention, the Special Rapporteur concluded that “the correlating 
principles of sovereignty and non-intervention presuppose a given domestic sphere, 
or a domaine réservé, over which a State may exercise its exclusive authority. This 
sovereign authority remains central to the concept of statehood, but it is by no means 
absolute. When it comes to the life, health and bodily integrity of the individual person, 
areas of law such as international minimum standards, humanitarian law and human 
rights law demonstrate that principles such as sovereignty and non-intervention 
constitute a starting point for the analysis, not a conclusion”.236   
The expression “international minimum standards” involves a claim of universal 
standards that obtain at general international law. As a technical and epistemic venue 
of the UN, the ILC has the ability to advocate in favour of these universal claims. 
Consequently, its work on this subject may exert a catalytic effect in evaluating non-
intervention’s (irrelevant) content (if any at all) during disasters.237 This point is 
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underscored by the statements of various ILC members, who were bemused by non-
intervention’s relevance.238  
According to one member, if the non-intervention principle were applied in a 
“classical”, “outdated” sense,239 then the ILC’s work on protecting persons during 
disasters might suffer from a “dissuasive effect”.240  Another member said that “the 
Commission must adopt a set of draft articles that balanced State sovereignty with 
the international community’s interests, on the basis of respect for human rights. 
Unfortunately, contemporary history showed that not all States responded to natural 
disasters while taking account of the need to protect human rights”.241  
Pertinently, Myanmar’s response during cyclone Nargis was cited as an argument 
against non-intervention because “one had only to compare the recent response of 
the Haitian Government with that of the Government of Myanmar a few years 
earlier…The reaction of Myanmar had been different, even though the situation there 
could be described as exceptional in many respects. There were many evil regimes 
in the world that might find it inconvenient to allow in international emergency 
assistance, as that would oblige them to open their borders to observers from the 
international community”.242  
 
This language of “evil regimes” is not new. During the nineteenth century, there is 
already some approximation to James Lorimer’s “intolerant democracies” during the 
nineteenth century.243 Today, the emphasis is on an “international community”,244 an 
amorphous construct245 which (presumably) self-appraises its own non-evilness.246 In 
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this respect, recall the language of ineptitude and all necessary measures by France, 
the United States, and United Kingdom against the Myanmar government during 
cyclone Nargis in 2008.247 Then there was the language of a responsibility to 
protect,248 against which the regional law-making of non-intervention had to 
appraised. To this extent, therefore, the ILC’s language of duties and human rights 
protection in its draft articles will likely form the context for the international 
community’s appraisal of how “evil” or “uncivilised” an affected State is when (if) it 
falls short of these general rules. There is, therefore, some force in Gerry Simpson’s 
observation that “relations between the civilised and uncivilised are the paradigm 
case in international society”.249 
Returning to non-intervention regarding an affected State during disasters, the ILC’s 
position on non-intervention is idiosyncratic.250 It approved non-intervention as a “core 
principle”, but the Special Rapporteur cited Article 2(7), UN Charter as its legal basis, 
although Article 2(7) is a narrow prohibition which precludes UN’s interference within 
the “domestic jurisdiction” of its member States.251  
Furthermore, the ILC also referenced the Friendly Relations Declaration252 as one of 
“numerous international instruments”253 to support non-intervention’s core status. As 
explained already, non-intervention in the Friendly Relations Declaration is broader 
and more ambiguous than Article 2(7), UN Charter.254 The two are not the same. 
Overall, it is not clear what basis non-intervention could be said to be a core principle 
of the ILC’s work.  
When the ILC adopted a set of draft articles at its first reading in 2014,255 the words 
“non-intervention” were not used at all.256 In contrast, the word “sovereignty” was 
explicitly used in a 2014 draft article:257  
Role of the affected State258 
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1. The affected State, by virtue of its sovereignty, has the duty to ensure the protection of persons and 
provision of disaster relief and assistance on its territory.259 
 
2. The affected State has the primary role in the direction, control, coordination and supervision of such 
relief and   assistance.260 
 
In response, Cuba, Indonesia, Russia, and Malaysia urged the ILC to recognise non-
intervention in the draft articles.261 The Special Rapporteur eventually relented, which 
I shortly explain.262 First, note this response: 
… the Special Rapporteur will not entertain in the present report isolated suggestions for changes to the 
text of draft articles, made in that general context or in the context of concrete draft articles, when they 
are intended to revive a largely superseded debate for the purpose of fundamentally altering the 
Commission’s basic approach; or specific suggestions which, by constant repetition, aim at 
disproportionally tilting in only one direction the delicate balance achieved throughout the draft between 
the paramount principles of sovereignty and non-intervention on the one hand and the no-less-vital 
protection of the individuals affected by a disaster on the other.263 
There is arguably no need for a “delicate balance”.264 An affected State and the 
international assisting actors can share broadly identical goals. Both sides broadly 
want to ameliorate a victim’s condition during a disaster. The ILC’s work could focus 
on strengthening operational supervision or coordination during disasters but it was 
disinclined to do that, possibly on grounds of its mandate to codify and progressively 
develop international law.265 Its position assumes that sometimes an affected State’s 
interests are necessarily different from the international assisting actors.266  
In short, “outsiders” during a disaster self-appraise their non-evilness: the result is 
that their actions are not prohibited by non-intervention.267 These “outsiders” have the 
power to evaluate the victims’ needs, possibly because an affected State cannot (or 
would not) do so. It is reasonable to conclude that this is the underlying basis for the 
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ILC’s determination of its choices, as being delicately balanced,268 because priority 
must be given to a clarity of vision seemingly enjoyed by the “international 
community”. Any other position risks tilting it in a “disproportionate way”.269 It is, in 
other words, the descriptive and evaluative vagueness of non-intervention’s content 
allows its reassessment as to a less stringent obligation, in the light of emerging rules 
at general international law concerning disaster management. 
By defending the “delicate balance” that the ILC had purportedly struck, this 
effectively articulates a difference between the ILC (only interested in advancing the 
individuals’ welfare during disasters) from others who seem unable to advance the 
individuals’ welfare during disasters. However, probably in response to the comments 
of various States who asked for some emphasis on non-intervention, the Special 
Rapporteur did concede a place for non-intervention in the draft articles’ fifth preamble 
in March 2016.270  The proposed wording was as follows: “stressing the fundamental 
principle of the sovereign equality of States and its corollary, the duty not to intervene 
in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any State and, consequently, reaffirming 
the primary role of the affected State in the taking of action related to the provision of 
disaster relief and assistance.271 
The Special Rapporteur’s concession was a brief one. When the ILC Drafting 
Committee adopted the draft articles on second reading in May 2016, it deleted the 
only reference to non-intervention. No explanation was offered. The final fifth 
preamble now states that “stressing the principle of the sovereignty of States and, 
consequently, reaffirming the primary role of the State affected by a disaster in 
providing disaster relief assistance”.272 
 
Thus only “sovereignty” (not “by virtue of sovereignty”) appears in the final version of 
the ILC’s work – in the preamble. Given the twists and turns concerning non-
intervention’s content in disaster management, it is striking that the Drafting 
Committee said that the word “sovereignty” provides the “background” for 
understanding the “entire draft articles”,273 and that its inclusion also “usefully 
contributes to the balance in the draft articles”.274  
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This part, therefore, has explained how the ILC made claims as to the existence of 
universal rules on human rights protection during disasters, which now prospectively 
stand as candidates to become rules of general international law. Against these 
putative general rules of international law, apparently to strike a “delicate balance” 
between an affected State and the victims’ rights, then the stringency as to non-
intervention’s obligation has waned.   
For instance, during cyclone Nargis, it was complicated enough for ASEAN organs to 
make and apply its regional laws of disaster management. Although its prospects are 
unclear,275 this formally non-binding work by the ILC potentially now belongs to the 
body of general rules against which the regional practice of ASEAN must now be 
evaluated. The ILC’s work potentially complicates disaster management and 
diminishes non-intervention’s relevance. 
To cite another example, consider the ILC’s range of legal bases for giving human 
rights law a central role in its articles.276 Of relevance to ASEAN is the ILC’s 
recommendation that the “best practices”277 of human rights should be used. From an 
ASEAN standpoint, the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (ASEAN Declaration, 
2012)278 is a regional “best practice” of human rights protection.279 The ASEAN 
Declaration is not binding. Protection of human rights within this regional framework 
is subject to two vital qualifications. The different political and cultural backgrounds of 
all member states must be considered.280 Furthermore, ASEAN member States bear 
the primary duty to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms.281  
Whether we regard the ASEAN Declaration as an example of “regionalist challenges” 
to universal human rights,282 or whether this instrument’s particularism283 is 
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“sinister”284 and not modern”,285 one ramification bears stressing. Some legal 
determination by the affected State and relevant assisting actors must be made 
during a disaster situation.  
Therefore, it is reasonable to ask whether a legalistic approach that emphasises 
human rights actually misses the point of providing humanitarian relief. Recall 
Myanmar’s unwillingness to accept humanitarian aid at the start of cyclone Nargis. Its 
government wanted to avoid the prospect of external involvement from transforming 
into internal scrutiny of its political governance.286 Recall, too, the TCG’s role in 
facilitating international humanitarian relief.287 The Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (19 May 
2008) delicately managed the “gap of trust” between the Myanmar government and 
international assisting actors through an “ASEAN-led coordinating mechanism”:288 the 
TCG. As explained already, “trust” already has a legal basis which can be evaluated 
against the obligations of ASEAN membership.289  
The ASEAN practice’s focus on operational assistance is centred on helping victims 
during disasters. It was a classic instance of regional law-making that suits its 
geographical area and is firmly supported by common goals of Southeast Asia. The 
most effective assistance is the one that an affected State does not reject. There is 
no need to involve a “human rights” approach, as did the ILC.  
Despite the misgivings as expressed by various States to including human rights into 
the ILC’s draft articles on disaster management, it is arguably a matter of time before 
the human rights rules in disaster management, which now exist as candidates for 
general rules of international law, will have to be taken into account by ASEAN 
organs. This is because, at the highest level, ASEAN Summit’s position regarding 
human rights is as follows: “We resolve to consolidate our Community, building upon 
and deepening the integration process to realise a rules-based, people-oriented, 
people-centred ASEAN Community, where our peoples enjoy human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, higher quality of life and the benefits of community building, 
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reinforcing our sense of togetherness and common identity, guided by the purposes 
and principles of the ASEAN Charter”.290 
 
General rules created by the ILC might, in due course, have consequences for 
ASEAN given its broad endorsement of human rights as a means of furthering 
regional integration. Already, recent non-binding ASEAN instruments acknowledge 
the dignity291 and “basic rights” of persons.292 This account matters because, with 
respect to the emerging rules of human rights law at general internation law and that 
of ASEAN’s non-binding instruments in disaster management which reference human 
rights, it affirms again the influence of general international law. Throughout this 
chapter, I have already explained why (and how), despite the regional making of non-
intervention law by ASEAN organs, the content of non-intervention, as assessed in 
treaty term based on the TAC and against rules of general international law, had 
waned.  
However, despite the waning of non-intervention’s regional content of non-
intervention, there remains the prospect that a customary rule at general international 
law remains, which applies to ASEAN. As explained already in Chapter Three, the 
law of non-intervention at general international law emerged after the ICJ’s judgment 
in Nicaragua.293 Although, in technical terms not a source of international law, the 
court’s judgment is a subsidiary means of identifying binding obligations, and its 
determination as to the customary basis and conceptual limits of non-intervention’s 
content are highly influential. Put another way, the ICJ’s determination is evidence 
that non-intervention at general international law is a customary rule that protects 
against prohibited interventions, which includes as its “essence”294 the element of 
coercion. Although there exists a general customary rule of non-intervention, based 
on Nicaragua, the descriptive and evaluative vagueness of non-intervention’s content 
must be assessed against general international law at a given point in time. 
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Furthermore, the acts in question must be coercive to constitute a prohibited 
intervention, as assessed against general international law at a given point in time, 
before the non-intervention rule is engaged. This is a high threshold to satisfy. 
Therefore, in the context of ASEAN’s various acts against Myanmar, such as the 
forfeiture of its ASEAN Chairmanship and acceptance of the TCG during cyclone 
nargis, for example, these are not regarded by general international law as forming 
Myanmar’s internal affairs (its domestic jurisdiction) anymore. Even if the acts did 
constitute Myanmar’s internal affairs, an assessment which is enabled by the 
descriptive vagueness of non-intervention’s content, its evaluative vagueness must 
be appraised against ASEAN conduct of external relations (and thus membership 
obligations under the ASEAN Charter), as well as emerging rules as to democratic 
governance and human rights at general international law.  
The outcome is that, after evaluating non-intervention’s content against general rules 
of international law, the internal affairs of a State are diminished, and the acts in 
question by ASEAN organs are not sufficiently coercive to form prohibited 
interventions. In other words, although there is a customary rule of non-intervention 
at general international law, which the ICJ in Nicaragua held is based on the broad 
attitude of States, the dynamic tension between general and regional international 
law is evident. Although a customary rule of non-intervention exists at general 
international law, its application to ASEAN is limited because the vagueness of non-
intervention in descriptive and evaluative terms must be appraised against the 
general rules of international law at a given point. For these reasons, the ASEAN 
approach in disaster management is not likely to last.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter’s principal argument is that non-intervention’s content, as a regional 
code of conduct embodied in the TAC, has waned. Through a case study of ASEAN’s 
conduct of external relations in relation to Myanmar’s actions, as an ASEAN member 
State, this chapter advances the core proposition by demonstrating how far regional 
non-intervention is being shaped by the encroaching influence of general rules at 
international law.  To this extent, I evaluated the acts of ASEAN organs, in the 2000s, 
with respect to Myanmar in two broad aspects. These acts involved a chain of 
developments at general international law which covered functional concerns on the 
international plane: democratic governance and human rights protection in disaster 
management.  
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First, in relation to democratic governance, I argued that non-intervention’s content 
had already changed since the Kampuchean conflict, given the impact of the regional 
law-making activities by ASEAN organs. The clearest departure was the AMM’s 
request to the Myanmar government that Aung San Suu Kyi and her party be allowed 
participation in the democratisation of Myanmar. This express involvement, 
regardless of its unsuccessful outcome in diplomatic and political terms, by an ASEAN 
organ into an internal matter of Myanmar’s governance sharply contrasted with the 
Kampuchean conflict, which upheld a more exacting regional content of non-
intervention in favour of the Khmer Rouge government.  
 
Second, the Nargis practice was examined to advance two arguments. On the one 
hand, it underscored again the regional law-making of ASEAN organs, in the area of 
disaster management. Here non-intervention’s content waned in relation to actions 
taken by ASEAN organs, on operational aspects of disaster management. On the 
other hand, and importantly for the core proposition, the Nargis practice provides an 
example of how general international law contains evolving rules on human rights 
protection which may, as created through the ILC as a venue, potentially weaken 
what is left of the regional law of non-intervention with an ASEAN character.    
 
Accordingly, this chapter reinforces the core proposition of this study by illustrating 
the dynamic tension between the relationship of general and regional international 
law. The evolving nature of non-intervention’s regional content with an ASEAN 
character, is shaped by international organisations (such as ASEAN and the ILC) as 
venues for law-making, and is always evaluated against general international law at 
a given point in time.  
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Chapter Six  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
I. Recapitulation 
  
The core proposition in this study is that ASEAN’s non-intervention practice is a 
distinctive, regional law which is made possible by general international law, but its 
scope as regional law is also constrained by general international law. It is, in this 
sense, that general and regional international law share a relationship of dynamic 
tension. In this concluding chapter, I make observations regarding this proposition’s 
implications for the prospects of non-intervention with an ASEAN character.  
  
However, it is useful to recapitulate how the arguments in each chapter contributed 
to this study’s core proposition. Chapter One identified a key problem with the current 
studies of non-intervention that concern ASEAN. There are many International 
Relations (IR) literature concerning non-intervention by ASEAN States. But these 
were not studies of acts with an ASEAN character, i.e., an international organisation 
with a separate legal personality. As a separate legal person, ASEAN’s practice 
(through its organs) can be separate acts, from the ASEAN member States which 
created the international organisation. This regional law as to non-intervention is 
distinctive because it is made by the ASEAN organs. The regional law is not made by 
ASEAN States acting in their sovereign, individual capacities which is the focus of the 
IR literature.  
 
This study, then, is a legal examination of non-intervention with an ASEAN character, 
which is distinctive as regional law. This examination matters mainly because when 
we appraise ASEAN’s non-intervention practice as regional law, the strong influence 
of general international law as to non-intervention’s regional content is manifest. For 
example, we examined the regional character of the disaster management laws, 
created by ASEAN organs, which protected the management of “internal affairs” by 
affected States during a disaster – effectively providing a regional content to the rule 
of non-intervention.  
 
This example also underscores the roles of powerful external actors in shaping the 
general rules of international law. Such general rules of international law, in turn, form 
  
 
226 
 
both the analytical framework to identify regional law and also influence the content 
of regional law regarding non-intervention. In short, although there is an ASEAN 
regional practice of non-intervention, its legal content is shaped by general 
international law. In this respect, non-intervention’s legal content is much narrower 
when compared to the IR literature, which studies non-intervention as part of a 
diplomatic practice, i.e., the “ASEAN Way”. The IR literature does not (it does not 
need to) distinguish acts between individual ASEAN States from ASEAN member 
States, and there is consequently scant legal basis to identify the legal content of non-
intervention.  
 
Chapter Two builds on this position that ASEAN has capacity for regional law-making 
by examining how general international law sets the rules regarding international 
organisations: namely, its separate legal personality and ability to act separately from 
its member States. To this extent, this chapter explores how soft law coexists with 
binding legal sources such as treaties and custom. Consequently, the legal rules 
which arise, at general international law, permit international organisations (such as 
ASEAN) to make regional law. In other words, without the general rules of 
international law, there is no firm basis (i.e., an analytical framework) to identify and 
assess the distinctive regional law which is made by ASEAN: it would be difficult to 
assess the regional law of ASEAN as being legally distinct to the region of Southeast 
Asia.  
 
Having explained how international organisations (such as ASEAN) can make 
regional law, Chapter Three concentrates on one specific area and explains how its 
law is largely made through international organisations – non-intervention. This 
chapter gives a broad account of non-intervention’s unstable content at general 
international law. First, it discusses the influence of Vattel and Oppenheim on the 
present content of non-intervention. Second, the Latin American practice is explored 
to show its difference from, and similarities to, non-intervention’s present content 
today. Third, after decolonisation, the UN General Assembly’s numerous attempts to 
agree content as to non-intervention is examined. Particularly, Chapter Three shows 
how the Friendly Relations Declaration (1970) had no clear legal content as to non-
intervention. Finally, the ICJ’s catalytic role in creating non-intervention’s content with 
reference to the Friendly Relations Declaration in Nicaragua and DRC v Congo is 
examined.  
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The purpose of this broad account of non-intervention, over a period of time, is to 
demonstrate its unstable content at general international law. The key argument in 
Chapter Three is that this unstable content, a moving target, is part of general 
international law, which gives an influential and extensive basis for ASEAN to develop 
its own regional law of non-intervention. Therefore, Chapters One to Three 
progressively advanced the core proposition that an international organisation such 
as ASEAN can make distinctive regional law, i.e., non-intervention, precisely because 
of the basis which exist at general international law. Regional law exists because of 
general international law. Regional law, therefore, is continually shaped by the 
general rules of international law: its relationship with general international law is 
marked by dynamic tension.      
Chapter Four illustrates, through this study’s first case study, how ASEAN embraced 
this extensive basis at general international law to create a distinctive regional law of 
non-intervention, in its capacity as a separate legal person. During the Kampuchean 
conflict, ASEAN acted as a venue to manage a longstanding conflict between 
Kampuchea and Vietnam. This long conflict allowed ASEAN organs, the ASEAN 
Standing Committee and the AMM (i.e., ASEAN foreign ministers), to develop ASEAN 
practice regarding non-intervention. Importantly, the ASEAN organs’ conduct against 
Vietnam’s illegal occupation of Kampuchea was acquiesced to by ASEAN member 
States.  
This acquiescence matters because the ASEAN member States confirmed the 
ASEAN organs’ functions, under the Bangkok Declaration (1967), in maintaining 
regional peace and security which was endangered by Vietnam’s actions in 
Kampuchea. The developments in Kampuchea involved the participation of powerful 
external actors (China, the Soviet Union, and United States) in the international 
politics of Southeast Asia. The regional distinctiveness of ASEAN’s practice regarding 
non-intervention is illustrated through ASEAN’s recognition of the CGDK. Non-
intervention protects even morally vile governments such as the Khmer Rouge: it 
prohibits the illegal change of governments. In other words, this is the distinctively 
regional core of non-intervention, a fairly precise rule, which arose from the conduct 
of ASEAN organs during the Kampuchean conflict.  
The regional rule as to non-intervention forms, it is argued, a code of conduct which 
is a subsequent practice to Articles 2(c) and 10, TAC. Notably, the regional content 
of this rule with an ASEAN character is repeatedly endorsed by ASEAN as a key code 
of conduct, in accordance with the TAC for conducting intramural relations in 
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Southeast Asia.1 Significantly, the potential legal effect of this regional law regarding 
non-intervention is indirectly acknowledged by Australia and the United States, in their 
interpretative declarations to Article 10, TAC, on their accession to the TAC.  
Chapter Five shows, through a second case study, how general international law 
continues to shape ASEAN’s making of a distinct regional law of non-intervention. 
This argument is instanced through two phases of ASEAN practice in relation to 
Myanmar. First, after the Depayin incident (2003), ASEAN requested democratic 
governance as a condition of changes to Myanmar’s internal political governance. A 
specific (and notable) request was that Aung San Suu Kyi had to play some part in 
these internal changes.  
The distinctiveness of non-intervention’s regional content is reflected in ASEAN’s 
statements that democracy is now part of its conduct of external relations with other 
international legal persons. It is distinctive with a regional character because we 
should compare this with ASEAN’s previous practice against Vietnam for 
overthrowing the Khmer Rouge government. Thus the extent of ASEAN’s intention to 
limit non-intervention’s regional content is evident in its persuading Myanmar to forfeit 
its chairmanship of ASEAN in 2005, because it had not satisfied the minimum level 
of democratic governance.  
Second, during cyclone Nargis, the law-making by ASEAN in the form of ERAT and 
the TCG further suggested the waning of non-intervention’s regional content. Through 
AADMER,2 the regional rules for facilitating humanitarian assistance justified 
ASEAN’s actions inside Myanmar. Indeed, the AMM’s statements during cyclone 
Nargis made it clear that Myanmar’s acceptance of humanitarian assistance, through 
ASEAN-led mechanisms like the ERAT and TCG, formed part of its membership 
obligations.  
This discussion of the two phases of ASEAN’s practice with respect to Myanmar 
serves to show the changes to its regional law-making of non-intervention’s content. 
To demonstrate the influence of general international law that potentially encroaches 
onto ASEAN’s regional content regarding on-intervention, Chapter Five’s final part 
highlighted the dynamic tension between general and regional international law by 
exploring the implications, which potentially arise from the ILC’s progressive rules on 
protecting persons during disasters.  
                                                            
1
 For a recent iteration, see Para 23, Chairman’s Statement, 31st ASEAN Summit (13 November 2017), 
available at: <http://asean.org/storage/2017/11/final-chairman’s-statement-of-31st-asean-summit.pdf>.  
2
 I.e., ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response.  
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The ILC is part of the UN, a unique international organisation with some law-making 
powers. It is this context that the ILC’s non-binding work on protecting persons during 
disasters might intrude onto ASEAN’s operationally focused approach during 
disasters. Whereas the AADMER and the extant ASEAN practice are focused on 
giving technical assistance to a requesting State, the ILC’s work contains a human 
rights approach: it self-consciously proposes (new) general rules of international law 
regarding disaster management.  
II. Implications of this Study  
 
In future, with respect to ASEAN’s content of non-intervention, regional law and 
general international law will likely converge. This study’s core proposition offers an 
analytical framework to determine which are the “proper” acts of regional law-making 
by ASEAN organs, and how far general rules of international law encroaches onto 
the distinctiveness of regional law-making by ASEAN.  
As illustrated in the case study regarding protection of persons during disasters, non-
intervention’s content, as regional international law, has already waned. In other 
words, general international law exerts strong and persistent influence in relation to 
non-intervention’s content as regional law.3 Importantly, these general rules, which 
influenced regional law-making by ASEAN, were either created a long time ago or 
were developed outside the region of Southeast Asia.  
In this respect, as explained already, Southeast Asia is an area which was 
constructed by external actors including through the Anglo-Dutch Treaty (1824).4 
Furthermore, in Chapters Four and Five, I also discussed the role of the United States 
in  shaping the regional law-making of non-intervention during the Kampuchean 
conflict.  In short, powerful external actors have always played a key role in Southeast 
Asia.  
Today this active role of powerful external actors in shaping the international politics 
of Southeast Asia remains unchanged. What is changing is the rise of a particular 
external actor – China.  China will play an unquestioned role in shaping general 
international law that apply to all States, including those located in Southeast Asia. 
Its role will likely replace the influence of certain western States.5  
                                                            
3
 Generally see Michael Byers, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules (International Relations and 
Customary International Law), (Cambridge: CUP, 1999).  
4
 See Chapter Two, Part V.  
5
 See President Xi Jinping’s Report at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 18 
October 2017 (决胜全面建成小康社会夺取新时代中国特色社会主义伟大胜利); an English transcript is 
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Significantly, its undeniable status in international relations, and its proximity to 
Southeast Asia, will exert powerful consequences for regional law-making of non-
intervention by ASEAN.  In future, it is likely that ASEAN (organs) will be unable to 
agree and make regional laws readily, which collectively involve the peace and 
security of Southeast Asia.  
This is because (some) ASEAN member States, through their representatives at 
ASEAN organs, will prevent collective positions with law-making effects from being 
made by ASEAN organs. At the highest levels of the ASEAN Summit and AMM, there 
are already indications that ASEAN organs have difficulties agreeing joint 
communiques which involve the South China Sea.6 This is likely to continue in future, 
as specific ASEAN member States start to align themselves more with China.  
Over time, therefore, China’s interests with respect to Southeast Asia may come to 
resemble the Monroe Doctrine.7 In other words, Southeast Asia is deemed by China 
to form part of its “domestic space”.8 To this extent, China has been moderately 
successful in persuading specific Southeast Asian States (who are also ASEAN 
member States) that their individual interests are best served on a bilateral basis, and 
not conducted by ASEAN through its organs.9 The Belt-and-Road initiative, a large 
scale multilateral trade project, will complement China’s approach in this respect.10  
Lately and particularly, China has started an ambitious initiative, i.e., the Lancang-
Mekong Cooperation (LMC), which involves five Southeast Asian States who are 
located at the Mekong sub-region: Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia and 
Vietnam, all of them are also ASEAN member States. The LMC is a new, Chinese-
                                                            
available at 
<http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Xi_Jinping's_report_at_19th_CPC_National_Congress.p
df>. 
6
 See “Asean Nations Fail to Reach Agreement on South China Sea, BBC News (13 July 2012), available 
at  <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-18825148>.  
7
 Generally see “Why Cambodia has Cosied up to China (and Why it Worries Cambodia’s Neighbours)”, 
The Economist, 21 January 2017; Ja Ian Chong, “Singapore’s Foreign Policy at a Juncture”, East Asia 
Forum, 21 November 2017; see further Chapter Three, Section IV.  
8
 Kerry Brown, “China: The Shadow Power for a Shadow Age”, The Diplomat (24 April 2018), available 
at <https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/china-the-shadow-power-for-a-shadow-age/>.  
9
 For a recent example, see Charlotte Gao, “Chinese Premier: China-Philippines Relations as Warm as 
Manila’s Weather”, The Diplomat (16 November 2017), available at 
<https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/chinese-premier-china-philippines-relations-as-warm-as-manilas-
weather/>.  
10
 See Xi Jinping’s speech (n5): “China will actively promote international cooperation through the Belt 
and Road Initiative. In doing so, we hope to achieve policy, infrastructure, trade, financial, and people-
to-people connectivity and thus build a new platform for international cooperation to create new drivers 
of shared development”, at 58.  
Development”; generally also see Linda Low, “China’s Belt-and-Road Initiative: Future Bonanza or 
Nightmare?”, S Rajaratnam School of International Studies Commentaries (29 March 2018), available 
at <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/co18058-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-future-
bonanza-or-nightmare/#.Wscm-enVx9A>.   
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led, Southeast Asian cooperative arrangement whose goals are contextualised within 
the Belt-and-Road initiative, which contains investments opportunities, concessional 
loans and aid by China to its participants.11  
In short, it would be increasingly hard for ASEAN organs to agree a common position 
as to non-intervention’s content. ASEAN cannot prevent China from using its material 
resources to influence the foreign policies of certain ASEAN member States, in aid of 
a favourable outcome to China’s interests around the South China Sea.  It is true that 
there are already indications various States, including ASEAN States, have begun to 
resist China’s attempts to assert itself.12 Therefore, China may not succeed in getting 
its way, on every issue, with every ASEAN State in Southeast Asia on over time.13  
But this development must be examined against a bigger reality: the peace and 
security of Southeast Asia is no longer just a matter for ASEAN. This is inevitable 
because of the region’s proximity to China. Southeast Asia’s development is now part 
of China’s broader interests because of the implications for China’s internal plans to 
be a “great modern Socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally 
advanced, harmonious, and beautiful.”14  
The United States, as the only other major power with resources to conduct 
meaningful international relations in Southeast Asia, will likely struggle to assert its 
control. This is not just because the United States is far away from Southeast Asia. It 
is partly because the United States’ democratic system will produce governments 
whose focus on Southeast Asia will wax and wane. China, through the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP), has the apparent advantage of a cohesive and persistent 
foreign policy towards ASEAN.     
Against this wider context, ASEAN would still make a regional law of non-intervention 
which is shaped by general rules of international law. The dynamic tension, then, 
between general and regional international law subsists. However, what is changing 
now is the role and resolve of China as a Great Power to shape general international 
law for all States. Because of China’s proximity to Southeast Asia, which contains 
member States who form ASEAN, the close relationship between regional law (by 
ASEAN) and general international law (influenced by China) will probably converge.   
                                                            
11
 Generally see Nguyen Khac Giang, “China is Making Mekong Friends”, East Asia Forum, 19 May 
2018.  
12
 Generally see Yoon Sukjoon, “Xi Jinping's “True Maritime Power” and ESCS Issues”, (2014) 13 
Chinese Journal of International Law 887.  
13
 Generally see Low, n10.  
14
 See Xi Jinping’s speech n5, at 10-11.  
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It bears stressing that ASEAN was created, partly by general international law, which 
consequently affirmed the reality of Southeast Asia as a region with common values. 
This was partially achieved through the distinctive regional law-making of non-
intervention by ASEAN organs. However, China’s role, as a Great Power and thus a 
powerful external actor, will likely challenge ASEAN’s ability and willingness to make 
regional law because it would be harder to agree common positions in future.  
When this happens, regional law will still be distinctive on a narrower basis, but likely 
because some ASEAN member States would not identify themselves as belonging to 
Southeast Asia anymore. The establishment of an analytical framework in this study, 
on which acts of ASEAN organs can be assessed, might allow us to appraise the 
prospects of a “smaller” Southeast Asia, and a long period of uncertainty for ASEAN.  
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